


















This book was first published under the title “Monopole, Kartelle und Trusts” by
Gustav Fischer, Jena, in 1909. I owe my thanks to Messrs. Fischer for giving their
consent to its translation.
To My Friend
Sir Hugh Bell, Bart
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This book was written and more especially translated in the hope of offering to
Englishmen interested in the economic problems of their country, some account of
its present industrial organisation. That organisation is characterised by monopolist
tendencies which run counter to the hitherto prevailing regime of free competition.
In England, the pioneer in economic history of competition, this development should
excite the greatest interest; yet it is in England of all countries that the least
recognition has been given to the economic importance of this new form of industry.
The present work attempts to explain the existing organisation of English industry
by a study of the history of monopoly and competition, and at the same time to give
an analysis of English cartels and trusts as they now are. I have tried to approach my
subject without parti pris, and solely to describe and analyse. As I regard the
historical alternation of monopoly and competition as an economic necessity which
dogmas and evaluations unavoidably coloured by contemporary prejudice cannot
affect, I have no personal bias to discount. It is, however, the duty of science to show
what facts give or have given rise to these two systems of industrial economy
respectively, and though itself without ulterior motive to assist those who wish to be
guided by knowledge in the attainment of their objects.
I should be grateful for any corrections on points which I have misunderstood or
treated insufficiently; and I must in conclusion express my warmest thanks to my
translator. To his energetic and intelligent assistance the appearance of this book in
English is primarily due.
Hermann Levy.
Heidelberg, April 1911.
I have no intention of writing a preface summarising the main ideas of the
following enquiry. I should like, however, to explain shortly how the material was
collected, on which my account of former and existing monopolies and my
theoretical conclusions are based. I owe very much to the excellent work of various
English economic historians, and most of the facts used in treating of existing
monopolist associations to Mr. Macrosty’s very instructive book. For Parts I and III
of my essay there were many previous books, both general works and monographs,
from which I could gather useful facts and hints and which suggested promising lines
of enquiry; but for Part II. I found practically no precursor. The laborious pioneer
work of extracting details of former English monopolist associations out of
long-forgotten Parliamentary Reports was, however, lightened by the delight of being
one of the first in the field.
It was, of course, necessary to spend a considerable time in England. For some
years the British Museum and the Patent Office were my headquarters during my
holidays. The library of the former provided me with the historical information I
needed, and the trade papers preserved in the latter explained to me the present day.
For investigation into English industrial conditions the examination of these papers
is especially necessary.
We in Germany, if only by reason of the number of theses produced, possess a large
collection of more or less useful studies of particular industries, but in England such
things only exist, if at all, in the case of the main industries. It is extraordinary that
there are no monographs on the economic position of such things as iron and salt
mining, the cement trade, industrial spirit and whisky distilling, the tobacco trade or
engine making. The enquirer must turn to trade papers for information on their
economic or technical position, their geographical connections or their finances. To
these I added prospectuses of large undertakings — often very instructive material
for my purposes — and reports of important events in the Commercial and Financial
Supplement of the Times, the Financial Times, the Manchester Guardian, and that
admirable paper, the Economist. But such a collection, taken mostly from newspapers
and interested parties, could not, of course, be used without considerable scientific
caution, and required to be interpreted in the light of personal statements, of criticism
from the opposing interests and of explanations from the leaders of the industries in
question.
I cannot sufficiently acknowledge the assistance I have received from all kinds ofHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 6
persons, many of them friends gained at the time of my studies in rural economy who
were also connected with urban industries. For valuable information as to the steel
and iron trade, I have particularly to thank Sir Hugh Bell and the editor of the Iron
and Coal Trades’ Review, Mr. Jeans; for the paper trade, Mr. Dykes Spicer, Sir
Albert Spicer, and Lord Northcliffe; for tobacco, Mr. A. C. Churchman; for the salt
and soda industries, Sir A. Mond, M.P.; for the tinplate trade, Lord Glantawe; for
coal mining, Mr. D. A. Thomas, M.P. My attempts to gain information even of the
most elementary kind from the directors of large textile undertakings generally failed,
and I cannot help feeling that the leaders of these monopolist associations desire to
avoid discussion. I am the more grateful to Mr. W. B. Morison, of the London Stock
Exchange, for placing his great experience of the textile industry and its
combinations at my disposal. My investigations led almost continually to
comparisons between English conditions and tendencies with those of German and
American monopolies, and I derived much help from the results of my former visits
to America.
In conclusion I would draw attention to the Appendices, in which I have included
certain documents which I could not quote in sufficient detail in the text and to which
I would particularly direct the reader. More especially would I recommend even those
who are otherwise unwilling to spend time in studying appendices to read Lord
Furness’s speech. It is a most excellent illustration of that movement towards the
concentration and combination of large industrial undertakings which has led many
English industries towards new organisation on a monopolist basis, and which will






When the Industrial Revolution began in the second half of the eighteenth century,
the organisation of English industry was better prepared for an advance than that of
any other European state. It is true that, as elsewhere, industrial undertakings found
their freedom of movement restricted by the survival, partly in law and partly in
custom, of the gild system; but much as these restrictions were opposed to the
interests of large capitalist industries, they could not repress the many enterprising
spirits who were eager to use to the full the new developments of trade. Long before
the actual repeal of the Statute of Apprentices and other gild regulations completed
the freedom of English industry, the way had become open even within the bounds
of industrial capitalism for individual activity and mutual competition. In other
countries the productive activities of single economic units were limited not merely
by the demands of the gild system, but in the majority of cases, even after that
difficulty had been overcome, by privileges, concessions, monopolies and the official
regulation of capitalist manufacture, which united to make individual operations
difficult and often impossible.
In England also, at the time when industrial capitalism commenced, the system of
granting privileges to particular persons prevented the growth of competition among
many who were both willing and fitted to be leaders of industry. Only when that
system, which gave advantages to the few at the cost of all the rest fell after
prolonged struggles at the end of the seventeenth century, did that most important
factor in modern freedom of industry, the abolition of all legal recognition of private
monopolies, come into play. Nearly a century later a new technical and economic
movement began, but the significance in this connection of the earlier won industrial
freedom was not observed by the English economists. They regarded the free play of
competition as a natural phenomenon in capitalist industry, and the unsophisticated
reader might well imagine from their writings that no other system had ever existed
since the rise of capitalism. The more this earlier triumph of free industry was taken
as a matter of course, the more content economists were to apply the expression
“freedom of industry” solely to the delivery of industry from the fetters of the gild
regulations. As a result classical economy and its pupils never examined the
liberation of English industry from the rule of monopoly in all its bearings, nor gaveHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 9
it its true importance in economic history.
It is only now that in all countries, including England, a new form of monopoly is
beginning to arise in industry, that attention is directed to the monopolies which saw
the birth of early capitalism, and whose fall was the necessary preliminary of that
epoch of free competition, which in its turn appears to be inevitably coming to an end
through the action of cartels and trusts.
The period which can be marked out in the early history of English industrial
capitalism as predominantly that of monopoly lasts from the end of the sixteenth
century to about 1685. Not that trade monopolies were unknown before that time; on
the contrary they were very common. What made the monopolies of the time of
Elizabeth, James I and Charles I appear in many ways something new, was that they
bore a purely capitalistic impress, and perhaps for this very reason represented
national industrial organisations in contradistinction to the former trade monopolies
1
of the gilds which were of purely local importance.
The period starts with the rapid economic expansion at the end of the sixteenth
century. During the reign of Queen Elizabeth, and even more in the first ten years of
the seventeenth century, a great number of new industries were introduced into
England partly by foreigners and partly by Englishmen.
2 The majority were from the
beginning of a capitalistic character, and far removed from the domestic handicraft.
The adventurers consisted in most cases of well-to-do foreigners acquainted with the
new industries, native merchants or rich courtiers, and the amounts invested were
often not inconsiderable even in comparison with modern times. The four capitalists
who undertook the working of the Yorkshire alum deposits in 1607 put £20,000 to
£30,000 into this undertaking within a short period. In 1612 it was estimated that any
one of the six existing companies employed 60 hired labourers, not counting foremen
and their assistants or the necessary mechanics. The total expenses of such a
company were put at about £2100 yearly.
3
Salt mining and the glass industry were also organised from the beginning on a
capitalist basis.
4 The last — if we neglect primitive beginnings — first became
important in 1619, when Sir Robert Mansell started to erect glass works in
Newcastle, which still survived till about 1855. He undertook to make a yearly
payment of £1000 to the Crown.
5 That he employed 4000 men is, no doubt, an
exaggeration,
6 but it is clear that the whole enterprise was of a purely capitalist
character. Soap was another industry introduced in the time of Elizabeth, althoughHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 10
the novelty in this case consisted chiefly in the adoption of an improved process of
manufacture, which, it was hoped, would make England largely independent of
imports.
7 As early as the first half of the seventeenth century soap boiling was no
longer reckoned as one of the crafts which came under Elizabeth’s Statute of
Apprentices, but was “an art of mystery,”
8 which any free burgess, knowing the
process and possessed of the necessary resources, might practise. In the middle of the
eighteenth century a considerable sum, relatively speaking, was considered necessary,
according to trustworthy evidence, for the initial capital of each concern, the work
being done by “Labourers” and “Foremen,” no longer by Journeymen.
9 There is no
doubt that as early as the seventeenth century the manufacture of soap, where not
carried out in private houses, was organised in a capitalist fashion. The Company of
Soapmakers of Westminster incorporated in 1631 was prepared to deliver wholesale,
and promised the Crown to supply 5000 tons of soap yearly. When the business was
transferred in 1639 to another company the latter paid for plant and material a
purchase price of £20,050.
10
As a last example of the new capitalist organisation we may take the wire industry.
While in Germany wiredrawing mills driven mechanically were introduced as early
as the first half of the fourteenth century,
11 the use of water power for drawing wire
was first brought into England by a German in the second half of the sixteenth
century. Till then, though the wire industry was practised as a craft in various parts
of England, and especially in he Forest of Dean, the main supply, both of wire and
carding wire, had to be imported. On the introduction of the new process a large
capitalist factory arose at Tintern, of which we are told that it often produced more
in the year than it could dispose of in England. When leased in 1592 the factory
commanded a rental of £1000 a year, and employed workmen who received as much
as £80 a year in wages, and were attracted from a distance, besides “many thousand
poor” who found employment in the works of the company incorporated in 1568. On
the other hand the finishing processes remained in the hands of craftsmen, who drew
their raw material from the capitalist factories.
12 
Contemporary mining shows another group of capitalist undertakings. At the end
of the sixteenth century Cornish tin mining was in an unfavourable position; many
works had come to a standstill owing to the increasing cost of working in deeper
levels;
13 and the introduction of pumping machinery had become an essential
preliminary to any increase of production. Presumably to bring the capital necessaryHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 11
for this purpose into the mining industry, Queen Elizabeth conceded her royal mining
rights to a number of capitalists, a policy continued by the English kings until 1643.
14
As a consequence the producers, hitherto independent miners and smelters, became
economically dependent on capitalists. In 1630 Judge Doderidge complains that “the
mine workers in respect of their poor Estate are eaten out by the hard and usurious
contracts for tin”
15 (a state of affairs exactly parallel to the conditions ruling as early
as the sixteenth century in German tin mining),
16 “as those poor labourers being not
able to maintain themselves and their families ... are by necessity compelled for a
small sum of money to enter bonds with the said regraters of tin, in value much more
than the money they had received from them.”
The persons here called “mine-workers” must, it is true, be still regarded as
formally independent, in spite of their name, as they produced their tin at their own
cost and risk. But in reality they were nothing but the instruments of their capitalist
purveyors, who sold to the “labouring tinners” at extortionate prices the necessary
mining materials, receiving payment in tin at far beneath its market value.
17 Further,
the smelters were compelled to have recourse to advances from capitalists
18 by the
provisions of the law as to sales, which only allowed tin to be delivered twice a year,
at Midsummer and Michaelmas.
19 On the other hand the producers, thus dependent
on capitalist assistance, were in their turn employers, for the great mass of those
employed in tin mining were ordinary labourers. As early as 1601 Sir Walter Raleigh,
who knew tin mining well, spoke of the “poor workmen” who formerly received 2
shillings a week, but now 4 shillings.
20 A document of about the same time states
21
that “the most part of the workers of the black tin are very poor men, and, no doubt,
that occupation can never make them rich ... for they have no profit of their tin if they
be hired men, for their masters have the tin.”
The need of capital, therefore, brought with it a triple classification of the persons
concerned in the industry — first, the capitalist trader; secondly, the producer or
working master without resources of his own and drawing all his supplies from the
capitalist; and lastly, the labourer he employed.
22 During the seventeenth century the
state of affairs so far changed that the capitalists became themselves “adventuring
tinners” working their own mines, and further, had an interest “in most of the
smelting-houses, which they either managed themselves or leased to poor smelters.”
23
In this way there arose in tin mining after 1600 a class of capitalists who appeared on
the one hand as traders under the name of “merchants,” supplying independentHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 12
working masters, and on the other hand gradually became themselves “masters,” and
laid aside the disguise of mere traders. The final stage of this development was
reached when the London merchants’ agents, who had formerly disposed of the tin
to the finishers, were gradually extinguished, and the capitalist smelters took over the
tin trade and sent their orders direct from London.
24 According to the statements of
Mr. Lewis this system is still in vogue.
The most important factor in the early English industrial capitalism was, however,
the development of North of England coal. The first authentic records go back to
1213.
25 About 1246 coal from the Newcastle district received the name ‘sea coal,’
which proves that already in those days it was carried by sea. From the end of the
sixteenth century its hold on the more distant markets, more especially on London
and the neighbourhood, continually increased. While, according to Harrison, export
coals “had first taken up their innes in the greatest merchants’ parlours” in 1577,
26
about 1640–50 an increase in the price of coal was already considered a great injury
to the poor.
27 Originally only irregular shipments, the export of coal to France had so
developed by 1552 that “France can lyve no more withoute” English coal “than the
fische withoute water”;
28 and in the days of Elizabeth the trade thus rapidly rising to
importance was used for revenue purposes by the introduction of an export duty on
coal.
29 But the chief increase in shipments took place in the seventeenth century.
30
The numerous statistics and figures of production given in various documents of the
time appear on inspection so contradictory that they are not worth much, especially
in view of the often uncertain details of weight. But it is a certain fact that the annual
coasting trade was estimated in 1663 for revenue purposes at 160,000 chaldrons, or
about 450,000 tons;
31 and according to an official return in 1871 the entire coal
production of England in 1660 was about 2 million tons.
32 The statistics concerning
the means of sea transport for coal are also striking. A single ship had a carrying
capacity in 1421 of about 20 chaldrons (1 chaldron = about 2.6 tons), in 1653 six or
seven times that amount was given as the average cargo.
33 In 1676 Sir William Petty
put the tonnage of the vessels employed in the Newcastle coal carrying trade at
80,000 tons, and stated that it had increased fourfold in the last forty years.
34
As the outlet for North England coal in more distant markets increased, coal mining
acquired the impress of a large capitalist undertaking. The Elswick mine, one of the
most important, originally let by the Abbey of Tynemouth
35 in 1330 for a rent of £5
a year, brought in 200 years later only £20, but in 1538 £50. In 1582 Queen ElizabethHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 13
leased the manors of Gateshead and Wickham, which were rich in coal deposits, for
£90 a year, and shortly afterwards transferred her lease to the town of Newcastle for
a payment of £12,000.
36 The yearly output of a number of collieries on the river Wear
was valued in 1644, a year, it is true, of dear coal, at £3000.
37
The great attraction which coal mines had for capitalists — often to their undoing
— is shown by the following description by Gray in the year 1649.
38 “South
Gentlemen have, upon great hope of profit, come into this Country to hazard their
monies in Coale Pits. Master Beaumont, a Gentleman of great ingenuity and rare
parts, adventured into our mines with his thirty thousand pounds; who brought with
him many rare Engines, not known then in these parts, as the best to boore with, Iron
Roddes to try the deepnesse and thicknesse of the Coale, rare Engines to draw water
out of the Pits, to the Staithes, to the River, etc. Within few years he consumed all his
money and rode home upon his Light Horse.” The conditions of work at this time
also show an entirely capitalist organisation. Gray relates that many thousand people
were engaged in the coal trade, and that a single employer had 500 to 1000 persons
“in his works.” And in 1662, 2000 miners sent a petition to Parliament complaining
of the injustice of their employers. At the beginning of the eighteenth century several
hundred people were employed in single collieries.
39 When it is remembered that in
1754 the entire production of the Grafschaft Mark was only 35,000 tons, the number
of miners 699, and each mine employed under seven men,
40 the very advanced state
of coal mining in the North of England as early as the seventeenth century, both in
the quantity of its production and in its capitalist system of management, becomes
even clearer.
Finally a large number of handicrafts were in the sixteenth century, and still more
throughout the seventeenth century, financed by capitalists,
41 and so gradually
converted into capitalist industries. The extremely complicated process by which
independent craftsmen came gradually into “indirect dependence on capital”
42 has
been recently reconstructed with excellent illustrations from authorities by Mr.
George Unwin. Traders in foreign goods, oversea merchants, and middlemen formed
a new class of capitalists, which by its command of money gained the mastery over
the craftsmen. Even at the beginning of the sixteenth century the Haberdashers, then
still chiefly dealers in fine goods from abroad, employed a large number of London
craftsmen, who are said to have been in the most pitiable condition; while well-to-do
masters also assumed the part of capitalists and pressed on the small masters, whoHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 14
were crushed out — for instance, in felt-making and cloth weaving — between the
capitalist masters on the one side and the simple journeymen and labourers on the
other. For a long while the small masters sought to maintain their independence
against the capitalists, partly by trying through an organisation of their own — the
yeomanry organisation — to win a place in the old corporations now gradually falling
more and more under the sway of the capitalist masters, and partly by striving to
create a corporation of their own. The craftsmen also made attempts by combined
action to emancipate themselves from the capitalists. The feltmakers collected £5000
in 1611 to make themselves independent of middlemen in the purchase of raw
material, and to prevent themselves being compelled by financial needs to cut prices.
But this organisation — a kind of limited company — only lasted three years. In the
middle of the seventeenth century there was a deep gulf fixed between the small
masters and their richer brethren, with whom they had united in the “Project” against
the capitalist middlemen. On the one side stood the rich felt-makers, many of whom
employed “ten, twenty, or thirty persons and upwards in picking and carding wool,
and preparing it for use, besides journeymen and apprentices.” They had freed
themselves from middlemen and become themselves capitalists. On the other side
were the small masters, still dependent as before on the capital of others and faced
with the certain fate of having to make way for the class of journeymen on daily
wages. Other corporations had similarly tried to maintain their independence with the
aid of co-operative undertakings and by attracting outside capital, and in every case
the plea of finding work for poor members had been to the fore. It was so in the case
of the horn-makers, the tin founders, and the cloth weavers, usually with the same
eventual result as with the felt-makers.
A valuable document of 1618 (State Papers Domestic, James I, vol. lxxi. 13, year
1615) gives us some information as regards the capitalist organisation of the cloth
trade at the beginning of the seventeenth century. It contained the following kinds of
traders:
1. The rich clothier, who bought his wool direct from the wool countries and made
his whole year’s provision beforehand, had it spun in the winter by his own
spinners, woven by his own weavers, and fulled by his own tuckers, all of
whom he paid “at the lowest rate for wages.”
2. The meaner clothier, who borrowed most of his wool “att the market,” employed
many “poor men,” sold his cloth, and then paid his old debt. “Of this sortHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 15
there are a great store that live well and growe riche and sett thousands on
worke.”
3. Clothiers who did not possess enough capital to buy wool in advance, but “doe
weekely buy their yarn in the market,” and make it into cloth and sell it
themselves. The yarn is made by “spinners” “who buy their woolle in very
small parcells,” and put yarns on the market every week, for which they
require the aid of chapmen.
4. Lastly, thousands of “poore people” who made coarse cloth “by theire great
Industry and Skill,” and were apparently in the same position as those named
under 3.
The entire classification shows the opposition between the large capitalist makers,
who provided themselves with raw materials and had them manufactured wholesale,
partly on a domestic system and partly in factories, and the small independent master,
who usually carried out only part of the process and relied on credit and middlemen.
This opposition, whose existence in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is described
by Prof. Ashley,
43 was permanently accentuated in the seventeenth,
44 though the
complete extinction of the small master did not occur till the Industrial Revolution,
with the rise of machinery and the final replacement of the domestic system of
industry by the factory.
45
The attempts of the small master by some kind of organisation to maintain himself
in the capitalist development of industry against those whom that development had
aggrandised must be considered to have been hopeless by the time of the Civil War.
By that time, wherever capitalism had introduced larger forms of industrial
organisation, the poorer master craftsmen were a moribund class of independent
producers who had no choice but to become day labourers.
46
Thus the general expansion of the trade, commerce and shipping of England in the
seventeenth century brought a new organisation in the most diverse branches of
industrial production. With the end of the sixteenth century, and then with every
decade of the seventeenth century, industrial capitalism extended, most markedly in
the industries newly introduced and in mining, slowly but steadily in trades till then
entirely carried on by craftsmen.
47 In many cases the decisive influence was the
extension of markets and the consequential increase in production. This in its turn
required a larger accumulation of fixed capital, as for instance in mining or where
increased machinery was required, and further necessitated the possession of capitalHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 16
by the manufacturer to enable him to obtain supplies of the necessary raw material
where wholesale purchases were profitable. In this way capitalism, either by
supporting small industrial units, as in the case of domestic capitalist industries, or
by building up large undertakings gained command over the most important English
industries of the time.
The special form of organisation which was characteristic of this early industrial




The legal foundation of monopoly rested on the grant by the Crown to individuals
or corporations of the sole right to carry on a given trade. Under Queen Elizabeth the
system of trade privileges, as is well known, grew rapidly. There was scarcely a
commodity which was not the object of a monopoly. On one occasion, when a long
series of concessions was recited in Parliament, a member exclaimed “Is not bread
in the number?” And to the astonished cries of “Bread!” he replied, “Yes, I assure
you, if affairs go on at this rate, we shall have bread reduced to a monopoly before
the next Parliament.”
48
Elizabeth had repeatedly to promise the abolition of monopolies,
49 and finally, in
1601, after a Parliamentary debate in which most of the speakers expressed in the
most unequivocal terms their exasperation with the existing privileges, a great
number of exclusive rights were in fact suppressed.
50 But the era of monopoly was
by no means ended thereby. The creation of grants, patents, etc., continued under
James I. and reached a new highwater mark between 1614 and 1621.
51 The reply to
this development was the well-known Anti-Monopoly Act of 1624.
52 The effect of
this Act, which is still of importance to English lawyers, has often been wrongly
estimated, so far as it concerned the actual creation of monopoly. M’Culloch, for
instance, was of opinion
53 that it had given freedom of trade to English industry. The
terms of the Act may no doubt have been inspired by doctrines akin to free trade, but
it would be a mistake to imagine that it abruptly terminated the existence of
monopolies, which, on the contrary, appear to have continued for decades afterwards
in spite of this express prohibition. The explanation is this. In the first place the Act
itself left a whole series of monopolies untouched, and secondly, it was divided into
two parts, one of which consisted of an emphatic condemnation of all monopolist
undertakings, while the other at the end of the statute (sections xii. xiv.) sanctioned
afresh certain important monopolies. As has been said, the entire statute is
characteristic of its creator, James I, the prince “with a head of gold and feet of clay.”
At the same time, the Act of 1624 would have greatly limited the power of
monopoly, had it not been frequently transgressed subsequently. Charles I’s claims
to rule without Parliament and to be financially independent of Parliament, drove himHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 18
to follow in the steps of his predecessors and to have recourse to the grant of patents.
For this purpose especial use was made of the clause of the statute (section ix) which
excepted civic corporations and companies from its provisions. It is true that
originally it was only permissible to set up a corporation of a monopolist character
within the area of a given town, and that in that town membership of such a
corporation might not be restricted without further formalities. But the enterprising
spirits who wished to conceal under such a corporation a national monopoly soon
found a way out. They obtained a grant by royal ordinance of the right of
“superintendence” over the whole national production, and finally a right to suppress
all outsiders. The traditional right of the free burgess, especially the free burgess of
London, to enter any company for the practice of his trade was similarly suppressed.
In this way the London Starchmakers’ Company, an undertaking managed by a few
capitalists, had already become a closed national monopoly even before the
Anti-Monopoly Act.
54 The Act made this method of founding a monopoly very
popular, and after 1624 numerous corporations arose with the express object of
forming national monopolies.
55
The provision of the Act (section vi) which allowed a fourteen years’ patent for
new discoveries opened up a further possibility or point of departure for the grant of
monopoly. Starting from this vantage ground the possessor of a patent could acquire
all kinds of privileges. He could be given a patent for his particular process and at the
same time the right “for the protection of his patent,” to keep watch on all other
producers, a measure which in practice led to the exercise of monopoly rights.
56 A
later writer even complains bitterly that this clause had been stretched to cover
imported goods, unknown to English manufacturers, so that anyone who promised
to produce such commodities in England could obtain protection against both foreign
and internal competition.
57 The use of the clause as to patents for purposes of
monopoly was so general that the word “patentee” meant in the period from 1630 to
1650 “monopolist.”
“The Monopolist and the Patentee 
Did joyne hand in hand as here you see”
is the legend under the frontispiece to an anti-monopolist pamphlet of 1642.
58 With
justice did a member of Parliament declare, in a debate in 1640:
59 “Better laws couldHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 19
not have been made than the Statute of Monopolies against Projectors; and yet, as if
the law had been the author of them, there have been during these few years more
monopolies and infringements of liberties than there have any year since the
Conquest.”
60
In view of the Elizabethan monopolies, the last statement seems somewhat
exaggerated, but the substance of the complaint is certainly true. The remarks of
speakers from all parties during the debate prove the existence of a profusion of
monopolists. The sarcastic speech of Sir John Colepepper in 1640 was famous. In
one passage he declares that “these, like the frogs of Egypt, have gotten possession
of our dwellings, and we have scarcely a room free from them. They sip in our cup;
they dip in our dish; they sit by our fire. We find them in the dye vat, the washing
bowl, and the powdering tub. They share with the butler in his bar. They have marked
and sealed us from head to foot. They will not bate us a pin.”
61
It must especially be remembered, in considering the effect of the Monopoly Act,
that the legal conditions in mining up till the end of the seventeenth century offered
in many ways great advantages for the creation of monopolies. The right of the
Crown to claim ownership of all mines in which silver and gold were found became
a means of monopolising copper, lead, and zinc mines. Since the time of Elizabeth
the Crown had exercised this contingent right, not without provoking many
lawsuits,
62 and it led to the formation of the great monopolies of that time.
63 No
radical alteration in the law was made till the time of William III, in 1689, when the
expression “mines royal” was unambiguously defined by a new law. “No mines of
Copper, Tin, Iron or Lead shall hereafter be adjudged, reputed or taken to be a mine
royal, although Gold and Silver may be extracted out of the same.”
64
Thus the mining rights in these metals were finally taken away from the Crown and
assured to the landowner, and in consequence the raison d’etre of the notorious
mining monopolies, the Mines Royal, Mineral and Battery Works, and the later
combination of these two, the Society of the Mines Royal,
65 was removed.
66 The right
of pre-emption of the Crown in the case of the tin mines in Cornwall and Devonshire
remained. But the abolition in principle of the mining monopoly was doubtless the
reason why the Crown made no further use of this method of creating a monopoly.
It was used once more in the reign of Queen Anne; but after 1717 vanished wholly
from the history of English mining.
67
The legal position reached at the end of the seventeenth century, therefore, noHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 20
longer put any obstacle in the way of free competition in the extraction of minerals.
In coal the ownership of the landowner had been the rule in most cases from time
immemorial. The law of 1689 put copper, tin, iron and lead in a similar position.
An exception remained in the so-called “free mining districts, “which were subject
to the royal rights of the Crown. Free mining existed, for the Crown merely received
dues and supervised the mine courts; but the mining villages had built up a
complicated system of principles and regulations which influenced in various
directions the organisation of each district. Generally speaking, no village in these
districts set up a monopolist system of mining. Of the five free mining districts
known to us, the Mendip Hills, Alston Moor, the tin districts in Devonshire and
Cornwall, some parts of Derbyshire and the Forest of Dean, only the last was
organised on the monopolist lines of a gild, while in all the others no special
limitations seem to have been set by the local mining authorities on the grant of
mining rights.
68 In the Forest of Dean, however, the Mine Law Court started after
about 1660 to attempt monopolist control over production and markets in all kinds
of ways — by attaching various conditions to the permission to mine as a “free
miner,” by fixing the prices, even by assigning definite prices to particular markets,
and trying to limit the production of individual miners.
69 In 1675, however, this
organisation seems to have been broken up by outsiders, who, in defiance of the
Court, but also without interference from it, began to mine “with the express purpose
of working against a coal monopoly. “These “foreigners,” as they were called, in
contradistinction to the “free miners, “ became more and more numerous, especially
when the Mine Court came to an end in 1777, and the “free miners” relinquished
their property more and more to strangers.
70 Still the possibility of monopoly lasted
longer here than elsewhere in English mining. The exception is, however, an
inconsiderable one. In the other free mining districts, especially in the tin mines of
Cornwall and Devon, there was no difficulty in acquiring mine concessions.
71 Mining
rights went with the ownership of the land, after the law of 1689 had finally settled
and brought into general use this legal principle.
In the same year took place the final repeal of another legal enactment of the
highest importance for the creation of monopolies. The claims of the Royal
Prerogative to dispense with the law, by which Prerogative the Crown had granted
monopolies over the head of Parliament by hair-splitting interpretations or even open
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number of existing monopolies had in all probability greatly decreased since about
1650 or 1660 — unfortunately we have no detailed record — the extinction of that
right showed that Parliament had henceforth the power to prevent all private trade
monopolies by means which could not legally be evaded. Only local monopolies
based on gild and corporation rights and having nothing in common with the great
national monopolies of the Tudor and early Stuarts could now exist, except where
Parliament by its own act otherwise ordained. Great capitalist monopolies such as we
have in view, controlling by legal privilege the entire national production of a given
branch of industry, were once and for all impossible. The Long Parliament in 1640
had declared most of the monopolies void, and thereby taken upon itself functions
in relation to the Crown for which it had no constitutional justification. After the
Restoration the Crown found itself similarly hindered
72 by the increasing power of
Parliament
73 in the exercise of its former custom of settling industrial questions on
its own initiative. This state of affairs received recognition in theory by the abolition
in 1689 of the Royal Prerogative, and the always latent
74 conflict between a Crown
inclined to befriend monopolists and a Parliament that was bitterly hostile to them
was thus finally decided in favour of the latter.
The legal conditions which were thus altered at the end of the seventeenth century
had for about a century largely determined the creation of monopolies in its general
aspect. But a number of other circumstances, such as the economic characteristics of
the industries concerned, the various trade regulations, and the manner, in which the
laws relating to the trade were administered had no less influence on the actual
development of the monopoly in individual cases. The forms of such monopolies
were very various. They differed from one another, owing to the differences and
permutations of the above and other circumstances, in structure, in the size of their
sphere of action, and in economic potency. No correct estimate of the actual
importance of the early monopolies in the economic life of the day can therefore be
gained without an examination of individual monopolies and their special
peculiarities.
Some of the most important, curiously overlooked by recent investigators,
75 are to
be found in mining, and especially in coal mining. Even without the aid of the law
the large consuming centres were limited for their supplies of mining products to
particular producing areas, which either because of the primitive means of transport
or from lack of any competing source of supply soon acquired a monopoly. London,Hermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 22
for instance, could only get coal or tin from Newcastle and Cornwall even when the
prices of those commodities rose very high. Clearly, if the exploitation of these
natural monopolies was further delivered over by legal concession to a few
individuals, or often to a single individual, a monopoly of unusual strength was
possible.
We first hear of monopolies in the coal mines of the north in 1590. Their history
is connected with the group of mines which, as has already been mentioned, belonged
originally to Queen Elizabeth, and was then transferred to the town of Newcastle.
The town made over its property to a company of free citizens called hostmen, and
this company gave its rights to eighteen or twenty of its members, who became coal
miners and coal merchants in combination.
76 This concentration of the coal trade in
a few hands much disturbed the London buyers, the more so as the price of coal rose
greatly between 1582 and 1590.
77 Rumours of a monopolist ring among northern coal
miners were in the air, and in 1590 the Lord Mayor of London made complaint to the
Treasurer Burleigh that the hostmen had “engrossed” the mines, and petitioned that
“all mines should be worked and a maximum price of seven shillings a chaldron
fixed.”
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No special privilege from the Crown had so far been necessary for the growth of
a monopolist organisation of production. But it by no means followed that there was
no desire for additional State protection. On the contrary, the stronger the agitation
of the consuming interests became, the more anxious the monopolists were to see
their organisation sanctioned by the Crown. After further complaints in 1597 against
the excessive coal prices,
79 hostmen seized a chance opportunity
80 to attempt to
obtain incorporation as a gild. The town of Newcastle had for a long while neglected
an obligation existing since the days of Henry V to pay a tax of 2d. a chaldron to the
Crown. Queen Elizabeth claimed the debt, and the town made her the following
proposal: the arrears to be struck off their debit account, and the queen further to
grant a gild patent to a “brotherhood, called the free hostmen, for the sale of every
kind of coal to the ships,” in return for which she should receive 12d. for every
chaldron of coal carried by sea. The queen accepted this proposal, and on 22nd
March, 1600, the aforesaid brotherhood became an incorporated gild. It was protected
by the gild statutes and its exclusive rights from any external competition. On the one
hand it had the monopoly of the most important mines; on the other it possessed the
sole right to sell coal to the ships which entered the River Tyne, and held in its handsHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 23
the entire export trade,
81 so that it could prevent the independent sale by possible
outsiders of any coal they might produce. It held, in fact, a right of pre-emption
sufficient to frighten off any competitor at the outset. The actual exercise of its rights
was assured by the fact that most of the members of the gild held public offices, were
free burgesses, and so on, and their influence served to maintain the gild’s rights and
privileges, and often to assert them by force. Accordingly we find the chief opponents
of the gild identifying the hostmen with the corporation of Newcastle, and attacking
the privileges of the town magistrates when their real objective is the gild patent and
its exclusive rights.
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But external protection by no means secured the internal harmony of the gild. That
had to be assured by ordinances limiting competition among the hostmen themselves.
That this step was taken immediately after the incorporation of the gild is proved by
the Gild Book of the coalowners in 1602. This book contains “An Ordinance and
Common Agreement for the Sale of Coal” among twenty-nine, or, counting partners,
twenty-four hostmen. These twenty-four, who were all coalowners,
83 were only a
small committee of the gild which had in 1600 forty-four members, but their
decisions were regarded as binding. Within this committee of the four and twenty
there were again four groups, each member of which might only sell a given amount
of coal, no member being allowed more than nine times the amount assigned to any
other member.
In other words, within each group the sale of coal was so regulated that the smallest
sale must be to the largest as 1 to 9.
84 This organisation was clearly an early attempt
to create a division of production, based on figures of participation.
This system continued unchanged under James I, though the complaints against its
control of the market had by no means ceased. We find in Gardiner
85 that about 1620
the Attorney-General filed a complaint in London against the town authorities of
Newcastle concerning the free hostmen, that, having all the selling of coal in their
hands, they compelled ships to take bad coal, and even delivered coal unfit for sale,
to the great harm of the people.
In spite of this, the Coal Gild received further express recognition of its privileges
by the Anti- Monopoly Act of 1624.
86 In 1638 Charles I again renewed its patent, and
decreed that it should be entitled to attach all coal exported by ship except through
it. Gardiner’s pamphlet, the origin of which we shall see later, proves that it
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producers is again and again the subject of comment. For instance,
87 “Gentlemen and
others in the counties of Northumberland and Durham are prohibited to sell their
coals to ships to be transported to London, and all owners of collieries are compelled
to sell their coals to them [the magistrates who were identical with the hostmen]. If
any shall presume to sell their coals immediately to the ships, they seize upon such
coals upon pretence that the owners of the coals are not free of their corporation....
Whereas if the owners of every colliery had free liberty to sell his coals to ships
immediately Tinmouth haven would afford two hundred thousand chaldrons of coal
in a year more than now are vented, which would reduce the late exorbitant rates of
coal in the city of London.”
This apparently refers to the outsiders put down by the Coal Gild, and in whose
interests Gardiner spoke. In the great petition laid before a Parliamentary Committee
in 1653 he again advocates the liberty of persons hindered by the gild.
88 The Bill
presented to Parliament by the committee in November in 1653 states:
89 “To the end
so useful a commodity as that of sea coal, wherein the poor of this commonwealth
are so principally concerned, may come cheaper to the market and the coalowners
may not be in a worse condition than the rest of the free people of this realm, be it
enacted and ordained that the said coalowners in the respective counties may and
have hereby liberty to let or lease of their coal pits and to sell their coals to whom
they please, as well to ships as elsewhere, for the benefit of the public. “This Bill,
drawn up after hearing evidence, and at the vigorous instigation of the chief witness,
Gardiner, never became law. Together with many other projects, it disappeared from
the scene on the dissolution of Parliament by Cromwell in 1653.
90 The scanty
documents which survive prove that in 1665 a coal gild no longer existed officially,
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therefore between that date and the time of the above Bill the abolition of the Coal
Gild’s monopoly must have taken place.
The monopolies in the tin mines in the south-west of England were very different
from those of the coal trade. In this case, as has been already remarked, monopoly
arose from the Crown’s right of pre-emption. At the end of Queen Elizabeth’s reign
this right was granted to private persons, and it remained the basis of the monopoly
almost without intermission down to the outbreak of the Civil War. The monopoly
was owned by capitalists. The capitalist form of the tin industry, as it appears at the
end of the sixteenth century, has already been described. The lack of necessary
capital had led to the dependence on the capitalist traders of the working mineHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 25
owners and smelters, who in their turn employed a number of dependent miners. This
process might have come about naturally, without the existence of a monopoly, but
the special effect of the latter was to concentrate in the hands of one or more
associated capitalists
92 the entire control of the trade capital, instead of leaving it as
at the end of the sixteenth century
93 in those of several capitalists.
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For some years the tin monopoly was owned by the London Pewterers. They had
“general supervision over the manufacture [of pewter] elsewhere in England,”
95 and
it seems quite intelligible therefore that they desired to be independent of the
monopolists for their supplies of the raw metal. The simplest way was to take over
the monopoly themselves. For that purpose it was necessary to have money, first to
acquire the privilege from the Crown, and secondly, because the existing monopolists
had made advances to the producers of tin and supplied all their needs, a practice
which the Pewterers would have to imitate if they intended to gain control over the
raw tin trade. The raising of this capital could not be shifted on to the Pewterers’
Company as a whole, because by no means all the members were rich enough to
contribute considerable sums. The only remaining alternative was for the rich
members to find the necessary funds. In 1615 twelve members of the company
subscribed £7000, to be used, together with £800 contributed by the company as a
body, to take over the monopoly for five years. Part of the tin thus acquired was
divided (at cost price, plus a certain surcharge) among the working members; the
remainder was used for the trade purposes of the richer members.
96 Thus the finishers
belonged at that time for the moment to those whom the monopoly profited instead
of to its victims. Their power was shown in the fixing of prices. It seems to have been
the policy of the monopolists to offer the tinners economically dependent on them a
fixed price, and to screw up the market price on the contrary as high as possible.
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The hold which they, as the financiers of the trade, had over the actual working
masters enabled them to limit the profits of the latter to the minimum. The effect of
this policy on the mining industry itself we shall have to describe later.
While the Crown was able to create a monopoly in tin mining by its right of
pre-emption, in the mines of the famous Forest of Dean where no such right existed
it adopted another course.
The district, like the stannaries of Devonshire and Cornwall, was one of the few
so-called “free mining” regions, in which by virtue of the royal rights of the Crown
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member of the mining community, was allowed to pursue the occupation of mining,
so long as he complied with the conditions fixed by the community. Under James I
this state of affairs was replaced by a special grant of the Crown rights. The Earl of
Pembroke obtained in 1612 the exclusive right to extract iron ore and coal in the
Forest of Dean. The free miners would not recognise this grant, and were allowed by
the Attorney-General to continue their occupation “as an act of grace and clemency,
and not of legal right”; the monopolist receiving a right of pre-emption over their
output, and no further increase in the number of free miners being allowed. This
monopoly was several times renewed. Under Charles I it was held by Sir John
Winter, whose privileges were later confirmed by Charles II Between 1660 and 1670
the earlier rights of the free miners seem to have once more flourished.
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Other minerals, the production of which was organised in a monopolist fashion,
were alum and salt. In contradistinction to coal and tin, these commodities were not
yet generally used in England, and required protection from foreign competition. The
output of salt in England was limited until 1670,
99 in which year salt mines were for
the first time worked, to the production of sea salt works. Attempts to develop the
trade in the time of Elizabeth had been frustrated by the importation of much better
and cheaper salt from Scotland, France, and Spain, which stifled English production.
Since the end of the sixteenth century monopolies for salt mining had been granted
to particular individuals.
100 They were among the most unpopular of monopolists, and
in the Anti-Monopoly Debate of 1601 it was asserted that they had in some places
increased the price of a bushel more than tenfold.
101 Elizabeth had to annul the grant,
and James I dared not renew it. It did not appear again until the time of Charles I.
Political reasons had in the years following 1620 reduced the imports of salt to the
advantage of the English producers, and when imports again commenced they
naturally sought to retain by artificial means the advantages which the Spanish war
had given them.
102
On the ground that “it would be a great benefit for the Kingdome of England and
that of Scotland to erect workes for the making of a sufficient quantity of salt and at
a certaine moderate price,”
103 the petitioners obtained (i) the prohibition of the
importation of salt from the continent, (ii) the incorporation of a company to conduct
the salt manufacture of the east coast from Southampton to Newcastle. Scotch
competition the Government sought to defeat by commanding producers in that
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Shields), on the ground that “a work of this nature should be under one rule and
government.”
104 The complaints of the consumers were loud. One of them in 1641
said: “A free trade that is now so much desired of the subject and a settled price
desired by the Patentee cannot consist, for a constant price forced upon a native
manufacture as a principall part of monopoly.”
105 According to Rogers’ calculation
the price of salt, about 13s. 4d. between 1630 and 1635, rose by 1640 to 27s. 4d.; in
particular a great difference in price existed between the sphere of the Salt Company
and places west of Southampton.
106 The trade was artificially retained by protection
and monopoly, although the conditions of production were immeasurably inferior to
those obtaining abroad; but it was only when rock salt was discovered that the
English salt trade really began to expand successfully.
In its general organisation the alum monopoly, which flourished from 1607 to
1648, resembled very closely the salt monopoly. For our present purposes it will be
enough to give its results as they are shown by the excellent investigations of Mr.
Price. Here again the industry was most unfavourably placed in England, and could
only be built up by the prohibition of imports and the grant of monopolies. As has
already been mentioned, very considerable sums, drawn from the pockets of
speculative monopolists, who followed one another in fairly quick succession, were
spent on its introduction.
The financial results of the “Alum Company” were extremely unsatisfactory, at
least for those who would not stoop to underhand practices. The supply sufficed
neither for the demand, which had to be met in part by smuggling, nor to cover the
costs of working. The average output of alum only amounted, for instance, between
1619 and 1624, to 313 tons a year, whereas to make the enterprise pay a production
of 2000 tons was required. Naturally in these circumstances prices were high, and
aroused discontent among the clothiers and dyers. The quality of the native product
was also considered lower.
107 None of all the monopolies of the seventeenth century,
whose nature and peculiarities are known to us, seem to have been more
disappointing, alike for producers, for consumers, and for the Crown, though its
effects from the economic point of view are not so serious as those of the monopolies
in more important commodities.
Glass was another of the monopolies existing in little developed branches of early
industrial capitalism. It lasted from 1574, when the Italian Versalini obtained a patent
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possession of a capitalist courtier, Sir Robert Mansell. As the main condition of his
patent was that coal was to be used for the furnaces and not wood, the existing glass
manufacturers, who, unlike him, worked with wood, were for Mansell troublesome
“outsiders.” On the ground that trees must be protected, he succeeded in securing the
prohibition of the use of wood in glass-making, in addition to getting various
obstructions and prohibitions imposed upon the importation of foreign goods. The
original patent thereby became practically a monopoly of the entire glass industry of
the country, and Mansell’s influence was so powerful that he even extorted the
exclusion of his monopoly from the provisions of the statute of 1624. The support of
the law was given to his privileges by the Privy Council with rigorous severity, and
the suppression of all outsiders who did not respect his rights was energetically
carried out. Mansell began glass-making on a grand scale at Newcastle, imported
many foreign workmen, and certainly put large sums of money into his enterprise.
But in 1642 the opponents of his monopoly, who accused it of producing high prices
and inferior goods, succeeded by the aid of Parliament in overthrowing it.
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The history of the salt, alum and glass monopolies, so far as their organisation and
growth are concerned, is very simple. In all three we find a new branch of industry
of an obviously risky nature, and therefore not particularly likely to arouse lively
competition. But in trades long known in the country, in which the power of the
monopolists could only be attained after hard struggles with the original producers
or afterwards with newly arisen “outsiders,” the history of the monopoly is very
different, and shows a series of dramatic catastrophes favouring now one side and
now the other. This is most clearly seen in the development of the soap monopoly.
Like so many other monopolies it started with the grant of a patent for a particular
process of manufacture. Such a patent was conceded as early as 1622 by James I to
two manufacturers, who were the proteges of a courtier. In 1631 several courtiers
took over this patent. They swore
109 among other things “ to make cheaper and better
soap than the soap makers of London “(about twenty citizens up till now the chief
manufacturers of soap). By promising the king a high royalty on their output they
obtained permission to establish themselves as “The Society of Soapmakers of
Westminster,” and further, the right of view of all soap not made by them. This
privilege enabled them to cheat the London Soapmakers, but not to overcome them.
They next tried to amalgamate with them, “but finding that notwithstanding all
endeavours their white soap would not vent according to their expectations, theyHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 29
laboured to draw the Soap Makers of London to joyne with them, using many
persuasions and promises of great profit.”
110 When this attempted Cartel failed,
another way was suggested, and efforts were made to gain the aid of the civic
authorities and the State.
In the presence of highly placed persons and of the Lord Mayor of London an
exhibition of washing was given, in which the Society’s soap was found to be better
than that of the old London Soapmakers. In vain the latter begged with promises
exceeding those of the Society for incorporation and the privileges of the
monopolists.
111 The influence of the monopolists was stronger. Besides the right of
search, they had obtained the prohibition of the importation of potash, thereby cutting
off their competitors from their supply of raw material, intending themselves, in
accordance with their process, to use only native material. A further royal
proclamation, forbidding the making of soap from anything but vegetable fats, dealt
a mortal blow to the London soap manufacturers who used train oil.
112 The rise of
new competitors was made subject to the discretion of the Star Chamber, and a
special ordinance passed “that outside a circle of one mile round London,
Westminster and Bristol” no soap might be made, and that the whole trade should
follow the regulations of the Westminster Company.
113
As the opponents of the monopolists did not scruple to break these regulations,
prosecutions and lawsuits followed. The result is described later in 1641 by a
somewhat partial author in these words:
114 “Many Citizens of London were put out
of an old trade in which they had been bred all their time and which was their only
livelihood, by Knights, Squires and Gentlemen, never bred up to the trade, upon
pretence of a Project and New Invention, which in truth was not so, their persecutions
of the Soap makers of London in the Star Chamber being beyond example in respect
of the manner of proceedings and of the sentence itselfe, who for using fish oyle and
not obeying their searchers, were fined at great summes, imprisoned at three several
times about twenty months, their goods extended, their Pannes, Fats etc. broken and
destroyed, their houses of a great yearly value made unuseful, their families dispersed
and necessitated and their estates almost ruined.”
The manufacture of soap by private persons for their own use was also forbidden.
But the most important concession gained by the monopolists was acquired in 1634.
Their soap was not favoured by the chief consumers, the dyers and wool-combers,
and they accordingly obtained the right to use train oil and to apply the old process,
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so that the original patent grew into a monopolist usurpation of the whole trade. A
mad policy of increasing prices resulted from this ever-growing monopoly, and
kindled the resentment of all consumers. Even the Crown joined in their complaints,
perhaps chiefly because the Company neglected to pay the promised royalties. A
proclamation of 1634 stated that soap formerly costing 2d. a pound had now risen to
from 6d. to 12d. a pound.
116
By 1640, however, the position was changed. The old soap-makers succeeded “in
buying their trade and their freedom” by promising the Crown larger yearly subsidies
than the “Projectors.”
117 They in their turn became a corporation, on the condition
that they would buy up the Westminster Company.
118 The original “outsiders”
succeeded, accordingly, to the rights of the adversaries they had so often fought. They
appear to have industriously studied the Company’s monopoly system in order to be
able to make use of it themselves. We hear that they petitioned for protection,
because “many persons did use the making of soap privately and secretly, carrying
the same to sale, even to the ruin of the Petitioners,” and that they eventually
obtained not only the exclusive right to sell soap, but also the exclusive right to
purchase potash, in order to paralyse the “outsiders” who were springing up against
them.
119 The complaints once so loud against the Westminster monopolists were now
re-echoed against those of London.
120 “These men will have no competitors in their
gains, they well knowing by experience how to taste a greater sweetnesse of gain than
the other sope-projectors, having for twenty years together gained much riches by
monopolising the Sope boyling mystery into 8 or 10 men’s hands, to the ruine of
many a family.”
Although the soap monopoly was one of the most unpopular, it succeeded, as Mr.
Price has shown,
121 in maintaining itself even in the anti-monopolist days of the
Commonwealth. The monopolists controlled, besides the district in which their
operations had commenced, the much contested market of London and Westminster,
also other important outlets like Bristol and York. When they were finally abolished
is unknown, but it is certain that they were still firmly established in 1657.
The monopolies so far described were created in industries whose capitalist
development had already commenced. Another not less important group is to be
found in the union of domestic producers of the artisan class with capitalist
entrepreneurs. We have already explained that after the end of the sixteenth century
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of the industrial producers into on the one side capitalist masters and entrepreneurs
and, on the other independent producers without capital either economically
dependent on capitalists or gradually sinking to the position of paid workman. For
about a century monopolies exercised an important influence on this development.
It is easy to understand that all who possessed sufficient capital to commence a
monopolist undertaking turned towards the craft corporations of the “small masters.”
They were already a monopoly, if at first only of a local kind, and the companies of
the then centre of trade, London, exercised an extensive influence on all the markets
of the country, or could attempt to obtain such an influence by royal ordinance. The
incorporation of crafts, though advocated and carried out in the interests of the “small
masters,” was also a means by which the capitalist could exploit trade on monopolist
lines. The poor craftsman was eager for incorporation, in which he saw protection
from further competition; though in fact it only gave the capitalists greater power and
control over his interests.
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It was, of course, also possible for the members of a corporation themselves to raise
capital by means of common contributions, with the assistance of the public and by
special calls on the richer gildsmen. This was, as we saw, in fact done by the
pewterers to secure a supply of raw material when the raw tin monopoly was bought.
The felt-makers of London adopted a similar system in 1611 to assist poor members
of the gild to purchase wool. Such measures, however, appear never to have had a
lasting success, owing to financial weakness. A far more successful device was for
one or two capitalists to finance the gild, and use the weight of their political
influence to obtain the grant of monopolist privileges.
A typical example of this form of organisation is to be found in the pin monopoly.
In 1605 the pin-makers became a special corporation. They had not sufficient capital
to meet the costs of incorporation, and accordingly they contracted with a courtier to
undertake the matter for them in return for a forty years’ subsidy on every 1200
finished pins. As a large number of pins were imported from Holland, the gild’s
monopoly was not yet complete. It was necessary to secure protection from foreign
competition. Once again capital was required. To obtain from the Government the
exclusion of foreign pins was costly, and the craftsmen who wished, after obtaining
such exclusion, to extend their production, required considerable sums of money at
their command to provide themselves with raw material. A second courtier, Sir
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and he became much more closely connected with the pin-makers than his
predecessor. In November 1616 he bought the latter out for £8000, and took over his
claims on the company. He then made an agreement with them, binding himself to
deliver to them the necessary raw material, wire, provided that they made over to him
at a fixed price all the pins they manufactured. Having thus taken to himself the
monopoly of pins, so far as London and the surrounding country was concerned, Sir
Thomas attempted to complete it by obtaining the sole right of import. This he
acquired in October 1618, though with limitations, which only secured him the
monopoly in London and its suburbs, and compelled him to promise a conservative
price policy — to use a modern expression. Owing, however, to the lax enforcement
of the prohibition of import, an important condition at the base of the agreement
between Bartlett and the pin-makers remained unfulfilled. The undertaking failed,
and after Bartlett’s death pinmaking remained free from such schemes until 1635.
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In that year the pin monopoly arose in a new form. The Company of Pin-makers
was re- incorporated and received two important privileges. Imports were strictly
forbidden in their favour, and all pin-makers throughout the kingdom were put under
the London Company.
124 The monopoly thus spread beyond local boundaries and was
secured in its operation by the company’s right of viewing, sealing, and regulating.
Its financial organisation was this time undertaken by a Mr. Lydsey, who attempted
in the interests of Bartlett’s heirs to regain the capital he had lost in the
undertaking.
125
A scheme prepared in 1639 and 1640 in connection with the pin monopoly gives
a good example of the operations which the monopolists were prepared to undertake.
An attempt was made to amalgamate the pin and the wire monopolies. The wire
industry, the introduction and capitalist development of which since 1500 has already
been mentioned, had become increasingly monopolist. Fiscal protection, suppression
of new enterprises by law, and partial monopolisation of locally limited raw materials
(iron, wood, calamin) had for decades given the monopolists a secure position in the
industry. Just before 1640 the aforesaid Lydsey had acquired a monopoly in the
production of brass wire from the Royal Battery Company, the privileged wire
makers. This monopoly it was now intended to strengthen by amalgamation with the
pin-makers, and no less a person than Charles I. himself figured as the “promoter.”
He promised to place £10,000 at the disposal of the pin-makers, in return for which
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pin-makers on their side were to use only Lydsey’s wire, and no iron wire. With
Lydsey the king had made a similar fixed agreement. The king, therefore, was
attempting to amalgamate in one single monopoly two hitherto separate industries;
and the monopolisation of the finished product, in order to obtain a more secure and
more profitable market for the raw material, brings to mind exactly the modern trust
organisation. When the king gave up the scheme, a capitalist called Halstead is said
to have undertaken all his liabilities towards the pin-makers on the one side and Mr.
Lydsey on the other. Lydsey, we are told, got back from the profits of the new
enterprise part of the capital, according to his own account £7000, which he had put
into the pin monopoly. The king failed in his attempt to play the part of financier,
because he was himself in want of money. His sole aim was to secure for himself a
share in the profits of what seemed a well-conceived undertaking. The outbreak of
the Civil War, however, prevented the realisation of the complete scheme.
126 
This perhaps is the best illustration of the relations between craft corporations and
capitalist monopolists. But similar cases occurred in various other trades, for instance
in the manufacture of finished cloth. The monopoly organised in that trade by the
well-known Alderman Cockayne has been recently described in detail by Mr.
Price.
127 Mr. Unwin, whom we have to thank for much light on these events, has
shown that a similar development took place in the production of beaver hats. The
use of beaver in opposition to felt attracted the attention of several capitalists to the
fact that a separate industry distinct from that of felt-makers could be made in
corporate form out of it and organised as a monopoly. This scheme was realised in
1638, when the Company of Beaver Makers received the sole right to manufacture
beaver hats. As the monopoly grew, it was soon seen that the poorer members of the
company, who had formerly made either felt or beaver hats, had fallen on evil days,
now that they might only produce the latter. As in other cases we have mentioned,
they had not sufficient capital to supply themselves with the large amount of costly
raw material that was necessary, if they were to limit themselves exclusively to the
manufacture of beaver hats. Accordingly complaints soon arose that the eight
capitalists who had been the leading spirits in the matter had, by their economic
preponderance, acquired the monopoly of beaver hat making.
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Many inferences might be made from the general bearing of the facts so far
considered. But the outstanding and fundamental conclusion is that industrial
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capitalism tended to expand on national lines and similarly its monopolies differ
from the monopolist organisation of the craft gilds in not being limited to special
areas. There are many reasons for this. Many merely local seats of production owing
to natural or economic causes or on account of transport facilities supplied distant
parts of the country, so that a monopoly in such a district immediately became a
national monopoly, as in the instance of the coal industry of the north, the Cornish
tin mines, or such trades as for some reason or other were concentrated in London.
Secondly, the expansion of a monopoly over the whole country arose where there
was a new industry whose founder had obtained by law, or could acquire by lawful
means, the privilege of sole manufacture throughout the whole country, as in the
glass monopoly, the salt monopoly, or the wire industry. Finally, the ‘nationalisation’
of monopoly might result from the affiliation of several local monopolies, especially
of craft gilds, or from the control acquired by a particular corporation over other
gilds. It was by this method that the London Soap and Pin Makers extended their
monopolies over production and markets in all the most important parts of the
country.
The essential foundation of all these early national monopolies was the grant of
privileges by law to particular persons or corporations and the legal suppression of
the unwelcome competition of other producers. Where these means were not
sufficient, private agreements could of course also be made. As we saw, the Coal
Gild of Newcastle created a system of division of production to restrict competition
within the privileged corporation itself. Other forms of association must also be
mentioned. In some gilds, as with the Beaver Hat Makers, economic advantage
enabled the capitalist masters to gain for themselves a monopoly over the heads of
their poorer brethren. In the pin trade, on the contrary, the gild monopoly was carried
on by an agreement between the corporation and a courtier till it fell into the hands
of a single capitalist. Another kind of association attempted to give the copper wire
monopoly the entire manufacture of pins from wire. Private agreements, therefore,
played a not inconsiderable part in the formation of monopolies, though secondary
to the foundation on privilege. Lastly, foreign trade policy served to increase
monopolies. Wherever foreign competition appeared, restrictions of import for the
protection of the monopolists, as we have seen, commenced. The importation of such
goods as competed with the products of monopolies was hindered by customs duties
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material, so as to make competition by any outsiders who might in spite of the
prohibitions of the law have arisen, as difficult as possible; witness the prohibition
of the import of potash in the case of the soap trade.
Monopoly arose, therefore, in the early days of English industrial capitalism on the
support of three chief buttresses, privileges from the Crown, suppression of internal
competition by law, and a protective trade policy; it developed further by the aid of
private agreements between persons seeking to profit by those privileges, and it was
distinguished from the monopolies of the craft gild by the national sphere of its
activities. To give an account of the various forms of this organisation was our first
duty. The question of the importance to be attributed to these monopolies from the
point of view of the industrial and economic development of England during this
period leads to the examination of their various effects.
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The monopolies of the seventeenth century have been generally condemned by
almost all the economic writers who from the time of David Hume to the present day
have dealt with them.
129 Mr. Unwin has recently added to the number of such
verdicts, though Mr. Hyde Price endeavours to find some favourable results at least
in the indirect effects of monopolies.
130 Possibly it is the general condemnation which
these monopolies have met with that has made certain writers find something to
praise in the system itself, and to consider only its application and its accidental
concomitants disastrous. For instance, the author who describes them in ‘Social
England’ says:
131 “The system of monopolies cannot be regarded simply as a means
of raising money without parliamentary sanction, nor merely as a means of enriching
favourites, nor as wholly based upon mistaken ideas upon the subject of what we now
call Political Economy. It was all these and something more — a provision against
real as well as fancied dangers, and in some cases a praiseworthy encouragement of
business enterprise and invention. But the British public did not make the needful
distinctions.”
Professor Cunningham also, though by no means, as Mr. Price seems to believe, a
defender of the monopolies, adds to his description of them some remarks on the
good intentions and economic ideals of the Stuarts, in which he represents the
monopolist system of industry to some extent as a well-meant but unsuccessful
experiment.
132 This point of view seems to me, however, a dangerous one. It is
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to decide what in fact the motives of the Crown
in granting patents were. It is inconceivable that hidden motives like the enrichment
of the king and his favourites were not as weighty as the openly proclaimed aims of
engrafting new industries, cheapening production, and improving quality. Which of
these motives was the most present in the grant of monopolies, how far the personal
wishes of the king where they conflicted with economic reasons gained the victory,
and which of the alleged objects were from the beginning only pretexts, it is quite
impossible to say. Secondly, even if it could be established that the grant of
monopolies was “well meant” on the part of the ruler, and represented an attempt at
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verdict on its practical working. And the elucidation of these practical results is the
more necessary, because they almost always turned out differently to what the
granters of the monopolies expected, or professed to expect.
It was this discrepancy between actual and expected results which was the constant
excuse of the Crown when the wave of popular anti-monopoly movements rose high.
Just as to-day many persons regard Cartels and Trusts as a system of organising
industry just as advantageous economically if moderately managed, as it is harmful
when fully exploited, so in 1601 Queen Elizabeth expressly maintained that she had
never given privileges which had in her judgment been “malum in se.”
133 In her
“golden speech” on the 30th November 1601 she represented herself as the victim of
deception, and thanked the Commons for showing her the truth about the monopolies
which without their intervention she would never have heard. About forty years later
Charles I used exactly similar words when compelled to promise restriction of the
monopolies. He explained in 1639 that the privileges which had been given “on
pretences that the same would serve the common good and profits of his subjects “
had proved themselves “to be prejudicial and inconvenient to the people,”
134 the main
cause of which had been that the privileges were “notoriously abused.”
The result found most intolerable was the increase in prices, especially when
inferior quality went together with higher cost. Nearly all the monopolists had, as we
have seen, promised to supply a better quality more cheaply. In no single case was
this promise fulfilled. Coal, soap, salt, copper wire, glass and similar articles rose
considerably in price under the sway of monopoly. The charter of the Coal Gild of
Newcastle set forth the “better disposing of sea coals” as one of the objects of
incorporation, but the essence of the later complaints in Cromwell’s time, put
forward in the form of a Bill, was that the Coal Gild with the help of the town
authorities had greatly obstructed “the free and quick trade of these staple
commodities, had made the River [the Tyne] dangerous, and often in many places
almost unnavigable,” in order to limit the coal trade to the town of Newcastle
alone.
135 The rise in coal prices during the first half of the seventeenth century must
be regarded as proved, although the especially alarming increase about 1640 was due
to the political crisis.
136 Complaints against the sale by the monopolists of bad and
unusable coal, already rife at the end of James I’s reign, found renewed expression
before the Council of Trade about 1650.
137 That the rise in the price of soap shortly
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already been related. How bad the soap of the Westminster Company soon became
can be seen from the fact that they had to abandon their new process and adopt the
old method of manufacture to find a market for their goods. In 1637 the Lords of the
Privy Council warned the head of the glass monopoly that “they had found that glass
was not so fair, so clear, nor so strong as it used to be.”
138 In 1601 Parliament was
informed by Sir E. Hobby that the price of salt had risen in certain places from 16
pence to 15s. or 16s. a bushel.
139 Between 1630 and 1640 an equal amount of salt cost
£4 15s. to £6 in the area of the monopoly, in other parts of England only £3 or less.
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Prices of this kind, though made possible by protection and the grant of
monopolies, were often the premium necessary for the introduction of new trades. As
such they are often defended, or at least lightly judged. But there is room also for
scepticism. Historical investigations show that a number of the “new created” or
“improved” branches of industry were of very doubtful importance. Professor
Cunningham, for instance, finds such an industry in salt mining, begun in England
in 1565, for which he thinks “ England was very well adapted.”
141 But the history of
English salt mining in the seventeenth century shows that it could only exist at all
under continuous and very extensive protection. When Cromwell removed this
protection, it was faced with complete ruin. “The ambition to develop salt and native
manufactures by means of monopoly and prohibition of imports resulted only in
disappointment,” says Mr. Price.
142 Only when the rock salt deposits were discovered
in 1670 did the industry become lasting and successful, while the produce of the sea
salt industry, so long nurtured by monopoly, was unable to withstand such
competition.
143 Alum is a further example, as we have already explained, of the
negative results of an artificially fostered industry. There are, further, among these
monopolies many enterprises which were merely of the nature of passing but
expensive experiments. The best instance is the dyed cloth monopoly granted to
Alderman Cockayne in 1615. By the aid of a prohibition of the export of “whites,”
and the possession of the sole right to trade in coloured cloths, he hoped to transfer
the dyed cloth trade to England, an object which had attracted the attention of Sir
Walter Raleigh at the beginning of the century. But Cockayne’s cloths were
apparently not so good or so cheap as those dyed in Holland, and found no market;
and Cockayne was not in a position to carry out his obligations as to the purchase of
white cloth.
144 It was clear even in those days that an industry could not be created
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Dutch not only forbade and obstructed the importation of dyed cloth from England,
but also made attempts to manufacture white cloth themselves by favouring weavers.
This in turn limited the market for such white cloth as could not be utilised and sold
in England, which the monopolist had received permission to export, while on the
other hand he could not look for a larger export trade in his goods because of their
inferior value.
145 As a result the whole monopoly was a complete fiasco, and one of
the chief industries of England suffered considerable disturbance both in its home
market and in its foreign connections. As early as 1617 the privileged company had
to abandon its undertaking. A royal proclamation shortly afterwards says:
“We declared our desires to have brought to passe as a principal work of our times
the manufactures of dying and dressing of broad cloth within this realm ... but finding
that time discovereth many inabilities which cannot at first be seen ... we intend not
to insist and stay longer upon specious and faire shows which produce not the fruit
our actions do aim at... perceiving that the former grounds proposed to us by the
Undertakers of the worke consisted more in hopes than in effects and finding the
work itself to bee too great to bee brought to pass in a very short time.”
146 Thus ended
the attempt to transfer an industry all the conditions of which were obviously wanting
by the grant of a monopoly and by a fiscal policy.
The most essential presupposition to the introduction of finer textile industries, the
existence of a qualified class of workmen, was not fulfilled in England at the
beginning of the seventeenth century,
147 and this need was only supplied by the later
immigration of foreign workers.
148 It was not till fifty years later, and then with far
less external stimulus, that this long-desired and afterwards so famous branch of
English textiles was successfully introduced as a permanent industry.
149 The cotton
industry also, which had already commenced about 1640 in Manchester,
150 has to
thank no monopoly for its creation, a fact not to be forgotten as evidence against the
alleged “educational” effects of the Stuart economic policy.
James I’s failure in the textile industry was closely paralleled, except that its effect
was less widely felt, by Charles I’s attempt to introduce by aid of monopoly a new
process in the manufacture of soap, which being in reality less valuable than the
existing method was unable to make its way in spite of its monopoly.
The results known to us, therefore, hardly warrant the conclusion that the grant of
monopolies was an effective instrument for the introduction of new industries, or that
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productive power, and to a certain extent the needful and successful premium against
risk for men embarking on doubtful undertakings. It was not undeveloped but easily
fostered branches of production that clamoured for monopoly, but on the contrary the
possibility of obtaining protection of this kind which often led to attempts to carry
on trades condemned to failure from the beginning by unfavourable economic
conditions.
In trades which did not require fostering but were already firmly established,
monopoly could not even outwardly profess to be a mere “encouragement.” In such
cases it was nothing but a check to a process of development already begun. Nowhere
is this more clearly seen than in mining. The Coal Gild in Newcastle with its trade
rules hindered the expansion of the production of coal for decades. Many owners,
says Gardiner in 1655,
151 preferred to let their mines fall into decay rather than
making themselves dependent in selling their coal on the gild and the town
magistrates. But the best example is in tin mining. As we saw, it was the policy of the
monopolists to put down the price as far as they possibly could against the real
producers, whom they financed. In 1636 the; Cornish tin miners complained to the
king that the mines were falling into neglect, as the expenses were continually
increasing, while the price they received for their tin remained stationary.
152 The
heavy fall in the figures of production between 1625 and 1646 gives some support
to these complaints.
153 When under Cromwell the monopolist right of pre- emption,
which belonged to the Crown, together with the regulation of sales which so
hampered the producers, were for about ten years in abeyance, a hitherto unknown
spirit of enterprise appeared in tin mining. The producers now had “the freedom to
sell at all times and at the best price.”
154 Traders, so we are told,
155 left their
profession in large numbers and began to mine tin. “Then it was that the old works
which were turned idle many years, before paying the wages of perhaps a hundred
men, were now wrought again with advantage, and employed three or four times as
many.”
156 In the days of the monopoly the profits of the mine owners and smelters
were so regulated by the monopolists, that they were insufficient to attract anyone to
devote himself to such a trade. And capitalists above all would be shy of putting their
money in a branch of production of whose profits they could only receive a share
fixed by a third party.
Even in later days reference was frequently made to the paralysing influence of the
monopolists’ policy on mining enterprise.
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insecurity for many years later predominant in mining was a kind of traditional relic
of the bitter experiences gained in the time of the monopoly continuing into the days
of free mining:
158 — a singular instance of the irony of fate, when we remember that
the special aim of the Stuarts was to guide fresh capital into tin mining by means of
the monopoly.
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The glass industry, so long as it used wood as a firing material, was scattered over
all England, and developed rapidly without the protection of monopoly. In 1589
fifteen glass factories are said to have existed, and seven years earlier the Chancellor
of the Exchequer had attempted to put a tax on glass factories to counterbalance the
waning receipts of the import duties. The desire to produce finer glasses, drinking
and cut glasses led to the grant of a monopoly, which ultimately, as we saw, brought
with it the suppression of the old wood-burning factories in favour of those that used
coal. In consequence the advance of the glass industry was slight, because the
monopolists progressed but slowly with their new process. The patent granted in
1574 for the manufacture of Venetian glass became within seventy years, step by
step, a monopoly embracing the entire glass production of England. As the
monopolists had had continual difficulties in obtaining skilled foreign workmen, or
in training English workmen, the families they had suppressed, who were closely
connected with the glass makers of Normandy and Lorraine, again entered the trade,
and had, in some cases down to the early years of the nineteenth century, a
considerable share in its prosperity. The rapid rise of competition after the abolition
of the monopoly was typical. In Newcastle a new undertaking sprang up at once in
spite of the Civil War. Glass-making spread to other regions, and a writer of the
Restoration says that the advance of the glass trade before the Civil War was
unimportant compared with its progress during and after the war. At the end of the
seventeenth century there were ninety glass works in England, twenty-three of which
made the finer kinds of glass. The greater number of these works arose after the
Restoration.
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If to decide how far English industry in fact developed under the regime of
protective monopoly during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is difficult and
at times impossible, to throw out the question how might it have developed without
that protection seems at first audacious in the extreme. Yet curiosity is continually
posing that question. When one keeps before one’s eyes the inglorious history of the
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after their abolition or even during their existence, trades arose and continued to live,
and how lastly the development of flourishing manufactures was hampered by the
monopolies and acquired new life at their fall, the greatest caution cannot blind one
to the conclusion that the expansion of England’s industrial productivity can only
have suffered by the system of monopolies, and that if that system had not been
adopted the growth of industrial wealth might certainly have been greater.
In the first place, monopolies led to the promotion of trades which had no possible
prospect of being able to exist without them and without all sorts of privileges from
the State, for which the monopoly could at no time be regarded as protection during
the initial stages only, and which in many directions were a dangerous burden to
general economic progress. Secondly, as the system was not limited to new
industries, but equally applied to developed industries, the general spirit of enterprise
was thereby checked for the advantage of a few monopoly owners, and the
development of many industries for which England even then possessed great
facilities hampered.
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But even this is not the final condemnation of the effects of monopoly. So far we
have considered only the expansion and development of industrial production and the
finding of a market for its manufactures. The evil effects of monopoly are most
clearly seen in the creation of a particular type of industrial undertaking, which has
given a special impress to the original organisation of early industrial capitalism in
England as compared with that of later times.
In later days the development of industrial capitalism in all branches of production
led to the springing up of numerous competing capitalist manufacturers. But the grant
of monopolies caused a concentration of capitalist ascendency in the hands of a
single individual or group of individuals. Take the case of tin mining. The tinners and
smelters had become capitalist “masters” as early as the end of the sixteenth century.
This process was interrupted by tin mining becoming the monopoly of a few
capitalists. The entire control over the tin market rested in the hands of the
monopolists, and a further capitalist development followed. Competition among the
buyers of the raw product from the independent producers was suppressed, and the
mass of sellers found themselves faced by a single buyer who could economically
oppress them. Thus it happened that during the first two thirds of the seventeenth
century the only period of comparative affluence for the tin miners was the time of
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limitation of sales to two dates in the year were in abeyance. Once more after a long
interval there arose, we are told, a great number of independent miners. The abolition
of the monopoly caused a reversal of the process by which owing to a single
individual becoming the financier of the entire tin mining trade, capitalism had been
carried to a high stage of development. The old movement however soon
recommenced, and gradually the capitalist smelters became the economic masters of
tin mining, a fact still to be traced to-day according to Lewis in the “apparently unjust
business relations between smelter and tinner.”
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The intention of the Crown in granting the tin monopoly had been, in addition to
many other motives, to secure a fixed price for the producers and thereby to improve
their position by freeing them from the capitalist tin merchants.
163 The opposite
happened. The dependence of the tin miners on external capital, already for various
reasons considerable, was necessarily accentuated by giving capitalists the monopoly.
They used their economic vantageground over the penniless miners to keep the price
steady, it is true, but so low as to leave the smallest possible surplus for their
dependents.
A similar position arose when capitalists became the monopolist financiers of a
gild. In pin- making financial control during the days of the monopoly was
concentrated in the hands of a single capitalist, and the craft had at once to buy raw
material at a fixed price and to deliver pins to the monopolist at a given price. As in
several similar cases, the capitalist ascendency either of the richer masters or of
particular traders over the poor craftsmen was succeeded by the exclusive power of
the single concessionaire, who did not hesitate, having once acquired the means, to
use his position to the utmost in every way. At the beginning of the seventeenth
century all limitations on the number of trade apprentices were removed, and in 1617
it was proposed to give every master thirty apprentices, and further, a great number
of women and children were employed who had never been apprenticed. “The
organisations,” says Mr. Unwin,
164 “which in other cases furnished through their
handicraft traditions a protection to the workmen, were dominated in the case of the
monopolist companies by the speculative capitalist, who was as little inclined to
maintain the best industrial conditions as is the modern shareholder when dealing
with unorganised labour.” In the manufacture of beaver hats too, as we related, the
monopoly resulted in the repression of the poorer masters by the eight capitalists who
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In the case of newly introduced industries never organised as handicrafts monopoly
from the beginning implied the rise of gigantic undertakings, as the monopolists were
by the help of protective duties to supply the needs of the whole country. In these
capitalistically organised industries the sphere of the enterprise was much further
expanded by monopoly than on technical and economic grounds was possible for a
single manufacturer. While, for instance, after the abolition of the glass monopoly
there arose many separate factories scattered all through England, in the days of
Mansell all factories were united in one undertaking. Further, as we have seen,
factories using wood had been suppressed at the instigation of the monopolists.
England being poor in wood must naturally have lost the small wood-using factories
far more rapidly than the forest regions of the Continent, but this suppression all the
same gave a further artificial advantage to the large coal-using factory. While in
Germany the demands of technical progress for greater capital expenditure led till the
end of the eighteenth century in many cases to co-operation in glass founding,
leaving the individual glass-makers their independence,
165 in England already at the
time of the monopoly a single large capitalist undertaking was omnipotent.
Starch-making, a new industry introduced at the time of Elizabeth, remained, so
long as it was a monopoly in the hands of certain patentees, confined to four plants
which manufactured for the needs of London and neighbourhood, although these
concerns had to replace the entire former imports. When the monopoly of the
patentee and of the later company incorporated under James I was abolished,
numerous small undertakings sprang up in a very short time, the process of
manufacture being obviously well suited to small craftsmen.
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In the wire trade the works at Tintern in Monmouthshire, dominated the national
production. About 1600 one Steere opened a new works at Chilworth in Surrey with
workmen he had- enticed from Tintern. A stormy dispute arose, and finally the
monopolists had to buy up Steere’s works and materials, and find employment for
him himself at “reasonable wages.”
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No doubt there were circumstances in mining, in handicrafts and in the new
industries which made the growth of capitalist enterprise necessary; but it was due
to monopolies that the functions of the numerous capitalists that arose or might have
arisen — for instance, capitalist smelters, capitalist masters, capitalist factory owners
— were united in single individuals, who were able by their financial importance to
gain control of an entire industry. If Prof. Sombart
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transmutation in our own times of the industrial organisation of large undertakings
into a purely financial administration one of the highest stages of capitalist
organisation, that stage was already reached by the old monopolies. The possessor
of large capital resources was in a position to finance whole industries, either by
himself entering into the manufacture, building works and trying new processes, or
by merely undertaking the purely financial organisation and management or the
placing of the goods on the market.
This possibility of uniting in one hand the financial control of particular industries
by obtaining monopolies made early English capitalist industry the happy hunting
ground of all who wished to lay out large capital sums to advantage. Such
undertakings were in strong contrast to the hazardous ventures of charlatans which
sprang up at the end of the seventeenth century in every sphere of English industrial
life. These were mere fraudulent “Projects” for the deception of a readily speculative
public, but the monopolist companies of the Stuart days were either due to the union
of interested traders (coalowners, tin founders) or to the commercial activities of rich
and politically influential persons, who hoped to increase their wealth by financing
large branches of industry and accordingly bore the risk themselves. That these “large
business men” belonged to court circles, and used their political influence and their
accumulated wealth for one and the same purpose appears to us by no means
remarkable, though it at times struck their Contemporaries as peculiar. When Sir
Robert Mansell, hitherto an admiral, renewed his patent for glass-making, the king
was amazed
169 “that Robin Mansell, being a seaman, whereby he had won much
honour, should fall from water to tamper with fire, which are two contrary elements.”
Sir Walter Raleigh was, as we have seen, for a time the owner of the tin monopoly.
Sir Thomas Bartlett had gained £40,000 in the service of the queen, with which he
financed the pin monopoly.
170 A great number of monopolies were given by the
Crown “as special favours in place of hard cash “to favourites, retired officials and
officers who hoped thereby to increase their wealth or to make use of their privileges
to gain riches by the help of capitalists.
171 The monopolies in alum, soap, starch, wire,
and many other commodities were financed by wealthy courtiers. It is often difficult
to recognise the real personality of the “Promoter.” The beaver hat monopoly, as we
saw, was due to eight capitalists, who decided the great mass of craftsmen to found
a separate corporation. But the actual charter was obtained for them by the Earl of
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was to receive therefor a fixed payment out of the tax collected by the company on
the sale of every beaver hat.
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The type of monopolist varied accordingly in the different industries. In the coal
trade, where the monopoly approximated more to a Cartel, it was the mine-owners
who united to organise the monopoly. The soap monopoly of the London
manufacturers was similar. But in the majority of cases the monopoly was in the
hands of one or more big capitalists. Their functions again varied. Some of them
appear only as the source of money or political influence, standing behind the scenes
of the organisation itself, or interested in it only as shareholders. Others took an
active part in the industrial and technical growth and the commercial management
of the enterprise, like Sir Thomas Bartlett and Alderman Cockayne. They appear as
the directors of new industries or processes, conduct lawsuits and prosecutions,
regulate prices, are at pains to influence the commercial policy of the government in
their favour and engage workmen from abroad, uniting in their persons the functions
of the large manufacturer and those of the organising financier. It was against this
kind of monopolist, in whose hands a more or less considerable political power lay
and who without regard for the interests of the thousands he injured changed the
social, industrial, and fiscal conditions of the country and brought his dominating
influence to bear on the most diverse fields of economic life, against the capitalist
financier of large industrial monopolies who made himself unequivocally a dictator
of national industry, that the anger of the people and of Parliament was chiefly
directed in the anti-monopoly movement. Mr. Price
173 is therefore certainly justified
in explaining the continuance of the London soap monopoly even under the
Commonwealth by the fact that this monopoly embraced all the original London
makers, and so was from the point of view of a democratic government less easily
assailable than the monopolies owned in contrast by particular individuals. With a
little goodwill the monopoly in this case could be defended as the systematic
organisation of the trade; whereas if it had been in the hands of a single individual
who through his wealth and political influence had gained control over a trade with
which he had no natural connection, that line of argument would from the first carry
but little weight.
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Monopolies had a very decided influence on the early growth of capitalism in
English industry, for they increased the power of capital in those industries in which
it had gained a footing, and concentrated it in a few hands. In this sense theHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 47
opposition to monopolies was a movement against the ascendency of a capitalist rule
artificially stimulated by privilege. In the last few centuries England has several times
gone through periods of economic agitation unparalleled in intensity in any other
land. Not unfrequently this phenomenon has been due to the exceptional degree
attained in England by the economic grievances which caused the conflict, the result
being a very heated agitation for their removal. Never was a battle against an existing
commercial policy fought with so much bitterness, enthusiasm, and energy as in
England in the ‘forties, for the very reason that never had a one-sided class policy so
threatened the general’ weal as did the prevailing system of high corn duties. The
same is true in the history of English monopolies. In Germany there was no similar
agitation against them, or, at least, owing to the division of the country into numerous
small states, it never acquired a single, clearly recognisable character. Generally
speaking the German monopolies, whatever may be the reason for it, did not tend to
such intense economic consequences as the English, and they did not become
important as the instrument of a system of government hated in domestic politics.
In England the system of monopolies was from the beginning the expression of a
definite and independent royal policy, pursued with ever-growing eagerness in spite
of statutory opposition from the days of Queen Elizabeth, and in a few decades so
successfully developed that in almost every important trade national monopolies
arose. At first doubtfully, and then ever louder rose the opposition to this policy from
the most diverse quarters. At one time enmity was kindled by purely economic
results, such as the increased price to consumers, or the restriction of competition
which crippled enterprise; at another by the ascendency of courtiers, the arbitrary
evasion of the law by the Crown, or financial mismanagement. As monopolies
steadily increased all these streams of opposition met in a single movement, which
succeeded in extirpating in England, after a comparatively short but exceptionally
effective existence, the monopoly system which in other countries continued to
flourish in one form or another for over a century more.
The main centre of the anti-monopoly movement was the House of Commons,
which “found the whole nation behind it”
175 on this question. Ever after the days of
the great monopoly debates in 1597 and 1601 the House made continual angry
protests against monopolies and monopolists. Even in the debate of 1601 the majority
of the speakers showed such determined and energetic hostility to monopolies that
their defenders, Cecil and Bacon, could not obtain a hearing, and the queen had toHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 48
soothe the discontent by formal promises. The Statute of Monopoly in 1624, though
in practice ineffective, was a further proof that Parliament desired vigorous measures
against the monopolies. When, after the absolute rule of Charles I, Parliament met
again in 1640, one of the first things it did was to declare the chief monopolies
invalid, and to use its growing power over the Crown for an energetic attack on all
industrial privileges. The deep hatred of the Long Parliament for all monopolies is
seen in the drastically worded resolution which decisively refused any monopolist a
seat in Parliament.
176 On the 21 st of January 1641 four “monopolists” were, in fact,
expelled from the House.
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The speeches delivered on the various occasions on which the Commons occupied
themselves with the question show sufficiently clearly the severity with which
individuals condemned the monopoly system, and the ardour with which they
attacked it.
178 The speeches of 1640 were fomented by an extensive popular
movement against monopolies. From all parts of the country petitions reached
Parliament for the removal of “grievances,” especially of monopolies.
179 At the end
of his fine and impressive description of the monopolies Colepepper could with truth
say:
180 “I have echoed to you the cries of the kingdom.” But these oratorical displays
are not by any means the only evidence from which we can picture the anti-monopoly
movement of the seventeenth century. They are supported by an abundant literature
of pamphlets.
The growth of this literature in the seventeenth century is very largely due to the
lively discussions on the monopoly question.
181 The characters of the numerous
pamphlets vary widely. A great number are purely inflammatory. At times they are
satirical, intended to put before the people in grotesque shape the evil effects of the
monopolies.
182 Just as at the present time the anti-trust agitation in America
represents the industrial monopolies in all kinds of humorous allegorical shapes, so
we find pictures of the seventeenth century monopolists with the products of the
various monopolies as symbols of their activity and with such legends as:
“If any aske, what things these monsters be, 
‘Tis a Projector and a Patentee.”
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Many of the pamphlets are concerned with the conditions of a single trade alone,
and are the appeals to public opinion of consumers or producers oppressed by the
monopoly in the industry in question. Instances of this are to be found in the casesHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 49
of the wine, soap, and salt monopolies of 1640 to 1650,
184 and especially in the
pamphlet on the coal monopoly written in 1655,
185 the importance of which has
hitherto been unfortunately not recognised.
The author of this work, Ralph Gardiner of Chirton, was for many years mistakenly
identified by posterity with a coiner of the same name, and was only rehabilitated by
the investigations of Dr. D. Ross Lietch in 1849.
186 His pamphlet, whose contents we
have already had frequent occasion to quote, attacked the monopolist policy of the
town of Newcastle, whose bye-laws under its charter were, according to the writer,
contrary both to common and statute law. The special object of his attack was,
however, the coal monopoly. This, he in one place states,
187 would most certainly
have been declared invalid by Parliament in 1640 “if any public spirit had arisen and
denounced this great pest which more than any other affects the life of men.”
Gardiner hoped himself to kindle in 1653 the agitation which was wanting in 1640.
He had suffered as a brewer in North Shields from the privileges and monopolist
control of the town, and became finally a bitter opponent of all monopolies and
restrictions on trade. Whether he undertook the fight against Newcastle’s monopolies
in revenge for the long time he had lain in prison there, or from unselfish motives,
we cannot say. If Parliament had not been dissolved by Cromwell on the 12th of
December 1653, Gardiner’s agitation, which had already led to an important enquiry
by the Committee of Trade and Corporations, would certainly have been successful.
As it was, Newcastle remained unmolested. But Gardiner’s tireless and heroic zeal
in attacking the coal monopoly contributed largely to a clearer knowledge of the
effect of the coal gilds, and his vehement but well-informed polemic strengthened the
movement against monopolies, even though his immediate object, the abolition of
the gild, was only in fact realised about 1660.
The agitation, of which pamphlets and Parliamentary reports give us such a lively
picture, exercised an influence on public opinion which extended to days in which
monopolies had long been abolished. It is a curious thing that down to the present
day the English consumer is especially opposed to any kind of industrial monopoly
or monopolist amalgamation, and the main origin of this anti-monopolist national
conscience is to be found in the anti-monopoly agitation of the seventeenth century.
Until the Elizabethan policy of monopolies began, the expression “monopoly” had
always been connected with the acute commercial monopoly which we nowadays call
a “corner,” and the chief monopolists were merchants who bought up corn and foodHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 50
supplies. Against such persons the statutes passed by Henry III.
188 and again under
Edward VI. against “regraters,” “engrossers,” and “forestallers” were sufficient
protection.
189 The condemnation of monopoly in the case of exchange of goods
expressed in these statutes was transferred to industrial production when at the end
of the sixteenth century it began to show an inclination to such a system. It seemed
a matter of course that monopolies were harmful.
Henry Parker states in 1648:
190 “That which seizes too great matters in the hands
of too few, and so is in the nature of a monopoly has been always condemned as
preventing trade, and held to be injurious to the major part of mankind.” The lawyers
tried to define more accurately the effects of monopolies. In a famous lawsuit tried
in 1602 the Court found “the evil of the monopoly” to lie chiefly in the fact that “the
price of the same wares has increased”; that after the grant of the monopoly “the
wares were not so good and serviceable” as before; and that other producers had,
through the monopoly, become unable to find work and so put out of the trade.
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This opinion was shared by writers like Misselden and Malynes, who may be called
the forerunners of the political economists.
192 Misselden starts that part of his book
written in 1622 which deals with trade monopolies with the words: “The parts of a
monopoly are twaine. The restraint of the liberty of commerce to some one or few,
and the setting of the price at the pleasure of the monopolist to his private benefit and
the prejudice of the publicke.”
193 Other writings of the time also use the expression
that the monopolist regulates the price at “his pleasure,” or “as he pleases,”
194 a
phrase which Adam Smith appropriated in this connection about 150 years later.
195
Only, Adam Smith had in his mind merely local gild monopolies, and applied to their
conduct words used a century earlier for much more extensive trade organisations.
The writings of Misselden and Malynes, though as much concerned in attacking
privileges of trade and commerce as those of purely industrial monopolies and
patents, are important evidence for estimating the anti-monopolist movement of the
time. The expression “free trade,” which first appears at the end of the sixteenth
century, came to be used indifferently as the watchword against artificial restrictions
of trade and commerce by joint-stock companies, colonial companies and municipal
corporations, and against the real trade monopolies of the Stuarts. The writings of
Parker, Roberts, and Brent, all between 1640–50, show how in the most diverse
fields of economic life as it then existed the beginnings of a movement for the
abolition of monopolist fetters and the development of free competition wereHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 51
present.
196 It cannot be doubted that this economic tendency was strongly influenced
by experience of the Stuart trade monopolies. On the other hand, writings which
attempted to introduce into other fields a freer economic system may in their time
have added vigour to the agitation against industrial monopoly.
That agitation can at any rate be regarded as an independent movement by the side
of the general tendency to economic freedom if such a tendency is to be regarded in
the first half of the seventeenth century as a single entity at all. For economic
Liberalism, with its systematic opposition to all restrictions on free competition —
whether by the mercantile system or by the trade regulations — was a far later
development. The early outburst in particular trades, and the popular character of
such a free trade movement as the anti-monopoly agitation, was due to the growing
bitterness among the people against the manner in which particular individuals
enriched themselves by monopolies. Doubts might exist as to the economic value of
a monopolist organisation of industry, just as to-day in America the position of the
people with regard to the chief questions of trust building is still undecided. But
against individuals who openly exploited the system, unlimited hatred reigned, just
as in the United States it is the struggle against the trust magnates, against
Rockefeller, Armour, Havemeyer, and similar persons that attracts the populace
towards the anti-trust movement. In the seventeenth century the monopolist was in
England the publican of the Bible. “Bloodsucker” and “monster” were the popular
names for him. And this hatred was deep-rooted among Englishmen even in later
days. When, in the second half of the eighteenth century, small farms were
concentrated into larger ones, certain opponents of that agricultural development
thought the easiest way to discredit it among the people was to compare a large
farmer to a monopolist.
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The popular character which marked the movement against monopolies led to the
rapid fall of that special form of industrial organisation in early capitalist England.
We have seen that the growing power of Parliament brought about the abolition of
many monopolies after 1640, and that the legal foundations on which monopolies
had arisen were destroyed in 1689 by the repeal of the royal power of prerogative and
by an important alteration in mining law. It was thereafter impossible in principle to
obtain exclusive rights from the Crown, as monopolies, even for foreign trade, could
only exist if authorised by Act of Parliament.
198 Internal monopolies Parliament
would not be persuaded to grant: it held fast by the anti-monopolist principle ofHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 52
common law and by the provisions of the Statute of Monopolies.
As early as 1690 Parliament gave certain projectors a proof of the hopelessness of
their wishes by refusing to grant recognition to a plan for renewing the pin
monopoly.
199 Not content with preventing the growth of monopoly by royal privilege,
they also expressly opposed private understandings of a monopolist kind between
merchants; for instance, in 1711 an Act was passed, especially aimed at all contracts
and agreements between coal-owners and others for the monopolisation of coal.
200
In the treatment of the newer industries a similar difference is found between the
trade policy of Queen Anne and that of the greater part of the seventeenth century.
Monopolies were absolutely forbidden. A close student of English economic history
of that time writes:
201 “The whole tendency, both of legislation and parliamentary
practice, was to afford stringent protection to infant industries by prohibiting
competitive imports from abroad, and at the same time to trust that the founding of
several factories of the same kind would provide sufficient safeguards for the
consumer by keeping prices low through the resulting competition.”
Important new industries arose in the eighteenth century, in spite of the
unwillingness of Parliament to grant their promoters any monopoly protection
beyond the usual inventor’s patent. In the still youthful silk industry a certain John
Lambe, who had studied the throwing of silk in Italy, received a fourteen years’
patent in 1717. When this ran out in 1732 his successor strove in vain to obtain its
renewal. Instead he received compensation to the tune of £14,000 and a peerage!
202
The tinplate trade, to this day such an important industry in England, arose in the
same way at the beginning of the eighteenth century without any protective
monopoly.
203
And Parliament, even if it abstained from any grants of monopolies, had other
Colbertian means, especially bounties, by which it could encourage and support an
industry.
204
So far as our knowledge of industrial England in the eighteenth century goes, no
national monopoly based on legal privilege any longer existed at the time in any
industry. Tucker, in his first essay, and later Adam Smith, whose detestation of
monopoly was all-embracing, would certainly have noticed any such abomination.
They know, however, only colonial trade monopolies and a few town monopolies,
as a special object-lesson in which they both choose the privileges of Butchers.
205 To
illustrate the attempts of manufacturers to obtain monopolies by law, Adam SmithHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 53
could find no other example than a Dutch clothier in Abbéville.
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Undoubtedly the continued existence of craft corporations with exclusive rights in
many ways restricted competition. Adam Smith himself experienced its effect in
Glasgow when Watt came there to build and sell his steam engines. The corporation
of Hammermen refused to allow him to do so, and his projects could only be carried
out within the bounds of the University.
207 But the case can hardly be characteristic
of the general influence of town corporations at that time. This had, at least in the
eighteenth century, considerably diminished.
208 While at the beginning of the
eighteenth century Lord Molesworth still complained of their harmful influence,
Tucker could write in 1782:
209 “The exclusive Corporations and Companies of Trades
in Towns and Cities have at present very little Power of doing mischief compared
with that which they formerly had.” More recent investigations have shown that the
attenuated rights of these corporations had mostly fallen into abeyance, and that in
many trades “the freedom of the corporation need no longer be bought, and the right
of view and other means of gild control had entirely ceased at the end of the
eighteenth century.”
210 Authorities on English economic history, like J. E. Thorold
Rogers, have expressly insisted that “the old system of gild and freeman production
and trade ... was by no means universal, for the great industries of the north were not
shackled by these limitations.”
211
Whatever may have been the functions of these monopolist town corporations in
the eighteenth century they are essentially distinguished from the monopolies we
have hitherto considered by their limitation to a single locality. While the latter could
create a national system of capitalistic industry, the town gilds, so far as they were
active at all, could only impose monopolist regulations on small masters in a local
market, while capitalist trades organised on the commission, or even on the factory
system, could settle in towns where gilds were unknown, or in the country.
212 The
growth of transport facilities and the rise of so many centres of industry destroyed,
after the end of the seventeenth century, the monopolist position held in certain goods
by the chief towns, and especially London, and accordingly the national importance
of local monopolist organisations also disappeared. When the London Company of
Frame Work Knitters tried to extend their rights beyond their own local sphere of
influence to Nottingham, their attempt was not supported by Parliament. They had
to allow the ten masters and operatives of Nottingham to escape their tyranny and
continue their trade in independence.
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regulations of these corporations from the industrial monopolies of the Stuarts that
a High Court Judge, in a celebrated judgment in 1711, denied altogether the
monopolist character of such local restrictions on trade.
214 Though wrong in the
abstract, this legal distinction was clearly based on the obvious but far-reaching
difference in the economic importance of two systems of trade organisation both
clearly forms of monopoly. In any case, no gild regulation could lead to the
concentration in the hands of a few privileged persons of the control over capitalist
industries working for a national market or even for exportation on a large scale, as
would have happened with the Stuart monopoly system.
By the end of the seventeenth century, therefore, the most essential half of Free
Trade had been won for English industry. Even though, as Prof. Brentano has
excellently shown,
215 the coming of the modern “industry” as opposed to the
handicraft was delayed by antiquated gild regulations, and especially by the Law of
Apprentices, this fact only affected the competition between the old and new forms
of trade. Within the bounds of industrial capitalism the way was open for
competition. No man who wished to put capital into a rising industry found himself
hampered by the prior rights of others or by legal decisions restricting competition.
This freedom of trade was won at a time in which English industry and industrial
capitalism were in their infancy. Had not the monopoly system so quickly fallen
through its excesses and become a standing abomination to the English people, who
knows that Parliament in the eighteenth century, in its ardour for the Mercantile
System, would not have tried that method of State interference in commercial matters
also? It was the part played by Parliament itself in the battle against industrial
monopoly which made this impossible. The mighty growth of industrial capitalism
in England which began in the eighteenth century and reached its climax in the
Industrial Revolution, followed in the train of a previously won freedom of trade.
The difference between capitalist organisation in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, as regards liberty of trade, comes out very clearly in the history of
industrial monopoly in England. A comparison with the country that has longest
known legal restrictions of competition in capitalist industry shows for what a long
time the freedom won so early in England was in striking contrast to the organisation
of other industrially advancing nations. A short digression on the growth and duration
of German monopolist restrictions shall therefore conclude this subject.
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A few preliminary observations are necessary. In the first place, Germany has never
had so uniform a system of monopoly as that existing in England under Elizabeth,
James I, and Charles I. The peculiarities of particular trade privileges alone made that
impossible. The phenomenon of a prince attempting systematically to unite industry
wherever possible in great national monopolies was unknown. The movement
towards monopoly started amongst capitalists, and found support partly in the
administration of trade by a bureaucracy imbued with “mercantile” principles, partly
in the craft gilds, and partly in the mining regulations. The princes did not play the
part of eagerly speculative “Promoters” of capitalist undertakings, while personal
enrichment and the trade interests of courtiers, so widespread in England, never had
a decided influence on the monopolist organisation of German industry. Perhaps just
for the reason that these shady sides of the system were unknown, it remained longer
in existence than in England and was abolished without leaving such general hatred
behind it.
It is hardly necessary to say that in speaking of the monopolist organisation of early
capitalism in German industry it is not implied that this organisation always appeared
in concrete form. Certain forms of trade monopolies existed, like the privileged
companies or the creation of a “staple” of capitalist merchants. But very often the
monopolist organisation of industry was only seen in restrictions of some kind set on
new enterprises by law, which accordingly put particular merchants in the position
of monopolists. When in spite of such provisions competition between existing
factories arose, such works might still have a monopoly against subsequent fresh
competitors. If in any such cases special organisation further improved the
monopolists’ position, the importance of their prior rights increased. In any case,
however, legal limitations on fresh competition gave monopolist protection to the
existing concerns. We must, therefore, take into consideration all laws which
introduced such restrictions, even if they did not lead to the grosser forms of English
monopolies.
An enquiry into the effect and importance of monopolist organisation on the growth
of German economic life would be outside the scope of our present discussion. WeHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 56
are only concerned to develop a descriptive comparison between the growth of
industrial organisation in Germany and England, and to answer the question to what
extent the monopolist organisation of early industrial capitalism, the rise and fall of
which in England we have described, lasted longer in Germany. To criticise this
system would necessitate a very different examination of details tRan is required for
the purpose of this book. It will be enough for the present to give a sufficiently
detailed picture of German industrial monopolies to enable us to institute a
comparison between their history and the early disappearance of monopoly in
England.
In Germany, as in England, mining is an important industry for trade monopolies.
Owing to transport advantages certain areas of production had down to the nineteenth
century and retain in part even to-day a “natural” monopoly in markets at some
distance from them. In such cases restrictions imposed by law on competition were
much more effective in creating monopolies than where producers had to compete
for a market with other industrial regions. From the latter part of the eighteenth
century up to about 1865 mining was especially subject to monopoly where the
so-called “Direktionsprinzip” or system of State administration, a characteristic
instance of the mercantile theory in mining, obtained. When freedom of mining had
been declared by virtue of the rights of the Crown, every person who found specified
deposits in any place was entitled to permission to occupy that place as a miner. This
grant was regarded as the consequence of the share in mining rights assured him by
private law.
This freedom, which could only be limited by the reserved rights of the State, gave
considerably greater facilities than had formerly existed for the continued growth of
new undertakings. The Prussian Government regarded the threatened competition of
many new mines as by no means desirable. Accordingly the royal share of the mining
rights was used to retain for the State the power to make regulations which might
allow or refuse the creation of new enterprises. A distinction was drawn between the
grant of the royal rights, the grant of a mining area, and the exercise of those rights
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(in other words, the commencement of an enterprise) and by decisions concerning the
last, the competition allowed by the declaration of free mining could again be
restricted at will. That was the case in coal mining in Rhenish Westphalia, which,
after being up till the end of the eighteenth century of only local importance, became
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neighbourhood of the Ruhr, originally only used by coaldigging peasants, were first
systematically mined in the time of Frederick the Great, when the trade was regulated
by a mining ordinance, and put under the control of the State department of mines.
In the area of the Cleve-Mark mining ordinance the working of coal seams was
dependent on the permission of the royal officials. The probability of obtaining such
permission could be estimated from instructions issued in May 1783, at the
instigation of the Minister von Heinitz to the department of mines in Cleve-Mörs and
Mark,
217 which insist that “No new coal mines shall be opened until the need of them
is proved.” The general intention of these instructions, as the wording clearly shows,
is to assure a monopoly to the existing mines. “Owing to the many seams which are
being worked coal has fallen in price, and one mine takes away the market of the
next,” and the object is to secure that “each of the mines can count on a
comparatively safe market.” These regulations were renewed in 1821, and continued
in principle until the reform of the mining laws in 1865.
How this principle in practice, even as late as the middle of the nineteenth century,
hampered the growth of fresh competition is seen in the history of the origin of the
“Kölner Bergverein,” which had to wait two and a half years for the formal sanction
of its statutes, and finally received it only in 1849, after numerous “doubts” of the
authorities about the statutes in their original form had disappeared.
218 Till after 1860
the authorities clung to the belief, as the explanatory memorandum to the 1865
mining law shows, that a co-operative mining association (Gewerkschaft), and not
a limited company, was the most suitable form of mining undertaking.
219 The
difficulties put in the way of every new company are therefore intelligible. But they
meant neither more nor less than the artificial restriction of just that form of
undertaking to which the future of mining belonged.
While on the left bank of the Rhine, where French mining law obtained, the firm
of Haniel acquired, in face of the protests of their competitors, the enormous area of
110 million square metres, official administration on the I right bank aimed at
maintaining as far as possible equality between the various mines and the
continuance of small masters.
220
Monopoly in coal mining did not rest, therefore, on an agreement between
producers, who enjoyed and sought to develop special monopolist prerogatives. Its
supporters and directors were the government and the administration. They protected
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individual mines from the possibility of mutual competition in the market by fixing
a single price for the whole district.
221 They even granted a bounty on export in bad
times.
222 The aim of the State in organising the monopolist system was no doubt
partly to put the miners in a position to bear the heavy taxes laid until 1865 on
mining,
223 and therefore here, as in England, the connection between the grant of
monopoly and the interests of public finance can be traced, though naturally in less
gross forms.
A similar system of royal right and official administration prevailed since the
enactment of the mining regulations of 1769 in the coal mines of Upper Silesia. But
the landowners received as compensation a previous, or, as it was later, a coincident
right of mining (Vorbau-Mitbaurecht) in the case of grants on their land. Some of
them received the jus excludendi alias:’
224 Till 1854 the expression “landowner” was
interpreted by the authorities to mean only the few remaining “Dominialherren,” in
the district of Beuthen the nineteen owners of estates in knights fee (Rittergut).
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Finally, the State had the power, as always where royal rights obtained, to reserve for
itself any area it desired by a mere declaration of the mines department. In Silesia,
too, royal rights, official administration, privilege of landowners, and reservations by
the State tended to restrict new competition, though monopoly did not outwardly
appear in so uniform a shape as in Rhenish Westphalia, where the principle of
official administration was adopted with greater logical thoroughness.
226 And the
extensive speculations in the exploitation of mining land which occurred when in
1854 every landowner received the Mitbaurecht
227 shows clearly how the limitation
till that date of such rights to owners of “Dominium” had checked the expansion of
mining.
In iron mining, which must be considered in close connection with iron smelting,
the circumstances were mostly different. Though the latter had been from early times
a separate industry, not legally subject to the principle of the Mining Royalties, the
unavoidable economic dependence of smelting and forging works on iron ore and
wood enabled the owners of land and of mining rights (except where, as in Upper
Franconia and Siegerland, they were pushed into the background by the
manufacturers), gradually to subject the smelters to their own conditions and
provisos.
228 Usually the owner granted a speculator a concession, in return for
payment in iron or later money, to dig for iron in a given radius, to build smelting
works, or to take a given amount of wood from the forests.
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where princely owners of mining rights owned smelting works, fresh competitors
found a barrier erected against them from the first. It was imperative, for the sake of
securing a fitting income from dues, to save the concessionaire from any new
enterprise which might by competition lower his prices.
The connection of landownership with smelting might result in the protection of
existing works even where free mining had been declared, as is shown by the history
of the Mansfeld copper mines. They received “a patent of freedom “as early as 1671,
and in consequence several works sprang up, apparently in complete independence
of one another. From time immemorial miners and smelters had enjoyed the right of
getting their supplies of coal and wood at very moderate prices from the forests of the
Counts of Mansfeld. Production increased, and as the fuel at their disposal became
more and more insufficient, the various works made mutual arrangements as to the
exact extent to which each might share in the available coal; in fact, the whole
smelting industry and its kindred trades was conditioned and regulated in extent by
the fixing of the so-called “Firing shares” (Feueranteile). Any new producer had to
attempt to secure a share in this fixed amount of fuel, or in other words, to come to
an agreement with the “cartel” of existing works. Naturally this fact put very
considerable difficulties in the way of fresh competition.
230
Where special grants of mining rights prevailed, competition was entirely out of the
question. This system of special grants was chiefly used by princes where mining was
considered a particularly hazardous business, entitling those engaged in it to the
continuous protection of a monopoly. An instance are the mines at Ilmenau, which
the Duke of Weimar attempted about 1780 to rescue from their entirely neglected
condition and to restore to prosperity. A new mining association was formed and
received the privilege of “taking over at its pleasure, subject to customary notice and
sanction, all seams and borders which might thereafter be discovered in that part of
the Henneberg mountains belonging to Weimar.” It also received the right of pre-
emption over “all wood and coal necessary for mining.”
231 In the Rothenburg district
and in the Saale region, contrary to the practice in Mansfeld, similar privileges were
granted to a single association by the owner of the royalty. Their exclusive right of
copper mining was renewed in 1691, and lasted till their indebtedness led about 1670
to the concession being taken over by the State.
232
In Siegerland the position was very curious until well on in the nineteenth century,
though there, too, the law gave protection by monopoly. Mining and smelting wereHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 60
influenced not by landowners or princes, but by the craft (Zunft).
233 Abolished in
1806 on the conquest of the principality by the French the craft gild was reformed in
1813, and in 1830 the gild of “smelting and forging works” received anew the royal
sanction to the “Smelting and Forging Regulations for Iron and Steel Smelting and
Forging in Siegerland.” These regulations show the way in which the transfer to an
increasingly capitalist industry of the monopolist institutions of the craft gild was
attempted.
234 The law first lays down that no new woodconsuming smelting works
shall be set up within the bounds of the principality of Siegen.
235 After this restriction
on new works the law goes on to deal with the limitation of smelting days, which had
existed for many years to economise coal and water supplies, and now became a
means of dividing production between the then new blast furnaces. Excesses over the
limit were punished by fines, but smelting or forging days not used could be sold to
another works in the same district.
“This provision,” it is stated in the ‘Berggeist’ as late as 1856, “is so often made
use of that there exist to-day smelting works that may be in activity the whole year,
and forges that are entirely shut down.... Though the forges are temporarily closed,
the works receive their regular income by the regularly repeated sale of their forging
days.” The possibility of transferring to another the quota of production represented
by the number of smelting days opened the way for concentration of the production
of each works in this cartel, in fact to a kind of trust organisation. Apart from this
fact, these regulations, like official administration in coal mining, were simply the
means of protecting small masters against concentration, and naturally delayed the
development of large capitalist undertakings. The growing facilities for coal transport
(Ruhr- Sieg Railway, 1861) shattered the monopolist position of charcoal-burning
works, as the Smelting and Forging Regulations did not apply to coalburners. But this
artificially maintained monopoly did not cease to be effective in practice until about
1860, and was only abolished formally in 1865.
236 The English economist, Banfield,
travelling in Germany in the ‘forties, was greatly astonished at these trade
regulations. “The principle of competition,” he says,
237 “by which so much has been
done in Cornwall, is ... altogether rejected.”
It is clear from what has been said that in German mining and smelting in the
eighteenth and in some cases till late in the nineteenth century the law hampered
competition and led to the monopolist dominion of existing undertakings. The facts
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monopolist organisation, more especially when it was combined with a dislike on the
part of the authorities to the new form of undertaking represented by the limited
company. Before the declaration of free mining, special grants of State mining
rights
238 had had a decidedly monopolist effect, and officialism substituted for a
single monopolist a compulsory Cartel of many members. The influence of
landowners and the gild organisation of the legally recognised craft corporations
combined with the monopolist tendency of the mining rights to restrict the
development of competition. The reform of the mining laws between 1850 and 1870
was expected to lead to a general encouragement of capital, and of the hitherto
suppressed spirit of enterprise,
239 and nowadays it would be admitted that no slight
share in the resulting expansion of mining was due to the era of free trade then
inaugurated.
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In trades where there were no craft associations, monopoly depended on the grant
of privileges to special factories and manufacturers, a custom which continued till
about 1800. Wherever the system of concessions prevailed, the government was
guided by the principle that there must be “a demand” for a new undertaking before
it could be sanctioned.
241 As the government itself decided whether such a demand
existed or not, this criterion frequently acted as a check to competition. The history
of the numerous privileged factories
242 offers very many examples of this. The Calw
Cloth Company, for instance, had owned since 1774 a factory which rejoiced in the
most complete monopolist protection. In 1775 a clothier at Nagold sought permission
to start a second cloth factory. His petition was, however, refused, as the company
succeeded in persuading the Chamber of Commerce and the government that a
factory of this kind would narrow its sphere of business.
243 As in England, in the
seventeenth century, infant industries especially received protection, and by exactly
the same methods. An excellent instance is to be found in pottery. In Bavaria the
heirs of Pfeiffer were granted in 1770 a monopoly by the Markgraf of Ansbach. Forty
years later an inventor named Leers petitioned for “the sole privilege of
manufacturing china and stoneware, and the prohibition or heavy taxation of all
imports from abroad of his wares.” Apparently Leers had not anticipated that official
views on the grant of monopolies had changed since 1770, or had hoped to move the
government to sanction so extreme a measure of protection by his financial promises.
And in fact he obtained quite a sufficiently monopolist position by the promise “that
no privilege of setting up a similar factory would be granted without consultationHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 62
with the owner (of the monopoly), and without detailed investigation.”
244 Equally
instructive is the history of the famous porcelain manufacture in the Frankenthal. The
founder of the industry, Paul Anton Hannong, had wished to make porcelain in
Strassburg, but had been hampered by the monopolist privileges of Vincennes, and
when, threatened with the demolition of his furnaces if he continued his trade, had
sought salvation in the Palatinate. There he received in 1755 the monopolist
advantages he was seeking, the right of exclusive manufacture of porcelain in the
Palatinate, the prohibition of the importation of foreign porcelain with temporary
provisions as to foreign wares in stock, the right to acquire under compulsory powers
land containing porcelain earth, and cheap supplies of wood from public forests.
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As regards early capitalist trades not organised on the factory system, such
monopolies as existed were far less uniform and much more complicated. Capitalist
financiers (Verleger) mostly traders, capitalist masters, and craftsmen sunk to
working for financiers (Verlagsarbeiter) are all to be found. Just as we have seen was
the case in England, the State in sanctioning such monopolies aimed at protecting
small masters, to secure for whom steady and profitable prices it was thought
necessary to protect capitalists by the grant of monopolies.
In the Solingen cutlery trade, which in the sixteenth and especially in the
seventeenth century had become a domestic industry financed by capitalists,
246 the
struggle for monopoly became at the end of the eighteenth century increasingly
severe. A remarkable book written in 1777 describes this struggle in detail and with
inside knowledge.
247 The privileged traders who, in spite of all attempts at legal
protection, had degraded the small masters to the position of “slavish day
labourers,”
248 attempted to paralyse the outsiders by aid of the law. The “outsiders”
consisted of first the unprivileged traders, and secondly the so-called “finishing”
small masters, who possessed sufficient capital to buy raw material and, in
contradistinction to the dependent craftsmen who only carried out certain processes,
delivered their knives to the| traders completely manufactured, or sold them directly
themselves.
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In 1777 the privileged traders tried to shake off the troublesome competition by
new trade regulations, which forbade (i) the combination of retail trade and
manufacture, (ii) the admission of new unprivileged traders, (iii) the giving out by
unprivileged traders of raw material to craftsmen, and (iv) the purchase of knives by
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their privileged brethren. In other words, the “finishers” were to a certain extent
compelled to sell to the privileged traders, inasmuch as they were forbidden to trade
themselves, and difficulties were put in the way of sale to unprivileged persons.
There was worse to come. The privileged traders ceased to buy finished knives. They
found it more profitable to have their goods made in separate stages; for finished
goods there was a price fixed by law, whereas where each process was separately
paid there was no normal rate.
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“The palpable result,” writes the author of the above quoted book,
251 “is that if a
finisher cannot sell the goods which he has made with his own materials either to
privileged or unprivileged merchants or abroad, he must either close his works or
become dependent on the privileged merchants who secured the exclusion of the
unprivileged from manufacturing under the New Regulations, and accept from them
the raw materials which he formerly bought himself considerably cheaper, and, like
every other downtrodden day labourer, gain his scanty daily bread by piece-work.
This way lies slavery, as certain a concomitant of the monopoly gained by the
privileged traders under the New Regulations as light is of fire.”
The argument that by reducing ruinous competition prices can be kept, to the
advantage of the dependent craftsman, from a “fall,”
252 was again and again used by
the privileged traders in support of their monopolist aspirations. A similar motive
was alleged in another early capitalist industry, the iron wire trade of Altena, where
the traders and the capitalist “Reidemeister” (wiremasters) formed a monopolist
organisation. Unlike Solingen, capital and trading were not actually united in the
hands of one class, but the capitalist (and mutually competing) “Reidemeister” were
closely dependent on the merchants.
Early in 1662 the Elector’s Vice-Chancellor Diest suggested a recipe for alleviating
the depressed producers, which was often used in similar cases: — that the retailers
should be given a monopoly, and be obliged in return to take all wire at fixed prices.
At the time this scheme proved impracticable, but after 1700 it was fully realised in
the so-called “staple.” Just as about 1700 the London felt-makers had engineered a
project of making themselves more independent of the middlemen haberdashers by
establishing a common place of sale with monopolist privileges,
253 so the “Carding
Wire Staple of Iserlohn,” “the Iron Wire Staple of Altena,” and the “Steel Wire
Staple” united the interests of the merchant and the maker by means of a single
market. Contrary to what happened at Solingen, a well-established monopolyHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 64
organisation arose. The details of the organisation changed, but its constant
fundamental principle was that the staple company should be in a position to pay
producers a higher price by the deliberate suppression of over-production and mutual
competition and by the possession of a monopoly. The organisations based on this
principle, which have been recently described in detail by Knapmann, could,
however, only exist by means of trade privileges, and all such staple companies are
accordingly of the compulsory type. For instance, even in the first carding wire staple
of 1720, any person who did not sell his entire produce to the staple was threatened
with imprisonment, and similar provisions were also usual later. Further, once
formed the staple companies became the only legal source of supply for native
merchants. These coercive powers were essential for the successful regulation of
prices and division of production, and for the assurance that the provisions relating
to individual production, most clearly expressed after 1773 in the Repartitions or
allotted quotas, were duly observed. In 1779 the evasion of the Repartitions by means
of outside labour was made punishable by heavy penalties and removal from the
trade. Further considerable restrictions were set on the rise of fresh competition by
trade regulations. In 1767 entry into the iron wire staple was made more difficult, and
an ordinance of 1754 limited by statute the number of forges in the steel wire trade
to 36, a provision which chiefly benefited the rich “Reidemeister,” four of whom
controlled more than half the total output.
A clear proof of the importance of these and many similar official measures to the
existence of the staple organisation is to be found in the fact that when legal
compulsion ceased monopolist associations were unsuccessful. For instance, in 1810
a projected combination in the steel wire trade could not be carried out because, since
freedom of trade had been introduced in 1809, newly risen makers could not be
forced to join. Similarly, after 1809 many manufacturers and “Reidemeister” in the
iron wire trade no longer regarded themselves as bound by the staple, so that here
too, after much litigation, the combination was dissolved. State protection of
monopoly had become a thing of the past. When in 1810 an attempt was made to
re-found the steel wire combination, the government refused sanction and asked: “Is
it right to favour an organisation which extorts from its fellow-citizens prices above
those which the trade would command naturally?”
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The history of the wire industry in Altena and Iserlohn shows how State limitation
of competition could lead to monopolist combination of capitalists employing smallHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 65
craftsmen, and therein differs from that of the Solingen industry in which the
privileged retailers were unable to formulate in the concrete form of a single union
based on common interests the advantages they obtained as employers. Besides the
staple, i.e., the compulsory cartel or officially regulated association, the monopolist
organisation in a handicraft controlled by capitalists might take the form of a
capitalist company, differing from a staple much as a trust differs from a cartel. Such
an undertaking was the Calw Cloth Trade Company (Zeughandelscompagnie)
founded in 1650 as a public trading company. In return for loans of money it had
obtained various monopolist privileges from the government, for instance, dyeing
privileges (Färberrechte), as they are called in the Clothiers’ Regulations of 1686.
These privileges restricted the freedom of independent clothiers, i.e., those not
employed by the company, and assured it thereby a firmer control over production
by making competition in finished goods from this side impossible. They were also
aimed against the competition of outside dyers, whose markets were similarly limited
by various regulations to the company’s advantage. Like the English patentees, the
company succeeded in obtaining the exclusive right to supply a number of goods,
whose manufacture they introduced from France, and taught to the clothiers
dependent on them, claiming on this account the right of a “new discovery.” No new
trader could enter the district. Within the region affected by the trade regulations the
rise of clothiers who might seek to employ their poorer brethren ceased. No member
of the company could leave it and set up an independent business. Outside the above
region the company tried by means of rights of view and pre-emption to restrict the
markets of independent clothiers. Free goods, that is goods not bought from the
company, were stamped by them, and this stamp, popularly called a “Voulez-Vous,”
whether rightly or wrongly, depreciated the value of the goods by the implication that
the company had rejected them. Between 1674–1688 attempts were also made in the
cloth trade to establish, by means of the “Knappenhaus,” a monopolist mart for both
buying and selling, for the protection of producers. Clothiers had to bind themselves
to deliver all their goods to the “Knappenhaus,” which was bound in turn to take
them all. Private sale to foreign traders being thus intercepted, the Knappenhaus, in
which the company played the chief part, could, by regulating production, balance
supply and demand, and at the same time prevent the sale of raw material at low rates
to foreign outsiders. Just as the wire interests in Altena created a staple to control the
production of raw material, the Calw Cloth Company found in the Knappenhaus aHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 66
means of imposing their own conditions on its delivery. When the market ceased to
develop after 1686, and the company’s influence was directed towards an
increasingly heavy reduction in the amount of goods produced, the general opposition
of the clothiers brought the Knappenhaus to an end. But other trade regulations
remained, which tended to reduce to the company’s advantage the production of raw
material; for instance, the gild regulations which tried to check overproduction of
cloth by putting restrictions on the younger men, by making it hard to become a
master, and by decreasing the number of apprentices.
Nevertheless, all this mass of privileges failed to uphold the monopoly for long.
The State had tried to assure the Calw company a monopoly over as large a field as
possible in the so-called “Moderations Bezirk”; but it could not protect the company
from the rise of the cotton industry, which began after 1750 to spread all over
Germany, and whose products entered into close and successful competition with
those of Calw. Just as the use of coarse cloth had given the Calw traders certain safe
markets, so now Calw in its turn was threatened by cotton goods. The changing
circumstances of the market necessarily brought about the fall of the State-supported
monopolist organisation. Such an organisation ceased to have any sense from the
capitalists’ point of view when it could no longer, by suppressing competition, help
to exploit the monopoly their goods enjoyed in a market. Though the trade system
which gave the Calw company its monopoly had not altered in principle, the
company dissolved in 1797. Contrary to what happened in many other cases, the
system of “moderations” and the monopolist trade rights came to an end because the
interference of the State in matters of production was found unnecessary and even
burdensome by the manufacturers just at the moment when their predominance in the
market began to wane.
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The examples quoted will serve to show the existence in the eighteenth century, in
some cases till late in the nineteenth century, of a monopolist system in the early
industrial capitalism of Germany, mainly in mining, smelting, newly founded
factories, and in handicrafts controlled by capitalists. The monopolies differ greatly
among themselves. Some owe their existence to a system of direct official
administration or to mining laws of a monopolist tendency; others to survivals of
feudal or trade gild organisation; others again to all kinds of exceptional rights and
privileges granted them by the State. In form, too, they vary from the mere
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single monopolist undertaking resembling a trust. But the universal characteristic in
all cases is the limitation of competition by trade regulation. The history of their rise
and fall is no more uniform than was their legal basis. By no means in every case was
it reorganisation on free trade lines which led to the downfall of the monopoly; as in
the case of the Calw clothiers, a change in the economic foundation of the
undertaking might make the continued existence of a monopolist trade system
superfluous. The general causes of the decay were the introduction of freedom of
trade, the abolition of the privileges of landowners, the repeal of regulations framed
by gilds but favouring capitalist employers of craftsmen, the growing distaste of the
government for monopolist concessions to particular factories, and the increasing
success of the movement for the ‘reform of the mining laws.’ The gradual union of
the German States in a single trade area, which made it impossible to favour
producers in the markets of a single State by prohibitive duties, vetoes on imports,
export duties or bounties, was likewise opposed to State-protected monopolies; and
the development of transport facilities brought to an end the dominant position long
held by given areas of production for supplying large markets. It was just in the case
where this predominance continued longest, as in mining and in some instances in
smelting, that the old trade system of monopoly rights lasted latest.
The great difference between the beginning of freedom of trade in German early
capitalism and the abolition of monopolies in England lies in their dates, and in the
contrast between a consolidated England and the separate States of Germany. While
in the German States the trade regulations restricting free competition continued to
a great extent to exist in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and only came to an
end by degrees — sometimes quickly, sometimes slowly — England abolished
industrial monopolies at a blow at the end of the seventeenth century. In 1775 the
Calw Cloth Factory received in Germany a monopoly; the large New Mills Company
in Scotland found itself exposed soon after 1700 to the competition of other
undertakings, and tried to come to “a good understanding”
256 with them. Throughout
the first half of the nineteenth century State administration was still hampering the
growth of new concerns in Rhenish Westphalian coal mining, and regulating on a
uniform plan the competition of the existing collieries. In the north of England, after
the downfall of the Coal Gild, coal mining was completely free from all official
interference; in fact, the creation of even an entirely private combination of colliery
owners was expressly forbidden in 1711 and 1730.
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There remains the important question of the economic effect of these monopolist
systems on the growth of early capitalist industry in Germany. That we cannot here
answer. Was the protective trade monopoly necessary for the creation of certain
industries or of modern forms of industry, or not? Did it, on the contrary, delay
development by preventing capitalist competition? If a general answer can be given
to these questions, it requires much more extensive examination of facts than we can
here undertake. For our purpose, the answer is also not essential. Our object is merely
to contrast the history of a specific form of trade organisation, which was abolished
in England by the end of the seventeenth century, with that of a similar system in
Germany. The contrast is certainly not unimportant, if we desire to form an opinion
of the trade system under which the powerful English industries of the eighteenth
century arose.
It is remarkable that English political economy at the end of the eighteenth century
was not aware of the contrast between the form assumed by capitalist industry in
England throughout the eighteenth century, and both that which it had taken in the
seventeenth century and that which it was then taking on the Continent. Neither Sir
James Stewart nor, as we saw, Adam Smith dealt with the abolition of the former
industrial monopolies in England, or in any way drew attention to its importance for
the industrial development of their own day and country. Both know only trading
monopolies or monopolist civic corporations.
258 In the case of Adam Smith this is
partly to be explained by the fact that in his observations on industry he mostly has
the handicraft system in mind. When he is thinking of wholesale capitalist production
no special explanation of competitive trade seems to him necessary. What he says of
the introduction of new industries shows this.
259 He who introduces such an industry,
“the projector,” expects “extraordinary profits,” and, if the project is successful, his
gains are in fact at first very great, but “when the trade or practice becomes
thoroughly established and well known, the competition reduces them to the level of
other trades.” These words were written about the time that the projector, or
entrepreneur, was being most vigorously attacked as a monopolist in Germany. Von
Justi, for instance, writes:
260 “When in a given kind of manufacture or factory there
exists only one entrepreneur, the competition and rivalry of many men in one thing,
to which the goodness of commodities and the cheapness of prices is due, is wanting.
The lack of good and cheap goods is not only harmful at home, but makes it
impossible to gain credit abroad.... Entrepreneurs are therefore, from every point ofHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 69
view, contrary to good principles.” While von Justi hurls the bitterest attacks at
privileged entrepreneurs,
261 and in Germany the organisation of wholesale industry
on the basis of free competition was regarded as a much desired reform, to English
economists the existence of such a system seemed something quite natural, and they
regarded it neither as the remarkable result of a struggle which raged a century
before, nor as a special form of industrial organisation, unknown at that time in any





After the seventeenth century prolonged competitive struggles between numerous
manufacturers arose wherever legal monopolies had been abolished, and were
regarded as a natural consequence of freedom of trade.
263 On such competition the
English Parliament, which in its admiration for Colbert on the one hand opposed all
industrial monopolies, and on the other tried to aid industrial progress by bounties,
prohibitions of imports, export duties, etc., or by the artificial stimulus of
consumption, counted. The same protective measures which had enriched particular
individuals or companies under Elizabeth and the early Stuarts were now under the
magic influence of competition to benefit whole branches of industry, and, inasmuch
as they favoured numerous mutually competing manufacturers, even consumers also.
Accordingly the inevitability of competition was always the argument with which the
fears of the consumer were soothed whenever, in consequence of the high protection
given to an infant industry,
264 he thought himself delivered over to the arbitrary
dictation of a few monopolist manufacturers.
These views, generally accepted in England after the end of the seventeenth
century, prevailed also among the founders of classical political economy at the end
of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. Very similar terms
to those which we have already found in Adam Smith were used later by Malthus:
“If a machine was invented in a particular country by the aid of which one man can
do the work of ten the possessors of it will of course at first make very unusual
profits; but, as soon as the invention is generally known, so much capital will be
brought into this new and profitable employment as to make its products greatly
exceed both the foreign and domestic demand at the old prices. These prices,
therefore, will continue to fall till the stock and labour employed in this direction
cease to yield unusual profits.”
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Except for legal restrictions on competition by gild regulations and for certain
special peculiarities in particular occupations, Adam Smith knew of no circumstances
which could prevent the tendency of manufacturers’ profits to equalise. Starting from
the proposition that industrial production could be increased at will at the same cost,
he concluded that when for any reason the profits of’a particular industry rose aboveHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 72
the normal level in a country, an immediate increase in undertakings would take
place. From this it necessarily followed that agreements between manufacturers to
keep up profits must in the end prove ineffective, and that the interest of each
manufacturer was best served by free competition. If, on the other hand, profits were
reduced to beneath the normal level, Adam Smith assumed that the weaker were
crushed out, either losing their capital or investing it elsewhere; so that here again the
interest of the stronger was in the competitive struggle.
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It is to be noticed that Adam Smith only identifies the interest of the individual
manufacturer with competition where he assumes elasticity of production. Where a
restriction of already existing undertakings seems probable, he fully recognises the
possibility and the appropriateness of a coalition. As he explains in his lectures:
“When a number of butchers have the sole privilege of selling meat, they may agree
to make the price what they please.”
267 In another place he says that “ The trades
which employ but a small number of hands run most easily into such combinations.
Half a dozen wool-combers, perhaps, are necessary to keep a thousand spinners and
weavers at work. By combining not to take apprentices, they can not only engross the
employment, but... raise the price of their labour much above what is due to the
nature of the work.”
268 Another time he contrasts two competing traders with twenty
traders, and says:
269 “In the latter case competition would be the greater, and the
likelihood of their combining to rise the price the less.” It would therefore be wrong
to assume that Adam Smith identified competition with the interest of the individual
unconditionally. Where he had in mind a limited number of sellers the substitution
of combination for competition seemed to him both possible and also in the interests
of the traders.
270 His later editor, D. Buchanan, vigorously attacked this opinion,
seeing in all such remarks of Smith’s a desertion of his own doctrine of enlightened
selfishness and failing to notice that to make use of coalition instead of competition
in Smith’s hypothetical case was simply the result of the desire for the greatest
possible profit which animated the trader. Against Smith’s wise reservation in the
case of competition among few traders, Buchanan argued that competition was the
strongest of all motives animating traders, and would therefore even in such cases be
the only consideration in their minds. He disputes Smith’s example of the
wool-combers thus:
271 “Dr. Smith is not aware that if the principle of combination be
once admitted it may be turned against the most valuable of his doctrines. But a
combination of rival traders is a phenomenon which, until human nature is changed,Hermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 73
will never be exhibited.” In other places
272 Buchanan, again in polemic against Adam
Smith, formulates more closely the peculiar and invincible desire of “human nature”
for competition: “No body of traders ever can frame an effectual combination against
the public; as all such engagements are broken by the partial interest of the individual
concerned. No trader will keep up his prices for the profit of others; he will always
sell when it suits his own convenience, and upon this principle accordingly is
founded all this rivalship of trade.” Even where official interference makes the
original rise of competition difficult or impossible, as among gilds, Buchanan will
not hear of the possibility of the private combination of such privileged workers.
“The same principle of selfishness which prompts them to form the league, prompts
them also to break it. Rival traders have no confidence in each other; not two of them
will ever act in concert.”
273 M’Culloch was of quite the same opinion. While he, in
support of Adam Smith, deduces the impossibility of increasing prices from the law
that profits tend to equalise,
274 he is, on the other hand, convinced
275 that the principle
of competition must prove effective even where the number of sellers is limited and
no fresh competitors are added. For as soon as a number of traders in combination
raise the price above “what is due to the nature of their work,” it would be “in the
interest of a large body of the combiners to secede from the combination and throw
their goods on the market.”
Therefore one can trust the supply of the most necessary articles to the unfettered
competition of a comparatively small body of masters.
While Adam Smith admits combination in the case of a limited number of
competitors, his immediate pupils were convinced of the unconditional value of the
law of competition and of its necessary application even in such a case. To them
competition is the necessary consequence of individual desire for gain, which will
sooner or later break down every monopolist combination, even if to the common
advantage of the interests concerned.
Not till John Stuart Mill do we find a doubt as to this opinion and a rehabilitation
of Smith’s reservations. Mill quotes the experience of municipal gas and water works
in the thirties and forties and of the railway companies to show that undertakings may
be so large that a very few of them can satisfy the entire demand. To think prices can
be kept low by competition between such companies is a mistake.
276 “Where
competitors are so few, they always agree not to compete. They may run a race of
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come to terms with him.” He is further of opinion that manufacturers often succeed
by all manner of chicanery in compelling new competitors to follow the fixed custom
of the trade, and that, similarly, they compel its observation within their own ranks.
It is typical of Mill’s scrupulous treatment of the subject that, in view of the few
exceptions that he finds to the law of competition, he disowns the doctrines of
individualist economy which assume its ubiquity. The effects of excluding
competition had just been exhibited to all beholders in a new field of industrial life,
in the erection of large municipal gas and water works and in railways. Combination
had conquered one whole sphere of industrial activity. But it was very different with
the large manufacturing trades, which had continued after 1800 to develop on former
lines. In this sphere of industry competition ruled, as before, without exception. More
especially is this true of the most important finished goods of the period. In these
trades we find in ever-increasing degree the continually growing number of
undertakings and the multiplicity of existing factories, which are nowadays also a
general sign of the prevalence of competition.
In 1835, 1313 establishments existed in the wool and worsted spinning trade, an
increase of 10 per cent, in four years.
277 In 1787 cotton mills numbered 143, in 1835
they were 1070.
278 The silk industry, though a late offspring of English textile trades,
also showed a rapid increase in the twenties and thirties. Silk factories increased in
Manchester and Salford alone from 5 in 1820 to 16 in 1832, and in 1835 the total
number of them in England was 231. The total number of wool, cotton, flax, and silk
factories increased in the short period from 1835 to 1839 by 1016, 98 of which were
not working in the latter year.
279 The iron trade had as early as 1791 73 coal-burning
furnaces;
280 as prices rose, their number increased in five years to 121, and in 1806
Great Britain already contained 233 such furnaces.
281 The number of furnaces is no
very safe guide to the number of undertakings, as even at the end of the eighteenth
century many ironmasters owned more than one.
282 The large number of undertakings
is seen, however, from the fact that in 1806 233 furnaces were divided among 133
works. In 1791 Scotland had possessed only 16 modern (coal) furnaces; in 1850 it
had 113, and in England the number had risen to 405.
283 Paper factories numbered
several hundreds between 1820–30.
284 Copper and brass had become divided, since
the eighteenth century, among numerous mutually competing manufacturers, and
where the consumers once feared the monopoly of a few works we have the
Birmingham makers complaining in 1799 that, owing to the “numerous competitors,”Hermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 75
they could not sell at profitable rates.
285 About 1820 these industries, both in
Wolverhampton, Birmingham and other places, were given over to an unceasing
competitive struggle. Comparatively little capital was required to start a new
business, and hundreds of small competitors sprang up beside the big works.
286 A
similar development took place in other industries — for instance in the glass
trade.
287
In 1833 a Parliamentary Committee enquired into the state of manufactures,
commerce and shipping, and the extensive evidence taken showed that in the
manufacturing of finished goods — which alone were, in fact, considered — a
vigorous competitive struggle was going on.
288 This had produced in the bad years
which preceded 1820 such a lowering of prices
289 that the profits of most
undertakings were exceptionally small, and in some cases no longer covered the cost
of production.
290 The opinions of the experts heard by the Committee were
characteristically expressed by a textile worker:
291 “We have long considered that part
of our grievances was caused by the steam looms and by the competition of foreign
manufacturers; but we consider that a very trifling matter in comparison with the
home competition that exists among our masters, and till there is some remedy for
that we shall never be better.” Employers and workers seemed equally convinced of
the oppressive results of competition; but there is no trace throughout the evidence
of any united action to restrict or abolish it. Rather in all branches of industry
competition was regarded as an evil, as inevitable as it was harmful, and the
survivors regarded it as little more than a natural consequence of the struggle for
existence that the weaker gradually became entirely submerged. Adam Smith had
taken the ruin of such men as a completely natural fact, unimportant compared with
all the advantages of the competition he championed. He had in mind the condition
of affairs which an expert stated in 1833 to be prevalent in England when he said:
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“I should ascribe to increased competition the misfortunes of many people in
England. If too many people run into one line of business, of course the weaker
portion must give way.”
The general characteristic of this great industrial expansion in England was,
therefore, ever-growing competition. All the variations which close observers like
Mill noticed appeared necessarily not as a refutation but at most as a passing
exception to the rule. They were important enough to refute the current deduction of
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sufficient to alter essentially the general complexion of industrial organisation. They
were in consequence neither fully recognised nor thoroughly investigated.
This is especially true of the monopolist combinations which existed in the various
branches of English mining in the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth
centuries, sometimes for long, sometimes for short periods. It is only recently that
these first variations from the competitive type since the establishment of industrial
freedom have begun to attract the attention of economists as early examples of the
monopolist organisation which is at present gaining increasing control over industry.
In their own day they were hardly noticeable exceptions to the general tendencies of
contemporary commerce, but we can now see that though they themselves have long
since passed away they were the forerunners of modern cartels and trusts. The most









After the official coal gild of Newcastle was broken up coalowners continued to
regulate the sale of coal by private arrangements. In 1665 “a meeting of the several
principal traders in coal” was held and came to an agreement as regards production
and prices;
293 though, as we have seen, the most vigorous attempts were made by
legislation in the next few years to strangle any agreement between mineowners
which might result in a monopolist control over the coal trade. The first prohibition
of this kind dates from 1711.
294 If one may deduce from its contents the state of
affairs which it was intended to meet, the agreement of 1665 was not unique, but a
common phenomenon in the northern coal trade. The Act, for instance, declares to
be “void and illegal” all contracts and agreements, written or oral, between
coalowners, etc., aiming at the monopolisation of coal, or the prevention or hindering
of any person from buying, loading, shipping, or selling coal. This provision was to
come into operation as from the 1st of June 1711,
295 and any person who after that
date maintained, continued or called into existence an agreement of the aforesaid
kind is threatened, with heavy penalties.
It is clear, therefore, that at that time agreements among the Newcastle mineowners
were everyday matters. Of the succeeding years we know little. The last known cartel
of the earlier eighteenth century dates from 1725.
296 It may be assumed that Queen
Anne’s Act, renewed in 1730 by George II, did something to hinder the rise of
cartels, though Rogers doubts this,
297 and is of opinion that the experts who stated in
evidence given in 1800 that 1771 was the year in which the cartels began, had
forgotten the existence of the earlier ones. This assumption is, however, improbable,
because there appeared before the Committee of 1800 persons who had been engaged
in the northern coal trade, in one case ever since 1755.
298 There seems little
justification for accusing their memories when we know of no facts, apart from an
attempt in 1768,
299 which prove the existence of combinations in the years before
1771.
The theory that a combination existed at that time rests on assumptions and
probabilities, and against it there is one important fact. The combination of 1771, theHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 78
so-called “Limitation of Vends,” was the result of certain competition which had for
some considerable time troubled the coalowners. This competition, due to newly
discovered mines in the north of England, must have contributed more to prevent the
rise of a single organisation of owners than the prohibitions of the law, which, though
drastic, could not touch private agreement.
It must also be remembered that the Sunderland coal trade, which only began in
1654, had reached considerable dimensions by 1750. Between 1755 and 1770 a great
number of new mines began to be worked, among others the famous Denton and
Tanfield Moor collieries.
300 Finally, the use of steam in mines greatly increased
production. After 1756 steam engines, chiefly owing to the efforts of Brown of
Throkley, became more and more common in the northern collieries. The technical
advances due to them and other innovations of that time “produced a new era, paving
the way to the opening of those extensive and valuable collieries below Newcastle
in the Wallsend seam, and the deeper collieries upon the river Wear.” This
development was regarded with dismay by those who, on the advice of “far-seeing”
agents, had acquired mining property, then considered extremely profitable, but now
of decreased value. The Ravensworth, Strathmore, and Wortley families had leased
such districts as offered in the existing state of technical knowledge a profitable
return, hoping thereby to acquire a monopoly, whereas owing to technical progress
since 1750 entirely new mining districts now sprang up producing the most excellent
coal and more favourably situated for transport. The overproduction caused by these
mines seemed bound to lead to a fall in prices, and thereby to the ruin of the older
coalowners, who “in their great eagerness to monopolise those districts,” had
burdened themselves with “long and costly leases.”
301 Technical progress and
increased production on the one hand and the discovery of larger quantities of coal
on the other led to the sudden suspension of the law of diminishing returns in various
districts of the northern coal trade — a severe blow to those who, like the old owners,
could not profit by its suspension, the more so as the new owners, to gain all they




303 gives the following description of the competition which long
raged between the various mines and which finally led to the cartel: — 
“As more collieries were opened below the Tyne bridge, adjacent to the river and
the sea, every facility of exportation was increased, both by situation and cheapness.Hermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 79
Hence a rivalry took place between the ancient and the new and improved collieries.
The contention between them was long, arduous and mischievous. It was which of
them should by whatever means engage and keep possession, of the market and the
public supply. The superiority of the new collieries in quality and adjacency to the
river was naturally and by the aid of steam engines so great, that the inferior collieries
were obliged, in order to keep up competition, to resort to a practice so blameable
that nothing can justify it except the plea of self-preservation. It was this, to pass their
coals through a screen or sieve, and so separate the round and the large from the
small, that they might meet in the market. This practice was a sacrifice of labour and
of materials, so that the smallest coals passing through the screen were made worse
than useless. The waste was so immense that the labourers were directed from time
to time to set fire to the heaps accumulated, in order to rid the ground of an
encumbrance. Thus with a known loss they were enabled to meet in the market the
superior article. But of this contention, after lasting some years, both parties became
weary; they found it prudentially wise to unite in interest, to equalise the price, to
regulate the transmission from each colliery and to feed the public at their own prices
and according to their own convenience; hence their union became a direct
monopoly; it was agreed that the market should be fed, and not glutted.”
The answers of Mr. Thompson to the Committee of 1800 corroborate this
description.
304 He became in 1768 manager of one of the most important new mines.
After some years the profits of the mine were not satisfactory, and he informed the
chief coalowners that he “thought it highly expedient that a certain price should be
fixed.” The exclusion of competition seemed to him a necessary preliminary to an
increase in profits.
At his instigation representatives of the coalowners of Sunderland — who had only
ceased to send their coal through Newcastle in 1704
305 — met the coalowners of
Newcastle. Meetings were summoned and agreements as to prices and other matters
made, and these measures were repeated at regular intervals, until in 1771 a
permanent union arose, which, though in no way a direct successor to the old gild,
must be regarded as a renewal of the organisation which formerly existed in a
different industrial system.
For the existence of this association of owners, which lasted with certain
interruptions from 1771 to 1844, two preliminary conditions were essential. First, the
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association, without allowing outsiders to develop effective competition, underbid
prices and make its decisions useless. Secondly, it was necessary to find a market in
which Newcastle was cock of the walk; a market which could be controlled, and in
which prices could be dictated because other producers or groups of producers,
whether at home or abroad, could not develop any considerable competition. In short,
the combine rested on the monopolisation of production and the monopolisation of
the market This latter it achieved in London and its neighbourhood.
As late as 1800 it was shown that no other English coal district could in any way
effectively compete in the London market with Newcastle. Besides Durham and
Northumberland, Yorkshire, Lancashire, Cumberland and if Westmorland in the
north, Nottingham and Derby in the midlands, Shropshire, Somerset and Wales in the
west had been important producers of coal
306 since 1750, yet even at the end of the
century it was only as a makeshift in times of great emergency that the metropolis
drew on them for its supplies. The great cost of transport prevented the growth of real
competition with the Newcastle trade. The Committee of 1800 declared
307 that a great
number of coal deposits existed in the midlands and the western counties, “an aid ...
against which no legislative Prohibition at present exists, but which nevertheless has
been very seldom called to the supply of the London market.” Welsh coal was
practically unknown in London. Since 1780 it had been exported in rapidly
increasing amounts,
308 but only very exceptionally to London, freights from Swansea
to London being far higher than those from Newcastle.
309 Inland coal was in no better
position to compete in the London market. Neither Yorkshire, nor Warwick, nor
Derby, nor any of the districts dependent on inland navigation for transport could
rival Newcastle. Attempts to bring inland coal to London proved only too often
unprofitable.
310 Though the building of canals had greatly advanced since 1770, it
was in no way capable of coping with the regular transport of large quantities of coal.
On such canals as existed the water supply was so deficient that frequent
interruptions in carriage were necessary,
311 the dues were heavy and appreciably
restricted competition with coal transported by sea,
312 and, finally, inland coal did not
at first enjoy in London the repute of the northern coast coal.
313 As a result, at the
beginning of the nineteenth century it was only when prices were very high that coal
came to London by inland transport. We hear for instance in 1801, when coal was
exceptionally dear, of a “growing feeling” in favour of bringing coal from the
midlands, whereat the northern coalowners were much concerned.
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Their fears were, however, superfluous. For some decades their monopoly in the
London market remained safe, though about 1820 the limits within which they could
extort monopoly profits without attracting a rush of coal from other districts became
narrower. The owners in the north attempted, according to an expert’s account in
1830, to keep their price always a little under that at which it would pay other
districts to compete. Sometimes, however, they miscalculated. In 1828, for instance,
a syndicate price was fixed which was apparently too high, for the supply from
Scotland, Wales and Yorkshire immediately increased, and the cartel had to lower
its price again.
315 The fact that under certain circumstances competition existed was
brought forward by the defenders of the coal cartel to prove that it was not a
monopoly
316 — a somewhat thin argument, but used to-day by supporters of cartels
and trusts who point to the number of outsiders and so on. An absolute monopoly the
English coal cartel did not possess. But the fact remains that it was, up to a certain
point, in a monopolist position; that is to say, so long as it did not screw up the price
so high that it became profitable to get supplies from other sources. Up to that price
limit (which was rather high) the northern colliers retained their monopoly in London
even in the thirties, owing to the far greater cheapness of bringing coal to the market
from the north coast. When prices were low inland coal never reached London.
317 In
1833 and 1834, when coal was exceptionally cheap, only about 6000 tons of inland
coal in all were sold, as against over 4,000,000 of “sea” coal in the same two years.
How great, even at this time, the share of the northern mines in the London supply
was, can be seen from the following table:
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Place  of  Origin.  1832 1833 1834 1835
(Tons) (Tons) (Tons) (Tons)
Sphere of the Coal Cartel
Newcastle, 456,880 460,848 774,835 534,000
Newcastle, Wallsend,  708,998 599,299  667,538 732,210
Sunderland, 59,235 74,209 55,959 28,152
Sunderland, Wallsend, 559,363 590,174 501,321 601,402
Stockton, 169,247 170,187 221,711 229,885
Outside Sphere of Coal Cartel
Blyth, 49,927 48,649 64,268  65,046
Yorkshire, 48,  938 16,050 17,139 27,394
Scotland,  49, 579 15,138 39,487 40,955Hermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 82
Wales, 38,644 28,416 31,025 35,420
Various, 1,195  60  446 367
Small Coal,  10,174  3,583  2,487 744
Total by Sea,            2,139,078         2,010,409          2,078,625             2,298,812
Total from Inland Districts,  10,742 4.395  1,826 1,004
These figures sufficiently show the predominance of the northern coal districts on
the Wear, Tyne and Tees in London. Of about 2,300,000 tons of coal transported to
London in 1835 they claimed about 2,150,000, while only the very trifling amount
of about 1000 tons come from inland.
The peculiar relations of northern coal with the London market thus satisfied one
of the necessary conditions for the creation of a mineowners’ cartel. Thi second
condition was that the possibility of utilising these special advantages should not be
snatched from their grasp by mutual rivalry. If the northern owners were to turn to
advantage the monopoly assured to them, subject to a certain high price limit, by the
exclusion through natural causes of outside competition, it must not be made
valueless by unceasing competition among themselves. To regulate the price of coal
to the greatest conceivable profit of the mineowners, no under-bidding and a
systematic plan of common control over sales were essential. Without that the
attainment of a “fair price,” naively defined by an interested witness in 1830,
319 as “a
price a little below what the consumer can get the same article for elsewhere,” was
impossible. The experience of the years between 1770 and 1840 pointed to the same
moral. Where competition between the various mines prevailed, prices showed a
tendency to sink to the cost of production. When there was common regulation,
prices rose independently of the cost of production to the limit at which considerable
importations from other coal districts became probable.
All the numerous cartel agreements made in the northern coal trade after 1771 had
therefore one aim, to keep prices in the London market high. For this purpose various
measures were adopted at different times. The reasons which prompted the first
important agreement, in 1771, we have just seen. In that year for the first tirrte the
Tyne and Wear owners consented, after a prolonged period of competition, to a
cartel. The agreement was made in secret and its terms were not published, for fear
that the existing prohibitions of monopolist “combinations” might be set in motion
against it and its members fined.
320 One phenomenon which runs through the historyHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 83
of all later coal cartels appears already in this very first combination. Special care was
taken to ensure, by fixing the price, that mines whose coal was inferior in quality and
more expensive to work should obtain profits. In other words, the weaker and the
stronger were to be united for their common development. Experience had shown
that all mines suffered from competition, but that the chief sufferers, even to the
extent of complete ruin, were those who produced the less valuable kinds of coal.
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As the Committee of 1800 found, the mines which had the worst coal often showed
the highest working expenses.
322 New shafts cost more to sink, and their situation
with regard to the river was less favourable than that of the good mines. The mines
with the lowest working costs had also adopted newer machinery and “so reduced the
work of men and horses.”
323 Further, they had better appliances for loading.
324 In the
circumstances it is clear that competition between good and bad mines meant a short
shrift for the latter. In proportion as it reduced the price of the best coal, it attracted
buyers to the kinds which thus became considering their quality the cheapest, and left
the poorer kinds to fetch prices which did not cover the high cost of their extraction
and transport.
325 To assure profits to the owners of mines worked on less favourable
conditions, it was therefore absolutely necessary to restrict the production of the best
mines so that it covered only part of the demand. The owners of the better mines
could be compensated for this restriction of their production by driving up as high as
possible the price of their coal — which in turn profited the poorer owners, for the
outlet and price for the inferior coals depended mostly on whether the market was
overladen with good coals or could only get them at famine prices. Gardiner already
had complained
326 that it was the policy of the Coal Gild to sell bad or even
“unmerchantable” coal together with good coal, and nearly 150 years later the same
desire to ensure a market and favourable prices for the inferior coal again led to
combination in a cartel. The desired object could, in the circumstances we have
described, only be attained by fixing a scale of prices graduated according to quality,
of course with the highest possible price for each quality. In this way the poorer
mines were assured the position given according to the theory of profits to those who
produce in the most expensive way, but whose goods are necessary to meet the
demand.
An expert who had himself been secretary to the first cartel gave the Committee of
1800 some details of the organisation of the 1771 combination. The mines were
classified by the quality of coal. they produced, and their sales regulated accordingly.Hermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 84
Five of the best mines received the main share of the total sales for a given time. Two
further groups were given a smaller share at lower prices. Usually the prices of the
different qualities differed by one shilling a chaldron.
327
Of the cartel of 1786, which was the continuation of the above, we know rather
more. The 1771 cartel had collapsed about 1780, and for a few years the market had
been open.
328 The price of coal sank, as might be expected, when regulation of
production ceased. In Rochester harbour it fell from an average of 27s. in 1780 to an
average of 23s. in 1785.
329 Whether it were so low that, as was alleged,
330 a number
of mines did not cover their working expenses, can of course not be proved. But it
is beyond doubt that about 1785 the northern mines were suffering from
over-production and sinking profits.
331 This state of affairs led to a renewal of the
cartels. They were defended on all sides
332 as the means of “saving many of the
Persons interested in Collieries from ruin,” and preventing a further fall of prices and
closing down of mines. A cartel was formed in 1786 and 1787, and lasted, with the
exception of a few months, for a great number of years. Its organisation was retained
by all later coal cartels. Its inner managing committee was called “the Committee of
the Coal Trade,”
333 and the special agreement as to production and prices “the
Limitation of Vend.” The terms of this agreement we must now consider.
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The main part of the agreement related to the share in the production of coal to be
given to the colliery districts on the Tyne and Wear respectively. Of the agreed total
output three-fifths were to be allotted to the Tyne and two-fifths to the Wear. The
prices were fixed on the same method as that of the 1771 cartel. The restrictions on
production were various. First, the entire production was fixed yearly by the cartel
committee, and the Tyne and the Wear each given their quota accordingly in the
proportion of 3 to 2. Next, the amount to be produced by each mine was laid down,
each receiving its due share in the fixed quota of the two districts. This yearly quota
was called “the basis”; that of the individual mine “the allotment” — the allotment
being “according to the Powers of working and other Circumstances attendant upon
each respective Colliery.” The yearly basis was fixed according to the results of the
previous year’s sales, increased by an estimated allowance for expansion, and the
total of each district was divided among the individual mines according to their
nature and position. If a mine produced more than its allotted share, a special agreed
fine was levied on it. For every chaldron of coal in excess of its allotment it had to
pay at the end of the cartel year a fixed sum to the cartel. This was considered by theHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 85
members to be “a Sort of Admission of the Collieries, who have vended less than
their quantities, into a Participation of the Profits resulting to the Collieries who have
exceeded the vends.”
335 But as “the Allowance made... is not equal to the profits
resulting to the Collieries exceeding their Vend from that Excess” there remained the
fear that, despite the fine, individuals might produce more coal than was desirable in
the general interests. Therefore, the above-mentioned inner committee decided the
exact monthly delivery of each mine. Each colliery had to send a written statement
on the first Wednesday of every month of their deliveries; and in many cases the
owner’s agent had to swear to the statement before a magistrate. The committee then
fixed a monthly allotment for each mine according to the state of its yearly share. If
a mine had produced more than its share allowed, the excess was subtracted from its
next monthly allotment; if less, the deficit was added. The mines received notice
every month of the condition of their allotments, and the notice was intended as a
guide to owners “how much they should vend upon that Basis till the end of the next
month.” As the committee exercised great influence on the amounts of fines, the
notice must in practice have been a kind of warning, where any considerable
irregularity as regards the quota had taken place.
336 Very often also, after 1790, the
monthly vend was settled by the committee on consideration of the existing state of
the market.
337 This is very clearly seen in some certified copies of letters reprinted by
the Parliamentary Committee of 1800. One of them, for instance, says: “The Demand
for Coals being much greater than expected, the Committee think it right to give an
additional quantity, etc.”
Another letter from the Secretary of the Coal Committee runs as follows:
338
NEWBURN, 24th Nov. 1782.
SIR,
I beg you may vend no more Coals from Flath-worth till after the twelfth of next
Month. As you have already sold above 1000 chaldrons this last Fortnight including
Thursday and Friday last, there is no doubt that Walbottle
339 will get the Quantity




This and similar letters show clearly the active control exercised by the innerHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 86
committee of the cartel. The annual meeting settled the total amount of the vends; but
all individual sales during the year were decided by the committee, which had an
office and a secretary at the common expense.
340 The functions of the committee
were twofold — first, to regulate the total production according to the position of the
market so as to prevent overstocking; and, secondly, to see that the division of
production between different mines remained in accordance with the general decision
of the annual meeting. The meeting decided the proportion of each mine to the entire
produce; the committee saw that that proportion was observed, however much the
actual production varied from month to month. Increases or decreases on the total
amount were in the same way shared by each mine in proportion to their vend. The
division of the total production for the year, and the observance of the fixed ratio
throughout the monthly variations of the total, were the most difficult tasks the cartel
had to perform.
Inasmuch as the stronger elements, whose coal found at all times a good market,
strove to increase their shares, whilst the less favoured opposed such a step, internal
conflicts were inevitable. The “superior collieries generally work nearly what the
allotted Proportion gives them; but it frequently happens that they are some hundred
Chaldrons over such monthly allotted Proportion.”
341 We never hear this of the
inferior collieries. They had very much less interest in increasing production,
especially as the fines fixed for exceeding the vend were a much greater burden on
their profits than on those of the better mines, a weakness inherent in the joint
regulation of the output.
These difficulties often gave occasion to conflicts which threatened the existence
of the cartel. In the middle of the nineties the agreement was suspended for some
months “owing to some difficulty in the arrangement of Quantities.” In December
1799 the agreement was not renewed
342 “in consequence of some collieries which
stood on a high basis requesting to be put on a higher.”
But they never led to a prolonged suspension of the cartel,
343 which continued down
to 1840, in spite of temporary small conflicts during which both the agreement as to
prices and the division of the vend were at various times — for instance in 1829
344
— for some months in abeyance. The fall in prices in such cases soon led to a new
combination, usually pressed for with especial eagerness by the less favoured
mines.
345
About 1830 the cartel was faced with a serious danger. Through the opening of theHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 87
Stockton and Darlington Railway the colliery district on the river Tees had greatly
developed in the last few years, and especially since the railway reached the river’s
mouth its exports of coal by sea had greatly risen. The Tees mines had remained
outside the Tyne and Wear cartel, and were regarded by them “as a rival trade.”
346
The competition of these important outsiders noticeably depressed prices, especially
when the cartel broke up in 1832 and a “fighting trade” began.
347 The market price
of the best coal sank from 20s. 3d. in November 1832 to 133. in June 1833.
348
Whether the frequently expressed opinion of the 1836 committee that this
competition and the fall in prices which accompanied it swallowed up the entire
profits of the inferior mines is correct, cannot be decided with certainty. It is beyond
doubt that the complaints of the interested persons who represented the position in
1832 and 1833 as entirely ruinous were much exaggerated. We have learnt from
experience in our own day that a cartel always depicts the distress in a time of
competition in the liveliest colours so as to justify its own existence. But the position
of many collieries during the period of open market was clearly much less favourable
than it had been under the cartel. Even after 1840, these two years, which had been
the only considerable period of competition during seventy years and also the time
of the greatest depression known to the coal trade, were remembered with a
shudder.
349
As before, general competition led to renewed attempts at combination. In July
1833 the colliery owners met and passed a resolution
350 “that a general regulation of
the coal trade should be entered into.” The new cartel, which came into existence in
August 1833, was joined on the ist March 1834 by the mines of the Tees district.
351
The cartel was therefore more powerful than any of its predecessors. The number of
“outsiders” on the Tyne and Wear was negligible: according to an expert estimate
their theoretical productive power in 1836 was about 3,600,000 tons
352 against
8,100,000 tons in the same districts by the cartel, to which must now be added the
mines of the Tees, the majority of which, including all those of importance, had now
sought admittance.
353 Generally speaking the constitution of the 1833 cartel differed
little from that of the previous cartel. It dealt first with the fixing of the yearly basis
for the three large districts of Tyne, Wear and Tees, and for a smaller district which
now obtained a basis of its own. The due share of each mine in the total annual
production was then decided accordingly. In 1835 the district basis was as follows:
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Hartley, Cowper, Netherton  68,750
Total basis,  1,752,750
A fortnightly regulation of production was substituted for the former monthly one.
“The basis,” so the chairman of the Newcastle Coal Committee declared,
355 “is
merely an imaginary quantity; the basis is taken merely to apportion the relative
quantities as between the collieries; the coalowners meet once a fortnight or
twenty-six times a year, and, according to the price in the London market, the
quantity issued, which is to be divided amongst the collieries, is determined.” These
meetings, in fact, decided on the amount of coal it was desirable to sell, and each
district was then informed that in the coming month they might sell so much coal per
thousand of their basis. In 1835 this figure varied in various months from 40 to 85
per thousand of the basis. In the whole year the sum of the monthly amounts, i.e., the
vend, was to the original basis as 768 to 1000; in other words, the districts were in
fact only allowed 76.8 per cent, of the basis.
356 The shares of the individual mines
were dependent on that of the district, and each mine received monthly its allotted
sales in proportion to its share. An exact account was kept, in which excesses and
defects were listed as “short” or “over” respectively. Here is an example.
357 The basis
for April 1836 was fixed at 65 per thousand. Accordingly, of the annual basis of
969,500 chaldrons fixed for the Tyne district, 62,367½ chaldrons might be sold that
month. A certain colliery in the district, the Backworth, had been given a yearly vend
of 30,000 chaldrons. On the basis of 65 per thousand for April, its share for the
month was 1950 chaldrons. As a fact, the 41 cartel mines in the Tyne district showed
the following results that month.
Chaldrons.
Year’s basis .... . 959,500 
Issue, month of April, 65 per 1000  62,367½
Over .... 1,265 Hermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 89
Short ..... 8.227½
Short of total vend for the month  6,962½
Various steps were taken to secure the observance of the shares of production
fixed.
358 Owners had to appoint a representative for each mine, who was required to
have exact knowledge of the financial arrangements of the mine and to be responsible
for any infringement of the agreement, either in production or in prices. This
representative — usually the agent of the mine — must be known to the Coal
Committee and correspond with them in matters of dispute. The Committee were
empowered by section 16 of the agreement, “to summon the parties to this
agreement, or their agents, to answer any interrogatories, and to produce any
documents necessary to enable them to give full effect to this agreement.” Refusal
to give the necessary answers was punishable with a prescribed fine. For the special
case of excess on the vend, section 23 provided that “any colliery exceeding the issue
beyond 100 chaldrons, or 2 per cent, upon the basis to finish a ship, shall forfeit for
every chaldron so exceeding 5s., and such excess shall also be deducted from the
issue to the colliery for the next month.” To secure the payment of the prescribed
penalty, each member of the cartel had to deposit a bill payable at sight to the amount
of £20 for every 1000 chaldrons of his basis. This remained in the hands of a Trustee
Committee.
To establish this system, which was only a repetition of the former one, was not so
difficult. The great difficulty of the cartel was to realise its end, defined by its
chairman in 1836
359 as “to apportion the vend to the different collieries according to
the quality of the coal and the powers of raising that coal.” According to him — and
he had over thirty years’ experience of the trade — that had always been the duty
undertaken by cartels. There had been but few differences of opinion as to the
suitability of the above system. How to carry out the “Limitation of Vend” when once
fixed had rarely been a matter of dispute; but with the basis of division it was very
different. The fixing of prices and the principle which, while duly considering all
interests, would give a “fair” division of the output to each, was the debateable and
at times very sore point in the cartels.
Prices had to be fixed, first as regards their maximum, as far as this lay within the
control of the cartel; and secondly, as regards the relation between the various
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differences of prices than in the maximum price for best quality coal. The inferior
mines were equally interested in both. All regulation of prices, however, depended
on restriction of production. And here, too, there was a double question. To raise the
price of all kinds of coal a general limitation of output according to the actual state
of the market was necessary; whereas the relative prices of the different coals
depended on the supply of each kind of coal available in the market. Whenever the
London market was well stocked with the better coals, inferior coal sold badly at low
prices, and vice versa. The chief method of regulating the relative prices to the
advantage of the poor mines was accordingly to limit, as far as possible, the sale
allowed to the good mines.
Within the cartel itself, therefore, individual owners had private interests besides
the general interest. The good collieries, always certain of finding buyers, required
as large a vend as possible and the mildest penalties for exceeding it. The bad mines,
which only seldom exceeded their vend, depended for their existence on the greatest
possible restriction being placed on the production of the good mines and on high
penalties for excesses. Mr. Brandling rightly told the Committee of 1836
360 that “ it
is the interest of the low-priced collieries to get the high-priced collieries to raise the
prices of their coal, because it would enable them to do the same.” But by the side of
this common interest in general high prices there were conflicts of the bitterest kind
with regard to differences of prices and to the shares of production allotted to
individual mines.
The 1833 cartel allowed, as far as might be, for these conflicts, and attempted to
produce a greater harmony of interests than had formerly existed. Formerly it had
been left to the mineowners themselves
361 to estimate the capabilities of their mines
and the quality of their coals. In future the Committee named certain persons to act
as mine-inspectors, to classify the various mines according to their capacities and to
report thereon to the Committee. The Committee thus obtained approximately
accurate information as to the working expenses and quality of each mine without
compelling each owner to betray the condition of his business.
362 It then fixed the
vend of each mine according to the inspectors’ reports, with the reservation that the
whole matter was a subject of negotiation between the coalowners and their
Committee.
363 The owners could oppose an allotment; and special provisions were
inserted in the above-quoted agreement to meet such cases. Every difference of
opinion came before two neutral “referees,” and if they disagreed, a third was namedHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 91
as “umpire.”
364 The remarkable effectiveness of this system was seen in a famous
dispute between Lord Durham, Lord Londonderry, and the Hetton Company — a
dispute touching three of the most important mines on the Wear.
365
Besides this important duty of fixing vends, the cartel had to decide on the amount
to be produced each month, and to fix the common standard of prices and the actual
prices of each quality of coal. The key to all these problems was the state of the coal
market in London. The London wholesale dealers in northern coal had formed a ring
or pool, and it was therefore extremely easy to calculate the state of London
wholesale prices. Further, there was direct connection between the cartel and the ring
in London. Every second Thursday the secretary of the latter sent a report to the
Newcastle Coal Committee.
366 The Committee, which knew the price of coal at the
pit-head and also the cost of freight to London, could at once discover from the
London prices the profits derived for the moment by the coal ring from the
fluctuating market prices. The price in Newcastle was, however, fixed for a whole
year on the basis that the price at the pit-head plus freight to London was just a little
under the price at which London could obtain coal from elsewhere. As we have seen,
that was the limit within which the cartel could enforce its policy with regard to
prices. Having a fixed price, the cartel was not interested in the fluctuations of
London prices, so far as their own prices were concerned. But as an expert expressed
it:
367 “the price in London” was “the only guide for the quantity issued.” As soon as
the coal ring’s price rose or exceeded the limit regarded by the cartel as the price in
open competition, that was a sign that the ring were pocketing “ immoderate” profits
and that the London market could consume more coal than before at the old price.
Then the monthly vend could be increased. If London prices fell, so that it was feared
the cartel price could not be maintained, that was a hint immediately to order a
restriction of the amount brought to the pit- head. The secretary of the Committee
stated frankly in 1836:
368 “If we see by the markets in London that the price in the
Pool has exceeded the price we consider to be the fail-average price, which is a price
something below what the coals from other districts can be supplied at, we issue a
large supply; if it is below that, we consider the supply is more than the demand
requires and we diminish it.” In short, the coal cartel was concerned with the
fluctuations of price in London, not in order to increase or diminish its own prices,
but in order to regulate its production accordingly, and to supply now more now less
coal at the same price.Hermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 92
The existence of the London Coal Ring, which dated from about 1770,
369 was of
great importance to the northern cartel, of which it was often regarded as an
extension.
370 The more the ring succeeded in times of falling demand in keeping
prices relatively high, the less the cartel had to vary its monthly quantities of output.
A slump in prices, which would have resulted from open competition among
wholesale dealers, would have increased the degree of these variations and possibly
made the whole system of a uniform price throughout the year unworkable. When,
on the other hand, the demand was keen, competition would leave the buyers liable
to the danger that prices would be driven up very rapidly and encourage inland rivals,
while the existence of an agreement made it possible to delay the rise sufficiently for
the northern combination to hasten to meet the greater demand by increasing their
shipments. It was therefore in the interests of the cartel to support the ring.
Until 1830 the law helped the ring by ordaining that every sale of coal in the port
of London must take place at the coal market and through “factors.”
371 As a result,
the shipowners sold their cargoes not to the numerous wholesale coal merchants, at
this time about 150 in all, but to a small number of factors who had formed a single
committee, the so-called Coal Ring. In 1800 there were only 14 factors as against 28
wholesale merchants. The Parliamentary Committee of that year rightly pointed out
372
that “Monopoly was created ... by the Exclusion of the Masters and Ship Owners
from an Interference in the actual Sale, the Factors dealing only with the Coal
Buyers.” This state of affairs received legal sanction by an Act passed in 1807,
373
which made the sale of coal in the port of London dependent on sales on the coal
exchange and specified the exact procedure to be followed. Wholesale merchants
must enter themselves in the exchange register, and must sign at each sale the factor’s
contract book, which showed the officially certified cargoes of the ships.
374 Although
no special conditions were laid down for becoming a factor, there were only 19 in
1830.
375 Each factor made a private bargain with the coal shippers, but they had a
common agreement as to the price at which coal was to be offered to the wholesale
merchants.
376 In comparison with the enormous increase in sales since 1800, the
number of factors, who were in London the first buyers, had risen little. The ships’
captains who sold their cargoes at the port found therefore a very small number of
buyers — a fact which naturally much increased the power of the ring in its
individual bargains. If the shipowners could have bargained direct with the much
larger number of wholesale merchants, the greater competition among buyers wouldHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 93
certainly have increased their profits. As it was, unless the factors had been set up by
them,
377 they had to leave the lion’s share of the profit given by the market price over
their out-of-pocket expenses (purchase money and freight) more or less to members
of the ring
But in 1831 George IV’s law granting these privileges to factors was repealed. A
new law
378 which came into force in 1832 aimed at freeing the coal trade in the port
of London from all restrictions, and abolished the obligation to buy shipments
through factors. “The trade is open to any parties who choose to attend.”
379 Legally
factors were abolished, but in practice they long survived. The coal cartel took care
that the ring continued. As we have seen, it was greatly interested in its existence,
which kept prices steadier than could be expected with unrestricted competition. It
was now legally possible for any one who wished to buy coal to get it direct from the
shippers, and therefore competition with the factors was not out of the question. But
the legal possibility of buying coal directly, to the exclusion of the factor, could only
be realised, if mineowners or shippers were ready to sell direct. And this was not the
case. In paragraph 27 of the cartel’s agreement quoted before the members bound
themselves “that all the parties to this agreement shall strictly adhere to such
regulations as to the sale of coals in London by the coal factors as the united
committees shall from time to time agree upon.” The gist of its policy was that no
member of the cartel should sell direct to merchants, but solely through factors,
whether set up for the purpose by the cartel or merely connected with it by business
relations. An expert, the colliery owner Mr. Brandling, stated clearly in his evidence
in 1836 the attitude of the cartel towards requests for the direct delivery of coal. Even
if the buyer promised immediate payment, members of the cartel could not be moved
to sell without a factor. “If you were to come to my office,” he said, in reply to a
member of the Committee,
380 “ and asked me whether I would sell you coal or not,
I should say, Certainly, and my price is so and so, provided that you choose to go to
my factor. If you do not choose to go to him, you may buy your coals elsewhere.” In
such a case there would remain the possibility of buying from an outsider, without
employing a factor. And this way out was suggested by another expert, who defended
the behaviour of the cartel with less self-possession than Mr. Brandling.
381 But, as the
chairman of the Committee pointed out to him, the number of outsiders was very
small, and under severe cross-examination he admitted that most of them had only
inferior coal to sell, so that even so the prospects of direct sale were remarkablyHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 94
small. The ring, therefore, with the aid of the cartel, retained its power in London
even when its privileges had been abolished. As before a small number of factors, no
greater in 1836 than in 1830,
382 ruled the London coal market, each buying cargoes
for himself, but offering the coal to the wholesale dealers at a common price.
Even the ring and the resulting restriction of competition among the first buyers
does not, however, seem to have produced in all cases the desired degree of
steadiness in the London market. A strong east wind or good sea weather might result
in a large number of ships reaching London on the same day; and, if their cargoes
were immediately delivered to the factors for sale, a fall in price was inevitable.
383
Conversely, unexpected delay might drive prices higher than would be the case with
a regular and even supply. As early as 1834 the cartel made an attempt to limit the
possibilities of such fluctuations. They appealed to the ring, whose members were
partly dependent on the mineowners, to suggest some remedy.
384 The factors
accordingly adopted a resolution, with which the cartel heartily agreed,
385 that only
a limited number of cargoes should be sold each day in the port of London, the exact
number changing with the market price. Incoming ships were entered in a register,
and offered for sale by the factors in turn. The first forty cargoes on the register were
to be sold, if the market price of the best coal had reached 21s. a ton on the day
before; if it rose above 21s. a ton 50, 60, 70 or more cargoes would be put up for sale
on the following days according to the level the price reached. This decision was
carried out with scrupulous care. “The Factors,” says a report of 1836, “are very strict
in keeping to their regulations; and although a fleet of 300 sail should arrive, no more
than 40 ships will be offered on any one day if the prices should be below 21s. the
previous market-day. The Factors in reality feed the market, so as to keep the prices
as near as possible to those fixed by their regulations.”
To carry out these measures, the means which we have already noticed were used.
If it appeared that a captain or shipowner had sold more cargoes in one day than the
decision of the ring allowed, or that he had not observed the rota decided on by the
ring, the secretary of the ring reported the fact to the secretary of the cartel. The cartel
then boycotted the offending shipper, and this danger was usually quite sufficient to
make shipowners and captains observe the ring’s regulations.
386 But occasional
transgressions did occur. The Parliamentary Committee of 1836 discussed one such
case. It was shown that in 1835 two ships belonging to a London coal merchant, the
“Olive Branch” and the “Lavinia” were boycotted by the cartel, on information sentHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 95
by the secretary of the ring, Mr. Scott, to the secretary of the cartel, Mr. Brandling,
that the respective captains had infringed the decision of the factors with regard to
the order of sale.
The cartel and the ring worked in organised co-operation. The power of the ring
kept down the middlemen’s profits, and produced the steady prices which the cartel
desired, besides keeping prices at the highest possible level, i.e., just under the price
of supplies from other sources. The cartel on its side regulated the middlemen’s
profits of the dealers, by increasing or diminishing the amount of coal offered
according to the state of the London market, and so suiting the London price to its
own fixed price for the year. The monopoly made this possible.
We see now why the cartel followed the fluctuations of the London demand as
regards the quantity it produced only, and did not fix its prices according to those
ruling in London. As the London price on the year’s average could be so regulated
that the middlemen’s profits were but moderate, and that considerable fluctuations
during the year were avoided, it was far simpler for the managers of the cartel to fix
the average price for the year in the north only, and to let the “big” members of the
cartel maintain their own London factors if they wished to exclude entirely all
middlemen’s profits. As far as concerned the cartel as a whole, to fix the price once
only meant an important simplification in the functions of the committee; to regulate
prices according to those in London would have been more labour than the relatively
small loss in middlemen’s profits was worth.
The reduction of these profits, whether they went to shippers or factors, was the
great advantage which the mineowners gained from the cartel. When competition
ruled in the north it was the shipowners and captains who made great profits. Coal
was at these times cheap at the mines, and the shippers had the opportunity of buying
at a low price and turning to advantage any increase in the London demand. This
being so, it is just in periods of competition that we find mineowners themselves
owning ships, attracted by the higher profits of transport to take over the vessels in
spite of their usual unwillingness to run the risk of carrying freight.
387 When,
however, cartels were flourishing, large middleman’s profits, either by shippers or
by factors, were practically impossible. Both shippers and factors were more or less
hangers-on to the cartel, which could remain satisfied with fixing a price for the year,
and merely used the fluctuations of the London market price to guide it in deciding
on its total output.Hermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 96
One last duty remained. To make the poor mines, and especially those which only
produced inferior coal, pay, it was not sufficient to maintain a high price for the best
coal and to limit the output of the better mines. It was necessary to deal with coals
of very differing qualities, the worst of which depended for a market on the
difference in price between good and bad coal; and accordingly it was needful to
regulate that difference, in other words, to fix the relative position of the prices. The
cartel, therefore, regulated on a common plan the year’s average price for the various
qualities of coal. A similar system had been organised by the cartels of the end of the
eighteenth century, and there was no change as regards this in 1830 to 1840. The
owners of the best coal fixed their year’s price in accordance with the ruling market
price, and the remaining owners were asked to conform. Naturally, the influence of
the committee as well as that of the impartial umpire was considerable, and the
committee’s exact knowledge of the mines in the cartel enabled it to see whether the
various owners had named a price “corresponding to” the quality of their coal, or
whether it required amendment upwards or downwards.
388 As a rule the fixing of
prices was a matter of less difficulty than the division of production.
389
Enough has been said to show that the coal cartel had since 1770 continually
tightened the bonds of its organisation, and was by 1835 firmly established. It
controlled three large mining districts, except for a few outsiders. Shippers and
factors were dependent on it, and gained no larger middlemen’s profits than the cartel
allowed. Wholesale prices were regulated by fortnightly or monthly fixing of
production. Its object was the general increase in the profits of the coal trade, all
mines, whether working on favourable conditions or not, to share the advantage
equally. To that end, increases or decreases in the total production were divided
among the various mines on an agreed basis fixed according to the capabilities of
each mine, and mutual competition which might have arisen from the rivalry of
different qualities was prevented by agreement as to the relative prices of each
quality. Such were the essential functions exercised by the northern coal cartel during
its continuance from 1770 to 1840.
The origin and organisation of the cartel might provide many suggestive facts for
an estimate of the effects of this combination. We see, for instance, that when there
was no cartel, prices fell heavily, and that the cartel served to protect weak mines
working under unfavourable conditions. But such results, important as they are, can
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or its advantages and drawbacks. The high prices for which the cartel was attacked
were not denied by those who spoke as interested parties. Then, as now, they were
justified on the ground that they were no more than would give a “fair” profit and
keep the inferior mines from closing down. So argued the chief witnesses before the
Parliamentary Committee of 1800.
390 The same argument was the answer of the
secretary in 1836 to the question what would be the result on owners of suppressing
the combination. “It would produce a fighting trade; it would increase the
competition, and the immediate effect would be a depreciation on prices. How long
that would continue would depend entirely on the effect it would produce on those
collieries that were raising their coals at the greatest expense. The public, in the
meantime, would certainly get their coals cheaper, but there would be a transfer of
the labour and capital from one district to another, which would materially affect the
value of property within that district.”
391
The rise in price, therefore, which the monopoly made possible, was not only
admitted, but defended. To test the real value of the defence would necessitate an
exact knowledge of how high coal prices must be to cover the working expenses of
the least favoured collieries. As in almost every colliery both these expenses and the
quality of coal differed, we cannot of course get this information any more than the
Committee could. We can only deduce some general conclusions from the large mass
of materials which we have considered. It was certainly true that as early as the end
of the eighteenth century the cartel had, by increasing prices, helped to keep alive
collieries unfavourably situated, owing to the causes we have related. “The Purpose
of these Regulations,” says the Report of the Committee in 1800,
392 “was answered,
the Evils to which they were avowedly directed were remedied, the Depression of
Price complained of was removed, and the Dangers apprehended to the inferior
Collieries effectually averted.” But even this Committee is driven to the conviction
that the level of prices prevailing under the cartel, that is to say, throughout the period
from 1771 on, except for a year or so after 1780, had far exceeded the amount
justified by the working expenses of the worst mines. Its conclusion
393 was that “the
Coals would admit, with just Profit to every Part of the Trade, considerable
reduction.”
In 1830 and 1835 the position was similar. The Committee of 1830 state:
394 “It is
true that the application of Steam Engine and the use of Safety Lamp have enabled
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abandoned; and though coal is thus obtained, which would otherwise have been
altogether lost, the process by which these workings are conducted is said to be so
costly that they could only be carried on under a high market price.” The law of
diminishing returns made high prices a condition of existence for the inferior mines.
But here again the question rises; are not the prices driven up above the limits set by
the conditions of production in the least favoured mines? The answer of the
Parliamentary Report is: “It is evident that the prices respectively given in by the
Coalowners as those which under the regulation of the Vend they are willing to take,
are not in all cases the lowest which would afford a compensating return, but are the
highest which they think they can maintain under the competition to which they are
exposed.”
The enquiry of 1836, and indeed the statements of the coalowners themselves,
corroborate this view. We have several times already pointed out that it was a
principle energetically held and openly admitted by the latter to maintain the price of
coal in London as high as was possible without increasing competition from other
sources. “That is the point we aim at, and that is the point we consider ourselves
justified in aiming at,” the secretary of the cartel declared
395 in 1836; and when he
was asked, with astonishment, whether that was not the conduct of a monopolist, he
replied: “Certainly not. I consider it to be a combination that we are perfectly justified
in entering into. It is a combination of the proprietors to keep up the price of their
article in the same way as a combination of workmen keep up the price of their
property, which is their labour.” By which answer he admitted that it was not
consideration for a “fair” profit which decided the policy of the cartel as regards
prices, but, on the contrary, consideration for the highest increase in price possible
within the bounds of their monopoly.
In view of this fact, it is difficult to defend the cartel’s prices on the ground that
their sole aim was the protection of the least favoured mines. For the cartel fixed its
prices not according to the amount of the cost of production, or at least not only by
this amount, but chiefly with a view to the highest possible price which could be
obtained without becoming subject to increased competition from other districts. Its
policy could not therefore be justified, even on the assumption that it was desirable
in the interests of the mines which produced little profits to obtain a relatively higher
price than that obtainable by free competition. Even from this point of view, even
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we cannot escape the conclusion that the tendency of this monopolist combination
was to keep prices at the highest conceivable level, whatever the conditions of
production might be. The coal cartel must be judged as regards its prices like many
of the cartels which flourish at the present day under protective tariffs. Their
representatives also often maintain that the prices aimed at are only sufficient to
make the worst factories pay, whereas in fact their policy is entirely governed by
import prices, and uses the monopoly given by the tariff to maintain the home price
above the world’s price by the amount of the customs duty.
Even, therefore, if the conduct of the cartels is regarded solely from the standpoint
of its own representatives, it must be admitted that the regulation of prices was far
more a policy of self- enrichment than of self-preservation. If, in addition to the
producers, the great mass of consumers, who had to pay by increased prices the cost
of maintaining mines with high working expenses, are also to be considered, what
must then be said of the cartel and its effects? The defenders argued on the point:
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“Consumers also profit by the Cartel; for if prices had sunk owing to general
competition, the bad mines would not have continued working, and their cessation
would have caused a shortness in coal, which would again have driven up the price,
far higher than they have been under the regime of the Cartel.”
This argument was but poor comfort for the consumer, as the enquiry of 1836
showed only too clearly. As the price in the time of the cartel usually stood at the
level at which it would pay to send coal to London from other districts, and indeed
often, for instance in 1828, rose above that level, even if the cartel had not existed it
could hardly have risen much higher. The pauses in which a free market existed gave,
of course, no opportunity to test the correctness of the expectations which the above
argument held out. Competition usually lasted only a few months or at most a year,
and therefore no mine closed down during such periods; on the contrary, the rivalry
resulted in a great increase in production. How mines with poor coal would in the
long run have been affected by the fall in prices cannot be proved, because
competition always led in a short time to the renewal of the cartel. But even the
opponents of the cartel did not deny that the price prevailing in these periods of
competition did not in many mines
397 cover the cost of production.
It remains to consider the position of mines producing good coal. According to Mr.
Brandling’s statement, the difference in the cost of production varied from 13–14
shillings a chaldron in some mines to 23 shillings a chaldron in others.
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the best coal sold at 26 shillings on the Tyne, and 28 shillings and 6 pence on the
Wear,
399 large profits must clearly have been made by mines producing the best coal
cheaply. The owner of one such mine, apparently aggrieved by the restrictions of his
output, declared that his gains “had risen above the standard of a reasonable profit.”
He even protested against the heavy rise of prices and the accompanying restriction
of output, because it seemed to him more profitable for his mine to sell larger
quantities of coal at lower prices.
400 Had prices, therefore, fallen to the level at which
they stood before the formation of the cartel in 1823, i.e., from 22–23 shillings, only
such good coal mines as were worked at the highest cost would have been
appreciably affected. Even mines in which the cost of production was moderate
would have made a profit. It is true that the coal of some mines never realised ‘more
than 15–18 shillings a chaldron even during the existence of the cartel,
401 and these
mines would have been very badly hit by a fall in prices, unless their cost of
production was insignificant. But the commission of 1836 established the fact that
the productive power of the mines which supplied good coal cheaply was so great
that they alone could have completely satisfied the existing demand in free
competition. In other words, the diminished production of poor mines might have
been made good by the increased production of good mines had the latter not been
artificially checked by the Limitation of Vend.
Mr. Buddle, an inspector of mines and an expert, estimated that the possible annual
output of the mines controlled by the cartel had increased enormously in the years
1829–1836, that of the mines on the Tyne and the Wear having risen from 5,887,000
tons in 1829 to 8,123,000 tons in 1835. Technical improvements and the sinking of
new mines had contributed to this result. But though the theoretical productivity
increased, the actual output was smaller. The total amount sold by the cartel on the
Tyne as well as the Wear was less in 1835 than in 1830; on the Tees alone, a far less
productive district, it was a little higher. Whilst the possible output on the Tyne and
the Wear in 1836 was estimated at 8,123,000 tons, the actual sales of the cartel
amounted to 3,495,000.
402 Good quality mines, capable of producing about 150,000
tons annually, received from the cartel an allotment of 110,000 tons.
403 Unbiassed
judges of the conditions of production in the north, such as M. Wood, who had
himself been a colliery proprietor, stated
404 before the Committee that the number of
productive mines with good coal was so great and their working expenses so low that
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profit, while keeping out the poorer qualities of coal entirely.
The arguments used by those interested to justify the cartel policy therefore became
more and more threadbare. It was only possible to preserve those mines which either
produced poor coal or worked at great expense by a special reduction of the total
output, or else by withholding a large part of the best coal from the market. “The first
effect then of the regulation is to force an inferior coal on the market, which in a state
of competition evidently could not be sent to pay the producer,” said one
mineowner,
405 discontented with the price policy of the committee. The old abuses
which Ralph Gardiner had attacked so energetically in the middle of the seventeenth
century still existed unchanged nearly two hundred years later. The report of the
Select Committee of 1836 seemed merely to repeat his complaints in formulating the
results of the enquiry as follows:
406 “The result, therefore, is that at present the great
majority of Coal-owners on the Rivers Tyne, Wear and Tees are combined avowedly
to limit the supply of Coals to the London Market, so as to raise the Price to the
Consumer higher than a Free Trade would command and, also, to force on the
Market a larger proportion of inferior Coals at Prices which could not be maintained
otherwise than by such a Combination.” Whilst, on the one hand, coal was being sold
to the English consumer at a higher price to benefit a few mineowners, on the other
hand, it was being disposed of abroad at much lower prices. Those pits which were
working at a profit, and which were most affected by the limitation of production,
naturally sought to equalise matters by disposing of some of their surplus abroad. The
cartel did not regulate export, and every mineowner could export as much as he
chose. Although the exporter had to be satisfied with lower prices, mineowners who
wished to increase their output considered export business the best means of reducing
the inconveniences of a low share of home production. It was stated
407 that coal was
often sold for foreign consumption at 4–6 shillings a chaldron less than the price
fixed by the cartel for the home trade, and that even at these rates mineowners, whose
working expenses were low or moderate, could derive considerable advantage.
According to a later Parliamentary report coal from the north of England was actually
40 per cent, cheaper in St. Petersburg than on the Thames.
408
Consumers were not unnaturally always greatly disturbed whenever a fresh cartel
came into being and prices rose again, and naturally the new cartel was often
represented as an “illegal monopoly” and so on. The coal cartel in Newcastle was
attacked just as the petroleum trust or our coal cartels are attacked at the present day.Hermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 102
In the years 1820–30 consumers everywhere regarded the cartel on the Tyne and
Wear as an “illegal coalition.”
409 Although from 1826 combinations of employers
were legal, the common law of England had, from the earliest times, laid down in
practice the principle that “contracts in restraint of trade” are illegal. On this ground
a suit was provisionally entered in 1793 against the cartel to be tried in York, but in
fact it did not ultimately come into court. The enquiries of the Parliamentary
Committee of 1836 were partly the result of petitions from the county of Middlesex
and the inhabitants of Westminster. The report of the Committee declared that the
complaints of the consumers against the existing coal cartel and its monopolist policy
were not unfounded. “A question may arise,” the report says, “whether the Coal
proprietors by their combining to prevent Coals being brought cheaper to market, do
not subject themselves to penalties.”
410 These expressions are cautious enough. No
one, in fact, dreamt of prosecuting the cartel for “restraint of trade,” or anything of
the kind. Without fear of legal consequences the cartel could now openly show the
power which it had had to conceal carefully during the period in which cartels were
prohibited. The frankness with which the secretary of the cartel explained its position
and its policy in matters of price and production showed clearly how secure the cartel
felt itself. It stood more firmly than ever. And yet its collapse was approaching more










Before describing the decay of the coal cartel in the north of England another
combination must be mentioned which excited much public attention in England at
the close of the eighteenth century. In consequence of the increasing number of
complaints from merchants and manufacturers in Birmingham concerning the rise in
copper, Parliament appointed a Committee in the spring of 1799 to take evidence and
to enquire into the existing condition of the copper trade. Tooke’s tables of prices
411
show that copper had risen from 84s. a cwt. in 1790 to 109s. in 1795, and to 120s. in
1799. Moreover, in 1799 manufacturers complained that prices for English copper
were much lower abroad than at home, and that it was a matter of pressing
importance to them to have the customs duty on copper abolished.
412
The report of the Parliamentary Committee showed not only that a cartel hadHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 103
existed in copper mining, but also that after the dissolution of the cartel the
concentration of firms interested had been sufficiently powerful to continue a kind
of monopolist organisation. The expert evidence given before this Committee is the
only witness we possess (a few pamphlets excepted) for the existence of these
monopolist conditions. The question of combination played so important a part in the
enquiry that the whole history of the movement can be reconstructed.
English copper mining began in the last twenty-five years of the seventeenth
century with the discovery of copper ore in Cornwall. It increased rapidly in the
eighteenth century, and a large manufacture of copper into finished products of high
value developed. England soon produced a large quantity of copper goods which
previously had been imported from Germany, especially from Nuremberg and from
Holland.
413 One large consumer at the end of the eighteenth century was the Royal
Navy,
414 which used copper in increasing quantities for various purposes. In 1784,
according to “a German traveller,”
415 the production of fine copper in Cornwall
amounted to from 3000 to 4000 tons. It was estimated in 1797–98 (June 30 to June
30) at 5427 tons, whilst in 1790 the total output in England was estimated at about
6500 tons annually.
416 Of course these figures must be taken as approximate only.
Their importance lies in the fact that England exported copper annually in large
quantities. For instance, the amount of copper sold in 1797 to the East India
Company alone was 1500 tons.
417 Thus England had far outstripped Sweden, the only
other European country which could be seriously considered as an exporter. The
output of copper in Sweden was estimated by experts at from 800 to 1000 tons
annually, two-thirds of which was exported.
The export trade of several other European copper-producing countries, such as
Russia (Siberia), Prussia (Mansfeld), and Hungary, was beneath consideration.
418 In
times of unusual demand the copper mines of Armenia and South America could
help the importing countries, but the regular supplies were not obtained from these
sources.
419
Although England in the eighteenth century was the largest exporter of copper in
the world, yet the English manufacturer had to pay for his material higher prices than
those current in the international market. The import price in the continental
consuming countries — especially in France in the last decade of the century — was
fixed by the competition of the above three exporting regions, especially of Sweden,
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eleven guineas a ton on copper. But the evidence in 1799 showed clearly that the
English price exceeded considerably not only the export price of copper, but the price
at which copper could have been obtained from elsewhere under a system of free
imports. When in the middle of the nineties the Government required copper for
minting, it made the sad discovery that it could not buy copper at the same price
which the East India Company had paid. Later it proposed, in order to supply the
navy with copper at a cheap rate, to import copper duty free for Government
purposes, and to forbid the export of copper by the East India Company — a clear
proof of the great discrepancy between the export and the home price. A Birmingham
manufacturer stated that he had in 1788 been able to buy copper in Sweden at £98,
which cost in England £105. As the English price was no higher than the Swedish
plus freight and duty, it did not pay him to import. Even the figures given by Mr.
Grenfell — the expert who advocated the retention of the duties — showed that there
was great disparity between the English and the Swedish prices. According to him,
the price of one ton of copper in Sweden in 1796 was £110 and in England £118. In
the same year the East India Company bought English copper at a contract price of
£106 a ton, about £12 cheaper than the home buyer.
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The remarkable fact that in the largest exporting country of the world prices in the
home market were relatively so high in spite of rapidly increasing output began to be
noticeable from 1790 onwards. Ten years previously the tendency had been exactly
the reverse. With an increase in output prices fell steadily. Copper ore had fallen
from £73 2s. 6d. a ton in 1784 to £63 8s. in 1790. Before 1771 the East India
Company always paid more than; £100 a ton for cake copper. But from this date
onwards prices fell steadily, so that in 1781 the company only paid £79. In 1783, in
a report, the company expressed its satisfaction that, “notwithstanding the Increase
in the demand of Copper for the East India Company and the consumption of his
Majesty’s Navy and Merchant Ships, and for Manufactures, which have increased in
as great a proportion, the Price of Cake Copper has been reduced by £22 5s. per ton,
whereby there has been a saving to the Company upon 13,509 tons, which they had
purchased from 1774 to 1782 inclusive, of the sum of £300,375.”
421 In 1789,
according to Mr. Grenfell’s statement, copper cost in England £80, whilst in Sweden,
as well as in Cadiz, the price was higher. In the same year the East India Company
also paid £79–80 — no more than the English consumer. Only in 1790 did the
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in price a considerable rise in prices in England as compared with those in the
international market and a correspondingly marked difference between home and
export prices. And from this time the existence of the copper duty was important;
earlier it would have been unprofitable at the low rate of prices in England to import
even duty free, and therefore a duty was superfluous. Now the producer was for the
first time able to add to the home price a part of the amount of the duty, and thereby
to make a profit from the home trade. The reactionary movement of prices in the
English copper market in the last decade of the century had obviously an intimate
connection with a concurrent change in the organisation of copper mining. The
period of low prices had not contented the producer, however much it had satisfied
the East India Company and the home consumer. It was a period of severe
competition, which depressed alike prices and profits. It dated from about the year
1773.
422 This same year was marked by the opening up of a new mining district in
Derbyshire and Wales — the Anglesea mines. These mines could deliver copper ore
at much cheaper rates than the old Cornish mines, and, although the ore cost more
to prepare before smelting, still the Anglesea district competed very closely with the
old mines. The low price at which the East India Company bought copper in 1781
was directly caused by the determination of the Cornish producers to “keep the
Anglesea copper out of the market.”
The Cornish producers included both smelters and mineowners, as the combination
of mine and smelting house did not exist in Cornwall as it did in Anglesea. It was
probably the lack of this combination which made Cornwall feel competition so
much. In 1785 the Cornish mineowners had had enough of the struggle. Addressing
themselves to Mr. Thomas Williams, who already occupied a prominent position in
the Anglesea district, they begged him to bring about an understanding between the
two mining and smelting districts, of which the aim was to be “to bring the metal of
both Countries to the Market at a fair stipulated Price.” By this means they intended
to break with the old system of “public ticketing,” and to replace the sale of ore to the
highest bidder
423 by a system of fixed price agreement. In 1785 influential
mineowners in Cornwall formed themselves into the Cornish Metal Company. This
syndicate, in its turn, made a contract for seven years with all the Cornish
mineowners, binding them to sell to the Metal Company seven-eighths of their total
output of ore at a price to be fixed annually, the Metal Company reselling the same
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competition among the Cornish mineowners had thus been limited and in part
replaced by a single sales organisation that it was possible to come to definite terms
with the interests in Anglesea. There it had not been necessary to form a single
organisation. Mr. Williams was “acting proprietor” of all the mines;
424 he was the
business representative of the whole district and embodied in himself the requisite
compact organisation. Now that, on the one hand, the inter-competition of the
Cornish mines had been greatly limited since 1785, and that, on the other hand, the
copper ore syndicate and the Anglesea district had come to an agreement, there was
ground for hoping that the prices of ore and copper would fall no further, and that the
mines and smelting houses would become more lucrative again.
The exact nature of the “stipulations” which, according to Mr. Williams, were
made with the Cornwall syndicate, is unknown. But from the fact that in 1787
differences arose between the syndicate and Williams as to the respective “Proportion
of Sales at market,” it is obvious that there must have been some regulation of the
contingent of output to be furnished by each. But their mutual relations did not
remain long on the original basis. In 1789 already Mr. Williams had been invited to
undertake the general business management of the syndicate.
Having on hand an unusually large stock of ores to get rid of, the promoters were
afraid for the safety of the capital they had invested in the concern, if they could not
find some capable individual to dispose of the stock at a firm price. They therefore
placed the uncontrolled business management in Mr. Williams’ hands until the
expiration of the agreement of 1785. Thus nearly the whole of the copper output in
England and a considerable part of the stock of raw copper was at the disposal of one
single individual.
It is difficult to determine how far Williams took advantage of his position to effect
a rise in prices. The price of raw copper certainly rose again from 1787.
425 But the
reproach subsequently made against him was not so much that he had created an
absolute rise in prices as that he had bought ore cheap from the mineowners and sold
it dear to the consumers, whether smelters or others. By these means he was said to
have forced up artificially the profits of the syndicate. This opinion is confirmed by
the official statement of prices before the Parliamentary Committee, which gave the
price of copper ore in 1787 at £67 4s. 10d. a ton, whilst the price of raw copper to the
East India Company was £69–71. In 1790 the company had to pay £78, when the
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to increase the disparity between the two prices, and it was therefore not surprising
that Mr. Williams should boast subsequently that he had repaid the shareholders their
capital plus 5 per cent, interest as long as the contract lasted, and that the obligations
of the syndicate had been discharged in full. But while the syndicate was prospering,
its policy was damaging two groups of interests. These were, first, the mineowners
(who, though not participating financially in the syndicate, had delivery contracts at
a fixed price with it), for in spite of the rise in copper prices, the price for ore was no
higher than during the time of public sale; and second, the Birmingham
manufacturers, who as consumers suffered from the high copper prices.
Individual mineowners first began to move in the matter, and finding that they
could get a higher price for the one-eighth of their output which was at their own
disposal than the price paid by the syndicate for the remaining seven-eighths, they put
on the open market increasing quantities of copper ore in spite of the running
contract. Mr. Williams replied by creating a new organisation of copper-sellers. In
October 1790 he actually succeeded in securing the total output of Cornish copper
for the Metal Company by means of a contract terminable at first in two years. The
mineowners were to get a higher price for their ore — £76 a ton. For that they
contracted to deliver exclusively to the syndicate, but “in case Cornwall produces a
greater quantity of Ores, so as to exceed the Consumption, the same shall not be
brought to market, but stocked up for the remainder of the term.”
The manufacturers of Birmingham saw with alarm that this contract had been the
means of making the organisation of the copper trade a much closer one, in fact that
it had become a monopoly. Like the tinfounders in the case of the tin monopoly, they
proceeded to organise themselves.
426 One of the experts stated before the
Commission: “About this time a Company was formed in Birmingham, consisting
chiefly of Consumers of Copper, called the Birmingham Mining and Copper
Company. They were led to believe that the Advance upon Copper was not owing to
the Price received by the miners, but to the expensive medium through which they
received it. Their object, therefore, was to bring Copper to supply the Manufacturers
of Birmingham as cheap as the nature of the Trade would admit.”
427 This company
and a second one, the Rose Copper Company, which was founded soon after, strove
to outflank the syndicate and its associated smelting houses. They bought mining
shares, acquired mines of inferior value, and above all purchased smelting houses.
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highest bidder by offering better prices than the syndicate price.
428 An expert
described the position as it now existed in the following words: “When the
Birmingham Mining and Copper Company began to purchase, there was but a small
Proportion of the other Ores sold at Public Ticketings; they however would give a
better Price to the miner than he then received, and yet bring Copper to Market much
cheaper than the Consumers could buy it elsewhere. This, I believe, induced some
who did not think themselves legally bound, to withdraw from the Contract, and
bring the Ores to open Sale.” Mr. Williams recognised the fact that there must be an
alteration in his sales organisation if it were not to go entirely to pieces. The contract
which he brought forward in November 1791 shows that his policy had changed. The
syndicate was only to claim delivery of three-fourths of the total output of Cornish
ore, and that at a higher price — £82. The smelters were to bind themselves not to
buy in the open market, i.e., by auction, on pain of forfeiting their share of the
contract. The intention clearly was to cripple public sale, as the high prices reached
at the auction of such proportion of output as did not belong to the syndicate had
always tended to raise the prices paid by the syndicate. At the same time, Williams
invited the Birmingham companies to share the contract with him.
But this organisation never came into existence. The companies in Birmingham
considered the proportion of the copper output offered them by Williams too small.
The Cornish mineowners, on their side, expressed themselves energetically against
the proposal in a resolution on January 24, 1792: “To use Arts to obstruct the public
Sale of our Ores and to decoy the offerers for them from the Ticketings, are not only
manifestly injurious to us as Individuals, but prejudicial to the Interests of this
Country.” So runs the second paragraph of this resolution. Henceforward the main
mass of copper ore mined in Cornwall was disposed of by public sale as before.
Although the existence of the syndicate was suspended as far as it represented the
union of the Metal Company with the Anglesea mines, the conditions which had
given rise to the complaints of the manufacturers still existed.
429 They were
intensified at the beginning of the nineties, not only by the further rise in copper
prices, but by systematic “dumping” in the export trade. This state of affairs led to
the formation of the Parliamentary Committee on the state of the copper trade in
1799. The combinations and the agreements were formally dissolved. But the
monopolist organisation of the copper trade, far from disappearing, continued to exist
in another form. As a manufacturer said: “Since this Time, the greatest Part of theHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 109
Ores of Cornwall have been sold by public Ticketings; but even upon this Plan it is
not difficult, when Copper is in Demand, for any Purchaser, who has a strong Interest
in the high Price of Copper, to advance it as he pleases.”
Williams was obviously meant by the word “purchaser.” In any case, it was he who,
up to 1799, was the most powerful member of the copper trade. In modern terms, he
“controlled,” as he says himself, the entire output and smelting of Anglesea ore. He
rented the mines from the two owners, and the entire management was in his hands.
The output of the Anglesea district was about 1700 tons of copper in 1799, about
one-eighth of the output in Cornwall. Even after the dissolution of the copper
syndicate, Mr. Williams still maintained his relations with Cornwall.
It was shown in the evidence given before the Commission that Williams
represented one of the eleven companies who appeared as buyers in the copper ore
market. Although the company were not always buyers, they were kept informed by
their agent, Mr. Vivian, of the conditions ruling in the Anglesea ore and copper
market. The same Mr. Vivian was also agent for another company — the Cheadle
Company, which bought every year in larger quantities. Thus Vivian was one of the
largest buyers in the copper market. In the three months December to February 1799
he bought on account of the above two companies an amount of ore equal to 351 tons
of copper. He had himself, in addition, financial interests in some of the mines. It was
therefore to his interest to keep prices high both for ore and copper. The interests of
the other mine buyers differed widely from one another. The two companies formed
by a combination of Birmingham manufacturers had a lively interest in buying copper
ore as cheaply as possible, as they worked it up into the finished article, and there
would necessarily be a decrease in the consumption of their products if the price rose
correspondingly with the increased price of raw material. As a matter of fact, it was
stated
430 that in consequence of the high price of raw material since 1793 the
consumption of raw copper in Birmingham had decreased by 500 tons annually, and
the conditions in the export trade had grown steadily worse. This was an established
fact, vouched for unanimously by different witnesses. But the decreased demand
from that quarter did not by any means check the movement of prices in the raw
copper market For the decline in the demand of this Birmingham high-grade industry
did not hinder the general rise in the consumption of copper. The figures in the
appendix to the report of the Committee showed that the consumption of copper
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seven years amounting to as much as 1500 tons.
431 In any case, there was beyond
doubt an increased general demand for raw copper, further stimulated by the
purchases of the government and the East India Company, and in consequence a
shortage of copper ore. This shortage led to the mining of much poorer ores than had
ever before been put on the market.
432 But who fixed the price of copper? Williams,
according to his own statement, followed the quotations for Cornish copper given by
Mr. Vivian. But through his agent in Cornwall he was able indirectly to effect a rise
in the price of ore, which in its turn naturally caused a rise in the price of copper. The
Birmingham companies consumed their own copper. Many manufacturers bought
copper in addition in the market. Mr. Vivian represented two companies. The number
of smelters in Cornwall who sold copper consisted only of eight individuals. Thus
competition among sellers of raw copper was extremely limited. It was therefore
quite feasible for the smelters to cause a rise in the price of copper corresponding to
the rising price of ore, more especially as they were protected by import duties.
Williams, of course, profited most by the high prices. He himself supplied ore, and
thus his profits from the sale of raw copper must have been very large. We hear,
further, that he owned large works which were mainly busied in working up copper
for the navy. Williams thus was the head of a business combination as well organised
as any conceivable to-day. The smelting houses pure and simple were obliged to
maintain the high price of copper, which was easy enough, as they were few in
number and demand was increasing. The manufacturers of fine copper goods in
Birmingham were alone in complaining of the high prices for raw copper. To get
their stocks on cheaper terms they had broken up the former syndicate, but in so
doing they had not rid themselves of the conditions to which they desired to put an
end. In spite of the dissolution of the syndicate, several causes prevented a return of
that competition which in the seventies and eighties had brought about the depression
of prices. These were: the demand for copper (which increased rapidly soon after the
dissolution of the syndicate), the output of ore which did not increase at a
correspondingly rapid rate, and the small number of smelters and consequently of
sellers of copper. In a rising market the concentration of the production and the sale
of copper in a few hands rendered a joint agreement unnecessary, with one exception.
If the export trade was to be retained in the future, export prices must clearly be
lower than those in the home market, now that copper prices in England were
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chief consideration in transacting sales with the East India Company, who could
easily provide themselves with Armenian copper in Smyrna when high prices ruled
for English exports.
433 It was therefore of the first importance to sell to the East India
Company for export at lower quotations than those obtaining in the home market. No
individual seller could have initiated such a line of policy, which would at best have
resulted in a lucrum cessans. A general agreement was necessary to the carrying out
of a method of exportation which sacrificed the individual in a certain degree for the
benefit of the whole smelting industry. Such an agreement was all the more feasible
as the East India Company only bought once a year, and then took over a large stock
of copper for delivery within a fixed time. As Mr. Williams stated: “It becomes a
treaty between the East India Company and the Copper Companies, who always unite
on that Occasion. A few Days previous to the sending in of the tenders, the Copper
Companies meet, and consider how far all or any of them are inclined to tender, and
to what amount. It has been generally agreed amongst them, that they shall furnish
the Contract when made in proportion to their Stocks on Hand, or rather the Amount
of their Stocks purchased within the last 12 months; the Amount of those Stocks
being fixed, the Proportions are made out to be delivered by each Company.” We
have seen already how such systematic “dumping” led to a marked differentiation
between home and export prices, a differentiation made possible in the first place by
the import duty.
Thus, even after the dissolution of the principal association, the Cornish Metal
Company, an “Export Syndicate,” continued to exist in the copper industry; whilst
the aim of the earlier monopolist organisation — the keeping up of home prices —
was realised without any special general agreement by the concentration of home
production in a few hands. This was still more the case when home demand
increased, and supply fell off greatly owing to large sales to the Continent whilst
output did not increase in a correspondingly equal rate and import was hindered by
the duty.
This is, unfortunately, the last that we know of combinations in the English copper
industry, though probably a monopolist organisation continued to exist till later.
Various writers in later years mention the “consolidations “ which took place from
time to time in the ownership of copper mines;
434 but no detailed account of the
results of such consolidations exists. Copper prices in the first decades of the
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Certainly they were much higher than in the middle of the eighteenth century. But
after 1820 they began to fall.
435 In the following years England lost gradually that
supremacy of production which she formerly possessed. New spheres of production
were opened up, and after the removal of the duties on copper in 1848 gradually
eclipsed England as a copper- producing country. The output of copper in England
in 1860 amounted to about 16,000 tons; to- day it is not above 500.
436 Thus the





Whilst unfortunately but little light can be shed on the later development and decay
of the monopolist organisation in the English copper industry, the facts which led to
the dissolution of the coal cartel have remained fairly clear. This is the more valuable
in that the producers’ organisation in the coal trade was much closer and more
detailed and of far longer duration than that in the copper trade. The final break-up
of the coal cartel meant the destruction of a monopolist organisation which, although
it had suffered lapses and alterations of form, had existed close upon 250 years.
The prosperity of the coal cartel in the north of England had had a double basis. It
rested on a monopolisation of the sphere of production and on a monopolisation of
the export market both in London and on the coast. Production had become even
more monopolised after 1830 when the mines on the Tees joined the cartel on the
Tyne and Wear, while owing to the expense of bringing coal from other districts, the
market was secure up to a fixed high limit of price. But after the close of the thirties
both these foundations seemed to be tottering.
In the years 1836–1843, whilst the cartel still existed, difficulties of organisation
arose which threatened to lead to a general collapse. From the middle of the thirties
in .particular both the number of mines and the producing power of the coal districts
in the north of England had increased considerably. This increase was due to various
causes. As the well-known mineowner, George Elliot, said
437 later, “the high
protective price was a temptation to colliery owners to open collieries.” The best
north-country coal averaged in London in 1832–35 20s. 7¾d. a chaldron. The price
rose in 1836–38 to from 22s. to 24s.
438 The “regulation price” for best coal in 1834–6
had been 26s. a Newcastle chaldron on the Tyne, and had then been considered high.
In 1844 the cartel price had actually been raised to 30s. 6d. for best coal.
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high prices which obtained under the regime of the cartel naturally stimulated fresh
enterprise, and thus created fresh competition with the cartel itself. Other
circumstances now arose which further increased the tendency.
First and foremost the railway system was making rapid progress and constantly
opening up new mining districts. The production of coal increased quickly in the
district west of the Wear and the Tyne, which up till then had been unworked, owing
to the great expense of transport. As technical progress in railway transport advanced,
the cost at which coal could be delivered diminished in a very marked manner. A
further factor now appeared. The mineowners formerly had owned railways and
means of transport themselves. They paid the ground landlords for the use of the
ground “wayleaves,” which were sometimes so high as to necessitate a permanent
large rise in cost of transport.
440 Then came railway legislation, which empowered the
promoters of public railway companies to buy the land required at a reasonable price.
As by this means the railway companies found their traffic expenses greatly
diminished, the network of railways extended more quickly than before, and a further
increase of production in the districts affected took place. Less capital was now
requisite for the opening up of a new pit, as the coal districts of the whole north of
England were intersected by numerous railway lines, and mineowners whose mines
were far from river or coast no longer needed to build their own railways, but simply
used the nearest public line.
441 By considering how much the cost of transport from
the mine to the vessel had added in former times to the cost of production in
particular mines, it is possible to gauge the revolution brought about in the paying
power of particular mines by the development of this network of communications.
It suddenly became clear that the old mines, which lay close to the water and brought
forward their own goods on their own lines at high wayleaves, had lost the advantage
they had previously enjoyed over the more distant districts, and had become less
favourably situated as regards freights than the “new” mines. “The construction of
the railway system through the country,” said Elliot, “gave facilities for opening out
the coalfields extensively and with small capital; because I may mention that
previously the large coalowners used to have their own private railways and their
private places of shipment, and they had the whole trade very much in their own
hand; but after the system of railways was introduced, the difficulties of maintaining
the monopoly and high prices became insurmountable.”
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At first the mineowners fought the new railway system; for they foresaw what itHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 114
meant for the cartel. As soon as Parliament empowered a railway company to
purchase land outright, those mineowners who had to pay way-leaves protested
vehemently against the building of any such line. “What we complain of,” said the
secretary of the cartel in 1830, “is, that the Government should assist the proprietors
of inland collieries, to enable them to compete with us in markets we were formerly
in possession of.” In order to ward off this competition the owners of the old mines
petitioned Parliament against the further multiplication of lines in Durham. Each
individual member of the cartel was forced to make a money contribution, in
proportion to his basis, to cover the expenses of the agitation against the railways.
443
But this obstructionist policy could not hinder permanently either the extension of the
railway system or the opening up of new mines.
According to Dunn, whose long expert experience in the mining districts of the
north makes him on the whole a trustworthy guide, the number of the mines were as
follows:
444
District. 1830 1836 1844
Tyne 37 47 70
Wear 18 9 28
Tees 0 16 22
Hartley and Blyth  4 4 6
Total 59 76 126
These figures show how much the potential production of the north of England coal
area had increased since 1836. But there was no increase in demand equivalent to the
increase in supply. Great stress is laid on this fact not only by Dunn in his book, but
later on by George Elliot, who had personal experience of these conditions.
445 It was
therefore only to be expected that there would be an increased amount of coal
exported by the cartel, and, as a matter of fact, the export of coal did increase
considerably between 1836 and 1842.
446 But this increase in export, which at its
highest at the beginning of the forties amounted to 800,000 tons more per annum
than in the middle of the thirties, had little relative importance compared to the
increased potential production of the northern districts, estimated at over 3,000,000
tons.
447 Moreover the export duty of 1842 necessarily limited the use of this safety
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French and Belgian coal. The export, exclusive of “smalls,” showed a decrease of
480,000 tons as against the preceding year.
2
The tendency to an increase of production and consequent depression of prices —
the result of the growth of the mines and the comparatively slow increase of demand
— was not in itself sufficient to cause the dissolution of the cartel. Earlier cartels had
been founded in precisely similar conditions, with the precisely similar aim of so
regulating by joint agreement the growing productive power of the mines, which was
in excess of demand, that prices should not be depressed by increased competition.
These were the motives which led to the formation of the cartel of 1771, and with
this aim the mines on the Tees joined the cartel on the Tyne and Wear in 1833 after
severe competition. Might it not be possible again to lessen the effect on prices of the
opening up of new mines by a joint limitation of the actual output? Might not the
allocation of production in accordance with demand even now result in a level of
prices which would secure the further existence of both favourably and unfavourably
situated mines?
448
The cartel did, in fact, follow the only system which appeared to promise salvation.
It limited output to an ever-increasing degree in comparison to potential production.
In 1837 it put up for sale 80 per cent, of the original basis, in 1840 this percentage
fell to 55.7, and in 1843 to 44. Thus the contingent furnished by particular mines
became steadily smaller.
449 One mine, the basis of which had been fixed in proportion
to its estimated power of production at 50,000 chaldrons, was permitted to sell only
22,000 chaldrons in 1844, although in 1838 it had been permitted to sell 40,000.
The members of the cartel might perhaps have borne patiently with this system of
increasing limitation of output had the result aimed at — the keeping up of prices —
offered them any equivalent for the great diminution of actual as compared to
potential production. But now a second danger shook the existence of the cartel to
its very foundation: the price limit within which north of England coal enjoyed a
monopoly both in London and on the coast began to fall.
It is not easy to give figures for the growing competition which north-country coal
had to encounter in the markets of the south after 1840. It is however a striking fact
that in 1836 only 2300 tons of coal were carried to London by inland water-ways,
while in 1840 the traffic had increased to 22,000 tons, and in 1844 to 72,000 tons.
Similarly, in 1844 carriage by railway began to assume larger dimensions.
450 Nor was
the growing competition with northern mines confined to London. As the increasingHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 116
severity of the rivalry between canals and railways forced down freights, Midland
coal began to arrive on the coast. Finally, the increasing output of South Wales meant
increasing competition for north-country coal and after 1840 Scotch coal was also put
on the English market in increasing quantities.
451
In this way the “competition price,” that price limit at which it had been profitable
to obtain supplies from other sources, fell considerably both in London and on the
coast. This was first apparent in 1844. From Dunn’s statement it seems that
consigners were the first to feel the impossibility of keeping up the cartel price, and
that they suffered for some time from the difference between cartel price and market
price. In 1844 the inevitable happened. The cartel price, which had been fixed at 30s.
6d. for best coal, had to be reduced to 25s.;
452 — in other words to a level, which,
according to expert opinion in 1836, meant the loss of all profit on poorer qualities
of coal.
453
The position of the cartel now became more and more serious. On the one hand the
strictest possible limitation of output; on the other a price which in comparison with
the former standard was extraordinarily low, and which did not in any way
compensate for diminished production. It is clear that the desire for an increased
allotment grew continually stronger among those mineowners whose mines, even
with low prices, could be worked at a profit, as long as there was a proportionate
increase of output. Owners of less valuable pits were anxious to see a still further
reduction of the allotment furnished by the more favoured mines. So a conflict, or
rather a crisis, in the cartel was inevitable. Even so friendly an observer as Dunn
recognised the impossibility of carrying on the organisation in its existing form. He
wrote in 1844: “The evils of regulation heretofore have been the limited quantity
allowed to each colliery under the abridged trade; but this has been felt more severely
by the long worked ajid smaller collieries, where, in many instances, the quantity has
been so limited, and the price so depressed, that nothing but a losing trade could
result;. and a strong feeling has prevailed, that their relief could only arise from a
concession of the quantities disposed of by great and highly valued collieries for the
general good. This feeling has been so urgently advocated that the present regulation
agreement contains a clause for a general revision and settlement of the basis of every
colliery in the trade; every individual thus satisfying himself with the hope that such
general review will benefit him at the expense of others. This is the present
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arrive, inasmuch as the investigation would be too endless, and would in all
probability create greater and more general dissatisfaction than that which prevails
at present.”
And “experienced persons” were right. There was no revision. Why should mines
working at a profit limit their output still further for the benefit of those not so
working whilst competition in the south and on the coast was becoming more severe,
and whilst no limitation of the vend in the north could force prices up to their former
level? On the contrary, it was now to the interest of the paying mines to meet the fall
in prices caused by competition elsewhere by an increase in output, which would
enable them still to work at a profit. But the owners of valuable mines, who had
formerly loudly advocated the cartel as the “preserver” of the inferior mines, had now
no further interest in taking steps to their own detriment for the general benefit. Their
indifference was shown by the fact that no revision took place, in spite of the needs
of the non-paying mines. The long strike of April 1844 accentuated the effects of the
drop in prices. Thus the year 1844 saw the break-up of the coal cartel.
From this time north of England coal has been sold by open competition among the
mineowners.
454 In 1845 one more effort was made to reorganise the shattered cartel
as another and closer association.
455 A number of large mineowners in Durham
formed a scheme for buying up all the north-country mines and amalgamating them
in one company. Circulars and prospectuses were printed, but the scheme failed in
consequence of the opposition of some of the large coal magnates. A scheme
proposed by the miners for a common regulation of production also failed.
456 The
cartel presupposed that it was possible to monopolise the market. The conditions
which had annihilated this assumption became increasingly prominent after 1844.
Although the output of coal grew rapidly in the north in the fifties and sixties, it
increased still more rapidly in other districts of Great Britain. The output of South
Durham increased from about 11 million tons in 1856 to about 17 millions in 1872.
But the output of S. Wales for the same time increased from 5½ to 10 millions, of
Scotland from 9 to 15 millions, and of the Midlands from 4½ to 10½ millions. In
Yorkshire, Lancashire, and the western counties output had also increased rapidly,
and the production of the N.E. district therefore lost in importance relatively to the
total production.
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The possibility of intercompetition between the separate districts had been greatly
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economic advantage enjoyed by the northern districts had been due for centuries to
the exceptional cheapness of sea carriage as compared with land carriage. The
progress made by the canal and railway systems and by means of communication in
general now began steadily to reduce the importance of sea transport. Inland districts
were better able to supply the markets which had hitherto been dependent on sea
transport. In 1850 55,000 tons of coal had been carried to London by rail, 85,000 by
canal; in 1868 2,988,000 tons were carried by rail and canal jointly. In the years
following transport by rail and canal grew rapidly in importance. Of 7,556,000 tons
of coal consigned to London in 1872, 5,000,000 were carried by rail or canal.
Moreover, the traffic statements of the railway companies interested showed that a
large portion of the supply came from districts other than the North East. The
Midland railway carried 1,615,000 tons, the London and North-Western about
1,000,000, the Great Eastern 687,000, and the Great Western 581,000.
458 The means
by which coal was supplied to London had therefore undergone an entire
transformation since the palmy days of the cartel. We have seen that whilst the
amount consigned to London in 1872 had increased to 7,500,000, the northern
districts sent 2,200,000 tons by sea, and if we credit them with the amount carried by
the Great Northern Railway only about 1,000,000 by rail. In the thirties supplies had
only been obtained from other districts than the north-eastern in emergencies, but
now these other sources contributed more than half the supply of the metropolis. The
report of the Committee of 1873 drew attention to this revolution in market
conditions in these words: “We do not believe that any combination either of
employers or workmen can by artificial means succeed in permanently affecting the
ordinary results of the relations of demand and supply by adjusting the quantity of
coal produced to the demand, or can permanently affect the price resulting from the
state of the market.”
459 The severe competition between the numerous areas of
production which ruled in the central market and which was bound to increase with
any rise in price, rendered hopeless the union of a single district in a cartel for the
raising of prices. On the other hand the multiplicity of geographically separated
producing districts made any combination between them difficult. Although England,
as Sir George Elliot said,
460 could not in the seventies reckon on imports of coal from
abroad and therefore mineowners, in spite of free trade, had a monopoly of the home
market, no cartel was formed to exploit this monopoly.
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had broken up, which fifty years later would be characteristic of many industries in
many different countries. Its history was rather regarded as an attempt to prevent the
competitive struggle proper to all departments of industry from running its “natural”
course, and its final collapse as a fresh proof of the correctness of the classical








During the eighteenth, and still more in the first half of the nineteenth century —
that epoch of unexampled industrial development — the industries of England
present a picture of increasing production, rapid increase in the number of single
undertakings and, in each separate area of production, the keenest competition
between the various manufacturers only giving way occasionally and under pressure
of certain exceptional conditions to a monopolist organisation.
For several decades this state of affairs remained substantially unchanged. When
the Parliamentary Committee of 1886 published its comprehensive report on the
depression of trade and industry, experts were still complaining of ruinous
competition as loudly as they had done in 1833. Lord Brassey, who was the best
judge of the industrial life of the time, ascribed
461 the crisis at the end of the seventies
to “British manufacturers having gone far beyond their rivals abroad in the rashness
with which factories have been multiplied.” But among the voluminous official
reports of the eighties there is no hint that any effort had been made anywhere by
means of any combination to weaken that competition which was so much
deplored.
462 It is true that in the iron industry a few preliminary schemes for a
systematised reduction of competition were brought forward, though they were not
mentioned before the Parliamentary Commission. They were local combinations,
mostly for the purpose of reducing the output of pig iron.
463 Similar loosely organised
unions can be detected in times of trade depression in the thirties.
464 But, as in that
case, the agreements of the eighties exercised no decisive influence on sale
conditions in the iron industry, nor had they the least permanent character. To
compare them in any way with the cartels and syndicates of the present is to put them
in a false light. They would hardly have found a mention in English political
economy of that day if it had not been thought possible to see in them, as Thorold
Rogers does, smaller editions of certain trusts which shot up in the United States at
the end of the eighties.
465
Though Rogers believed he saw in 1889 that “the beneficial operation of
competition was at an end,” and looked forward to the systematic formation of cartels
and trusts in England in the near future, his prophecy was not fulfilled for another tenHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 122
years. On the contrary, the problem in England seemed rather to be why cartels and
trusts should develop extremely slowly or not at all, while in Germany, France,
America, and other great industrial countries such monopolist associations should
spread so rapidly. Thus Prof. Liefmann writes
466 “when the cartel problem was very
prominent with us, England, usually the first in economic developments, had hardly
heard of it,” founding his opinion on the results of personal study at the end of the
nineties. It did not escape this careful observer that for some years past several
monopolist undertakings had existed in Great Britain, specially in textile industries.
There were not many, if those undertakings and combinations are subtracted which
have often been inaccurately described as cartels and trusts,
467 but there were enough
to disprove the assertion that no monopolist industrial organisations existed in the
home of free trade.
The number of lasting monopolist combinations existing in Great Britain at the end
of the last century and the beginning of the present were far fewer than in America
and Germany, their structure, their organisation and their spheres of action were
entirely different, and their growth was less rapid than in other countries. But
whatever the causes of these differences, which must be looked into presently, may
have been, these monopolist undertakings cleared the way for new developments of
industrial organisation. No present writer on competition could ignore the possibility
of organising industry on a monopolist basis, as W. B. Hodgson ignored it in his
work on the subject in 1870.
468 But the criticism applied to this form of organisation
in England differed very little from the views of monopolies held by classical
economists. Even at the end of the nineties Prof. Edgeworth
469 put forward the theory
that the self-interest of mankind by its very nature necessitated competition:
“Competition is an almost ineradicable growth of self- interested human nature.
‘Expellas furca, tamen usque recurret.’ Combinations resisting the tendency of this
force are liable to disruption.” Thorold Rogers
470 expressed himself (1892) with
greater caution. He believed in a further development of the syndicate and trust
system, whose beginnings he had observed. But, while not venturing to maintain that
the position of the consumer was assured by the natural selfish interest of the
producer, whose whole attention was directed to competition, he nevertheless held
fast by the law of equalisation of profit held since Adam Smith’s time, which he
looked upon as a palliative against any abuses caused by the monopolist element in
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strong men, or a combination of strong men, to ruin weak ones by low or
unremunerative prices, and having secured a monopoly, to commence a legal pillage
of the public. But though the expedient may enrich individuals, it is essentially
transitory. Sooner or later competition reappears and extraordinary profits are
arrested.”
It is not surprising that in the country where the doctrine of free competition had
been accepted unconditionally for over a century, notwithstanding the change in the
conditions on which that doctrine was based, there was nevertheless no sudden
alteration of economic doctrine. This is the less surprising, as the change in Great
Britain was taking place but slowly. It happened as with other economic theories. The
classical economists’ doctrine, that competition was equally to the interest of the
consumer and of the producer, had been regarded as an invariable truth, not because
it was in any way correct, but because for a long time it was borne out by existing
facts. In agriculture similarly the doctrine of the superior value of cultivation on a
large scale was maintained just so long as cultivation on a large scale was the
dominant form of agricultural industry. And economists who regarded the
development of small cultivation, notwithstanding its rapid growth, with incredulity
and suspicion, were equally slow to appreciate at its true value the rise of monopolist
associations.
But when it was seen, towards the end of the last century and the beginning of the
present one, how firmly industrial organisation on a monopolist basis was taking root
in both Germany and America, how international monopolist companies were
springing up, and how the monopolist movement was showing itself in England, then
Englishmen began to realise that their former conception of competition failed to
apply universally. Industry was being steadily reorganised in the largest industrial
countries on a monopolist system, and this reorganisation produced entirely new
economic phenomena. “The doctrine of free competition became no longer a fact, but
a theory,” as Professor Brentano wrote in April 1904.
471 That competition among
wholesale manufacturers which had been looked upon hitherto, and particularly in
England, as the inevitable result of an immutable law of economics, now became
merely a possible condition of industrial organisation and out of date at that. Many
foreign critics considered the determined persistence of competition in English
industry as a proof that monopolist organisation was wanting; and even to-day there
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studied the fundamental conditions of cartel and trust development, ought to
investigate with special interest not only industries organised on monopolist lines, but
also those where monopolist organisation has either not been tried or where it has
failed. Only a close examination of these “defective” conditions can preserve the
student of cartels and trusts from making hasty generalisations similar to those
formerly deduced from conditions of apparently universal validity in the case of free
competition. The industry of Great Britain offers the most convenient starting-point
for such an examination, as many important trades which in other countries are
worked on monopolist lines are here still subject to competition. If English writers
on political economy had revised their still persistently insular theories in the light
of the world’s new economic developments, this question would not have been
neglected. But it was only when monopolist organisations began to show themselves
in English industry that such problems excited interest. And even then there was no
attempt made to discover why this special form of organisation had developed so
late, and had been restricted to so small a circle of industrial interests — restricted,
that is to say, in comparison with the importance of English industry in international
economics.
472 Both English and continental writers were content, if ever they thought
of the question at all, to attribute this rather perplexing phenomenon to special
peculiarities of the English economic system without analysing in detail the influence
of these very peculiarities on the existing conditions of competition. This was more
supposition than explanation. It was considered, for instance, that free trade, or the
low cost of freights owing to England’s insular position would make it impossible
to form a cartel or trust for the raising of prices. This view must be discussed later on.
It has been disproved now by the prosperity of existing monopolies.
473 But even at
the time when no monopolist organisation existed in English industry, objection
ought to have been taken to this explanation if there had been any desire to prove as
an actual fact what was after all only an opinion. The very principles underlying that
explanation were questionable. For an industry can owe its monopolist position as
regards a foreign country to other causes than a tariff or an advantage in freights.
International agreements may come into play, and, finally, competition can force
down prices far below that limit “at which imports from abroad into a free trade
country seem possible,” a fact early emphasised by Prof. Liefmann.
474 Later on we
shall be able to give several instances to prove the actual realisation of this possibility
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slight development of cartels and trusts in England, which, although of an entirely
different kind from the foregoing, has in common with it a want of positive proof —
I mean the opinion that the objection of English manufacturers to cartels and trusts
is psychological. The chief exponent of this theory is Prof. Liefmann,
475 who
maintains that “the chief reason for the absence of cartels in many branches of
English industry lies in the fact that the doctrines of extreme individualism still retain
a firm hold over English manufacturers. The idea that ‘free’ competition is the
‘natural’ condition of economic life, that it best secures the advantage of all, is still
extremely common and extremely powerful among them.” His opinion, shared by
Prof. Jenks,
476 is certainly plausible, if we take into consideration the conservatism
(somewhat strange at the present day) of English people in economic matters. In
England the lack of cartels and trusts has often been held up as a sin of omission on
the part of manufacturers. But no positive proof has ever been adduced that the lack
of such organisation in the eighties and nineties was due to any such psychological
aversion. The influence of the doctrine of free competition on the English
manufacturer was taken as given, and his indifference to monopolist organisation
seemed to follow from it. But concrete confirmation of this inference is all the more
desirable as several facts are entirely against it, and tend to weaken the hypothesis
connecting the slow development of cartels and trusts with the psychology of the
manufacturer. The history of the early coal cartels is most important evidence that
monopolist associations existed even at a time when the doctrines of classical
political economy had far more weight with English people than they have now. And
as Prof. Liefmann supports his conclusions as to the influence of individualism by
the case of present-day competition in the English coal mining, we are forced to
enquire why that individualism did not show itself when the mineowners created in
the Newcastle Vend the most powerful coal cartel which has ever yet existed, and
maintained it for seventy years. The monopolist organisation of copper production
at the end of the eighteenth century is another important instance of the possibility
of forming a cartel in former times, and Babbage in the thirties describes a
bookseller’s
477 cartel, the aim of which was “to put down all competition,” and which
exhibited a striking similarity to the “Borsenverein der deutschen Buchhandler,” as
we can prove, though exact details are wanting.
478 Further, we notice in the eighties
and nineties, when neither cartel nor trust existed, repeated attempts by large firms
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were, for instance, at the beginning of the eighties, attempts at forming a syndicate
in pig iron, though they were not long successful. In 1894 a coal syndicate was
formed in the north of England with the object of fixing a minimum price and of
regulating conditions of output, but this also only lasted a few months.
479 At the end
of the eighties a syndicate was projected but never realised in the paper trade, the
only monopolist branch of which at present is the wall-paper industry. Among other
unsuccessful early monopolist organisations is the well- known Birmingham
Alliance, which, created originally in the interest of the bedstead industry, transferred
its activity subsequently to other trades. It was an effort to regulate the prices of the
various trade products in conjunction with an organised association of workpeople.
But these associations could not permanently withstand the pressure of outsiders and
of foreign competition, and at the present time free competition obtains in these
trades also.
Attempted cartels and trusts, which failed either because they never passed beyond
the stage of a project, or because they had not sufficient vital power to carry them on
for any length of time, can be seen in other branches of industry in the same years.
It was clearly not through any lack of will on the part of manufacturers that the
powerful and effective cartels and trusts of Germany and the United States did not
exist in England. That their efforts to carry out their desires were unavailing was the
result of competition, either that of the foreigner or that which arose at home.
It must therefore be recognised that the undoubted anti-monopolist conscience of
the English nation and its belief in economic individualism has always been subject
to limitation when the individual Englishman thought of himself as a producer and
not as a consumer. The cartels and projected cartels of the past clearly show that
English manufacturers have tried to form monopolist organisations wherever they
saw a prospect of making any profit. English shipping firms inaugurated between
1870–80 the now well-known “shipping rings,” and English business houses gave the
first impetus to the nitrate cartels of Chili early in the nineties. Facts such as these
show that the English man of business is a much greater lover of cartels than he
should be, if his adhesion to the principle of individualism were as firm as is
generally supposed. Let us turn lastly to the testimony of Prof. Clapham,
480 the author
of the best extant work on English textile industries. “It is true that in all branches of
the trade the promoters of a combination have to deal with special obstacles, not the
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manufacturer; but these things have been overcome before, and may be overcome
again, when there is a gain to be made or a loss to be avoided.” Thus, as the
subjective conditions of monopoly have obviously existed in spite of the doctrine of
individualism, we can only conclude that the external essentials of monopolist
control were not as fully developed in England as in other countries, and that even
at present they are in part lacking. What these “defective” elements are can be shown
only by more intimate knowledge of the conditions of production and sale in those




A considerable number of cartels and trusts in all parts of the world are essentially
dependent on the existence of mineral deposits which are easily convertible into a
monopoly. In the first place, certain minerals, being found only in a single country
or in one or two countries, are from the outset a monopoly to the rest of the world.
In this connection may be mentioned the powerful monopolies of the potash deposits
in Germany, of kaolin in Austria, nitrate in Chili, marble in Italy, petroleum, copper
and borax in America, zinc in Germany, Belgium and America, and diamonds in the
Transvaal. Secondly, certain areas of production, such as the coal and iron ore
districts of America and Germany, hold monopolies, if not in the world’s market, at
least in a given national area, generally as a result of the freight charges which a
foreign competitor would have to face.
The naturally narrow limits of such mineral wealth and the marked tendency of
mining from the very beginning to accumulate fixed capital have created relatively
early and with comparative ease close monopolist combinations or a semi-monopolist
predominance of particular interests in all such areas of production.
Great Britain, on the other hand, has no monopoly over other countries in any
mineral whatever. The copper output of Great Britain, the largest in the world at the
beginning of the nineteenth century, is estimated to-day at the trifling amount of 500
tons a year.
481 The output of English zinc is now equally unimportant.
482 Cornish tin,
the best known in the world for over 2000 years, amounted to only 5040 short tons
in 1905 as against 65,565 short tons produced in the Malay States.
483 In the last
twenty years the output of English lead has been only a small fraction of that of the
United States, Spain, Germany, and Australia.
484 At the present time the mineral
resources of Great Britain are practically confined to a very few products. Out of a
total value of £135,200,000 in 1907 £120,500,000 came under the head of coal. Iron
ore accounts for £4,400,000; the extremely important branches of stones and clays,
485
so necessary to the Portland cement industry, for £7,100,000; and the salt industry,
which represents a not unimportant proportion of the world’s production, for
£600,000. In all, these four products represent a value of £132,600,000 out of
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furnishes only a small part of her own needs. None of her chief mineral products are
present in sufficient quantity to give them anything approaching a monopoly in the
world’s market. But from the point of view of its own national market it is a striking
fact that precisely those very important raw materials and other products which are
worked abroad as the closest monopolies, are subject in Great Britain to very marked
competition. One most prominent instance is that of the coal trade.
Here we have to deal with a branch of English production which, although it has
more and more lost during the last twenty years its former monopoly of the trade of
the world, has, on the other hand, never been affected by foreign competition in the
home market.
486 In the eighties and nineties, even if an English coal trust had put up
coal prices considerably, it would have had no cause to fear imports from abroad.
Jeans writes
487 in 1894: “There would appear to be no insuperable difficulty in the
way of founding and carrying a combination to keep up the price of fuel at home, so
far as foreign competition is concerned, and this is more than can be said of most
other industries.” Prof. Ashley in 1903
488 was of opinion that if “very high” prices
were to rule in the English market for a few months, German and French coal might
perhaps be attracted to the country. But as a practical matter the importation of
oversea coal has never been discussed in England. And it is not probable that foreign
coal would be imported in the case of merely “very high” prices. It might be imported
if prices were extraordinarily high in the English market, and at the same time very
low in Germany, Belgium, or even America. But even in 1900 — the year of the
great rise in the price of coal — when, with the additional impetus of the Boer war,
prices were unusually high, German and American competition was not felt, though
prices in Germany and America had not risen to anything like as high a level as in
England.
489 The increasing competition of these two countries was only to be detected
by the fact that they competed more successfully than before with English coal in the
export trade to non-English parts of the world. In some areas where English coal had
previously enjoyed a monopoly, foreign coal even drove it from the field. Thus in
1900, for the first time, American coal appeared on the shores of the Mediterranean,
while German coal competed with English on the northwest coast of France.
490 But
England itself during the coal famine had no recourse to imported coal.
In 1901 there was a marked fall in English prices; in Germany and America they
remained unchanged.
491 It was perfectly plain that, in this condition of the
international market, a coal cartel in England could have hindered the fall in homeHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 130
prices, which only affected the home market, and in September 1901 certain
important firms urged the creation of a cartel with great eagerness. Even opponents
of the cartel system could not maintain that such a cartel by causing prices to rise
would attract competition from abroad to England, so they had to be content with
pointing out that in the long run a rise would increase the competition of the
foreigner in certain export markets.
492 But the failure of the cartel and trust schemes
of that time was certainly not due to any fear of provoking importation from abroad.
It was due to a very different cause. The same facts which had worked the ruin of
the old Vend in spite of its seventy years of existence are at work to-day, and prevent
the creation of a monopolist organisation in the English coal industry. As we have
already seen, these facts were the multiplicity of the sources of production and their
mutual competition, owing to increased means of communication since the latter half
of the nineteenth century. In 1906 English coal production, which amounted to about
251 million tons, was distributed among the principal districts as follows:
493 Scotland
about 39 million tons, Newcastle and Durham about 54, Yorkshire and Lincolnshire
35, the Midlands 33, Wales about 52, Lancashire 11, Staffordshire and the southern
counties 15 millions each. Coal is therefore produced in all parts of the country.
There is no such localised concentration of production as in Germany
(Rhenish-Westphalia and Silesia) and in America (East Pennsylvania anthracite and
soft coal districts). Experience has shown repeatedly and clearly that the cartel system
has little prospect of success where coal is so universal. The Durham Coal
Association of 1894 lasted but short time after its increased prices had quickened the
competition of Yorkshire coal on the London gas coal market. A similar fate befell
a Lancashire and Cheshire Coal Association in 1894.
494
In Wales the conditions were more favourable, and from 1870 up to the present
time projected cartels have found here a suitable field for operation.
495 But, excellent
as Welsh steam coal may be, it has to compete when prices are high with coal from
the north of England,
496 so that in this case also any organisation to be effective must
be able to control both districts.
497
It must not be forgotten that the above-mentioned districts do not all produce the
same quality of coal, and in so far they do not always compete with one another,
some districts in this way having a preference in the market. But if any one district
were to attempt to put up prices to any marked extent consumers could obtain coal
supplies from other districts, though possibly of different quality.
498 Thus we find inHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 131
the official report of 1873 mention of “the variety of coals produced, which though
primarily used for particular purposes, will at certain prices be used for others.”
499
The only exception in this respect is the anthracite district in the extreme west of
South Wales.
500 No other region of Great Britain produces similar coal. But the entire
annual output is only 2½ million tons and the ownership of the mines is in many
hands.
With this single exception, unimportant as compared with the total amount of coal
produced, we are brought to the conclusion that monopolist combinations in separate
districts could only have an extremely limited sphere of action. An effective
monopolist organisation could only be formed if all the coal districts were combined
in a systematic cartel or trust.
But the difficulties are great, as the excitement caused by Sir George Elliot’s trust
scheme, published in the Times of Sept. 20, 1893, clearly showed. The scheme,
which was never realised, was opposed by the trade on the following grounds: that
it would be impossible to take into consideration the special conditions of production
and sale in particular districts; that the number of mines to be combined was too large
— they were estimated at 3400 pits; — and that as most of the mines belonged to
private companies, the difficulty of buying them out would be all the greater.
501 The
first objection was probably the most weighty. And in a lesser degree there were in
each separate district a variety of separate interests to be considered, which entirely
did away with the idea of a joint cartel, for the continued independence of individual
firms would make any combined agreement on questions of price and production
impossible. To buy out however so large a number of mines a much more tempting
offer would be necessary than that which the “trust maker,” Sir G. Elliot,
contemplated. For although, in view of the bad times, many mineowners were willing
to sell, others thought the basis price of 15s. a ton, at which the properties were to be
capitalised, much too low and not sufficiently tempting to induce them to sell.
Monopolist organisation in English coal-mining would have a better chance if there
were a concentration of undertakings in the separate producing districts. But up to the
present this tendency is hardly noticeable. Even Mr. Macrosty, who describes each
development of the concentration movement with special interest, because, in his
opinion, it indicates the “movement towards trusts,”
502 has to content himself with
stating that “a considerable number of firms and companies did in fact produce
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concentration existed, but that very few general amalgamations had taken place.
The desire of creating a monopolist organisation to influence prices which leads so
frequently to combination abroad simply cannot exist so long as competition is to be
feared from other districts if prices are raised. On the other hand, this competition
protects the buyer from the exactions of monopoly. Even the large consumers have
no cause for fear, and there is therefore no need for them to buy mines to supply their
own requirements; so that factor also, which might have aided the processes of
amalgamation and concentration, falls into the background. Combinations, if made
at all, aim, as a rule, at economising working expenses, or at technical improvements,
such as the centralisation of water power. Such amalgamations have often, however,
been financial failures, as for instance the United Collieries Co., which was floated
when times were good, but over-estimated the advantages of combination and
suffered from over-capitalisation directly prices fell after 1900.
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In South Wales concentration, like cartel projects, found to some extent a
favourable soil. In 1896 Mr. D. A. Thomas, the well-known member of Parliament
and mineowner, gave the first impetus to the movement. He wrote:
504 “30 companies
produce over 90 per cent, and about 50 companies produce 95 per cent, of the total
output. If it were possible to get the 20 companies or collieries constituting 80 per
cent, of the output to combine, the combination would, in my judgement, be
sufficiently powerful to control and regulate the steam coal trade of South Wales and
Monmouthshire.” But even this optimist thought it not improbable that some other
competing district might take “an undue (sic) advantage of the regulation,” so that
he especially added that provision must be made to meet this contingency. But the
mineowners seem to have thought the prospect of rapidly growing profits not
sufficiently sure, and the proposal met with as little success as Elliot’s more
comprehensive one.
But Sir D. A. Thomas did not abandon his plans. He amalgamated several mines
and founded the Cambrian Trust, Limited, in 1908, which produces about 4 million
tons annually.
505 He thus became the largest producer of coal in the country. But his
enterprise did not seriously infect with monopoly a land which produced in 1907 267
million tons of coal, or for that matter even his own particular district. The output of
coal in South Wales was nearly 50 million tons in 1907, close upon 3 millions more
than in the preceding year,
506 and many new mines contributed to this total.
507
Yet it is an interesting fact that, if we neglect the smaller districts,
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in South Wales, which enjoys a certain advantage in competition over other large
districts, that cartels and concentrations are most noticeable. This is indirectly a
further proof of the assertion that in Great Britain it is mainly the multiplicity of areas
of production and the divergence of their interests which prevent the formation of a
monopolist organisation in the coal industry.
In the second greatest branch of English mineral production the absence of cartels
or trusts is due to quite different circumstances.
Within the last twenty years the progress of iron mining in England has been slow
and intermittent, but even at the present time, when its predominance has been
contested by America and Germany, it is still the third greatest in the world.
509 In the
United States the ore-producing country of Lake Superior belongs to the Steel Trust,
which was interested in the years 1902–7 to the amount of 50–60 per cent.
510 in the
deliveries from this large district, and which by agreement two years ago with the
railway magnate Hill obtained power to dispose in the future of the remaining riches
of the district. In Germany, Minette iron, now the most valuable iron ore, has been
monopolised by the manufacturers of finished products. In Siegerland there is the
Iron Syndicate in iron mining proper, while but a small portion of the large iron
production of Lorraine-Luxemburg reaches the market directly, most of it being
further manufactured by the large iron concerns themselves — a fact which makes
any special monopoly organisation such as a cartel or a syndicate for the most part
superfluous.
511 This is at least true so far as sales to outside smelters in the Minette
and Saar regions is concerned, as the big sellers, who are comparatively few in
number, can command a complete view of the whole market and check mischievous
underbidding without any special system of regulating prices. It is only in the case
of the relatively small sales to outsiders in Rhenish Westphalia that Spanish
competition detracts from the power of the large mines to influence prices by their
monopoly.
512 In the United States the position is similar. The Trust and a few similar
enormous combines control most of the iron production, and only small quantities
come on the market.
513
In England things are very different. As late as 1903 Jeans was able to write “that
the majority of the works engaged in pig-iron making in this country are pig-iron
makers only, having to buy all their raw materials.”
514 But in Great Britain, too, in the
last ten years, the tendency for related branches of business to combine has been
making headway,
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however, no question of any development on monopolist lines, such as some writers
have thought this tendency denoted.
516 There is nothing in the Cleveland district or
elsewhere corresponding to the monopolist concentration of Germany or America.
Even if this were the case, it would still be impossible to speak of a monopolisation
of the iron ore supply in England. The official figures for the consumption of iron ore
in 1907 were 23,352,000 tons, of which no less than 7,635,000 tons were imported.
517
As the quality of the imported ore, which comes chiefly from Spain, is much higher
than that of English ore, we may assume that 50 per cent, of the present English
pig-iron output is manufactured from foreign ore. If the English were to employ more
extensively in the future the Thomas process,
518 which they have neglected hitherto,
home ores, to which it is well suited, would certainly be more largely used.
519 Even
then the low rate of freight to England for Spanish ore,
520 and the relatively small cost
of inland transport in England itself, would be against any movement in the direction
of monopoly. Even in Rhenish Westphalia there is competition between the Lorraine
and Spanish ores, though the foreign ores have to pay much higher rates of freight,
and this would necessarily be still more largely felt in England; consequently, one
important reason for forming monopolist organisations in the iron industry of other
countries — the exploitation of the protective effect of freights — does not exist in
England. Again, in the case of the quarrying of stones and earths (specially
sandstone, slate, limestone, chalk, clay) monopolisation is out of the question owing
to home competition. The supply of these minerals is so abundant and distributed
through such an extremely large number of competing districts that any monopolist
movement is impossible. The trade also in many of the branches of production is
extremely small and the plant comparatively undeveloped, so that in these cases even
local monopolist associations would give an immediate stimulus to fresh
competition.
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Thus in England competition is still the ruling principle in the three most important
mineral products. As we shall see later on, the same thing cannot be said of the fourth
one, but its importance as compared to the sum of English minerals and of their three
chief groups is insignificant.
We can therefore affirm generally: firstly, that England has no raw material in
minerals possessing that monopoly in the world’s market which favours the
development of cartels or trusts; and secondly, that it is precisely in the most
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unfavourable for monopoly. Monopolist combinations are consequently for practical
purposes excluded from the sphere in which their success in other countries has been
most marked.
Turning now to the finishing trades, in which, from their very nature, monopoly
resting on natural scarcity is out of the question, what are the elements of successful
monopolisation which are “deficient” in England? It is obvious that the protective
effect of freights, which in England bear very lightly on heavy raw materials, can
only influence the manufacture of high-priced goods in rare cases. The higher priced
the goods, the more clearly must the English manufacturer recognise the fact that
freight rates give him no advantage over the foreigner in the home market, which
consists of an island with but a small inland area. The absence of protective duties
in all those manufacturing industries which are or may be influenced by foreign
competition considerably increases this openness to attack, and Free Trade is
therefore a sufficient explanation of the non-existence of cartels and trusts in a large
section of English industries.
Certain branches of the iron trade are an excellent example. Jeans writes with
reference to the absence of monopolist associations in the production of pig-iron:
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“The main reason for this fact is that while in protectionist countries prices may be
regulated by such combinations within tolerably wide limits, here prices must be
largely determined by the behaviour of the foreigner. An arrangement made to-day
to sell at a certain regulated price may be completely upset tomorrow by the action
of an outside country. Although the output of iron and steel throughout the world is
now so enormous, the iron market is so sensitive that an offer of 25,000 or 50,000
tons of pig-iron or steel in markets like Glasgow or Middlesbro’ at 5s. or 10s. below
current prices would completely demoralise the market and almost create a panic.”
It might perhaps be thought that English manufacturers would find a general
agreement as to prices most useful and most easy to carry out if, in the case of an
international fall in prices, English pig-iron fell lower than foreign. But the price,
even in protected countries, may fall at the present day in times of depression to the
level of the English price for pig-iron. In 1897 and 1898 Bessemer pig-iron cost in
Pittsburg less than the best English.
523 In 1903 west coast Hematite pig-iron cost 56s.
8½d., whilst Thomas pig-iron cost 55.9 marks in Dortmund. The lowest point
reached by prices for American pig-iron was 12.46 dollars (about 50s.) in 1904,
whilst similar quality pig-iron in England did not go lower than 52s. 2d.
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conditions a monopolist movement to create a rise in the price of English goods
would only be the direct way to encourage importation from abroad. If even in
protected countries the price of pig-iron is in depressed times no higher than the
English price, then “dumping” is dangerously near at hand, and it becomes easy to
understand the alarm felt in 1908 by the English ironmasters at the dissolution of the
German cartels in pig-iron and the expected fall in prices.
525 The imports would of
course be felt less in the form of pig-iron than in that of blocks, bar-iron, and other
semimanufactured articles; but yet in consequence of the above-mentioned
conditions, the import of “unworked or half-worked” steel rose from 280,000 tons
in 1902 to 522,706 tons in 1904.
526 Although we find in an English Blue-book of
1903,
527 “the possibility of obtaining cheap German steel has materially reduced the
demand for pig-iron,” it is nevertheless clear that any monopolist rise in the price of
English pig-iron at such times would merely increase “dumping,” to the prejudice of
the owners of large blast furnaces. The case of the iron founders is slightly different.
Great Britain (especially the Cleveland district) exports considerable quantities,
whilst prices in America as well as in Germany are even in bad times higher than in
England by the greater part of the duty and freight.
528 In this case there would be no
cause to fear foreign competition in depressed times even if prices were regulated on
a monopolist basis. But every such rise in prices must still further narrow the market
abroad, which shrinks in any case considerably in such times, while any difference
that might arise between the home and the near foreign market
529 could only be very
slight as long as free trade put no difficulty in the way of re- importation.
When there is a general rise in prices in the international market the price of
English pig-iron goes up considerably as a rule, so that a monopolist price policy
must seem unnecessary to manufacturers. Actual experience has shown that in
January 1907 West-Haematite rose to 77s 9d., and averaged during the year 74s. 9d.
as against 53s. 5d. in 1904, and that Cleveland pig- iron rose during the same period
from 43s. 11d. to 56s. 2d., while the export of English pig-iron jumped up from
814,000 tons to 1,947,000 tons. It may therefore be said: Price conditions in the
English pig-iron trade are determined so much and so directly by market conditions
abroad, that English manufacturers would find a monopolist price policy useless in
bad times and unnecessary in good ones. Loose agreements as to price, and even
these only in exceptional economic conditions, are the most that can be expected. As
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iron and steel products, such as rolled blocks, bar- iron, and bars. Foreign
competition would leave English cartels or trusts very little power to fix a price limit.
In attempting to mark out that sphere of English industry in which free trade is still
a defence against monopolist prices, we must consider all those industries (i) where
the importation either of the same goods or of substitutes is easy; and (ii) where
English prices are normally the same as import prices (freight included). In all such
cases a monopolist rise in prices created by a limitation of competition would simply
encourage the foreign competitor. Both the silk
530 and the paper trade fulfil these
conditions. As a protective policy gave the first impetus to the prosperity of the Paper
Trust in America,
531 so, conversely, free trade in England makes a monopolist
agreement as to price impossible. A Paper Makers’ Association, which regulates
certain trade usages, does certainly exist, but as one of its members wrote not long
ago,
532 “while one thing more might have been tried, they knew they could have but
little control over it: regulation of wages and prices must be left untouched.”
Although the paper trade in England, especially in its printing branch, has developed
on a very large scale, and only the largest factories survive,
533 this concentration of
trade has, nevertheless, not been able to bring about an agreement as to a rise in price,
because the position of prices is too strongly affected by the possibility of foreign
competition.
Attempts to disregard or only half recognise this condition of affairs and to regulate
prices on monopolist lines generally end very quickly in a fiasco. The collapse of the
Birmingham Bedstead Makers’ Alliance in 1900 is a good example. It had doubled
the price of bedsteads since 1891, but the final result was that “foreign competition
was stimulated” and the cartel fell to pieces.
534 A very common instance of such
competition from abroad is seen in cases where a monopolist association holds only
a local monopoly, or where substitutes may possibly enter into competition. Imported
goods will then in part be able to take the place of home products, thus limiting the
extension of a monopolist price policy over the entire total production. Instances of
this will be given when we come to consider the monopolist associations of to-day,
as they concern free trade as a means of reducing the sphere in which a monopoly
may be dominant, rather than as a preventive of monopoly.
Its significance as a means of defence against the monopolist price policy of a
national organisation of manufacturers may be deduced from the well-known fact
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many classes of goods in which she formerly had the predominance over other
countries, at least in the home market. Free trade has of late years contributed
essentially to the non-existence of monopolist associations in all such branches of
industry. In former days they might quite possibly have been organised on
monopolist lines, so far as foreign competition was concerned.
This fixes, however, only one of the limits of competition in English industry.
Where for any cause, in spite of free trade and the slight protective effect of freights,
there is immunity from foreign competition, the formation of a monopolist
organisation becomes independent of these factors; on the other hand, high freights
or even protective duties do not in themselves necessarily entail the creation of a
cartel or trust. It remains to determine the sphere of competition within the bounds
of home trade, i.e., to distinguish the essential factors which prevent the substitution
of monopolist combination for competition, if home trade is regarded as a
self-contained entity.
The industrial competition on which the classic economists based their
observations is still dominant in a considerable proportion of English industries at the
present time. In many trades manufacturers are increasing in number and production
is extending, and, consequently, it becomes more and more difficult to create a
monopoly. The increased profits which existing manufacturers might hope to gain
thereby, would only stimulate the growth of fresh undertakings, whilst in any case
existing firms are far too numerous to combine in a monopolist organisation at all.
This is pre-eminently the case in the textile industry in its simplest stages, both in
cotton spinning and wool spinning and weaving. In cotton-yarn spinning at the
present time there is a very large amount of over-production,
535 which manufacturers
attribute, not without reason, to the rapid rise of new mills during the last period of
inflation. The joint action of manufacturers and trades unions in 1904, which
shortened hours of labour and therefore limited production, has not approved itself
as a means of moderating competition and over-production, although Mr. Macrosty
536
enumerates it in his “Trust Movement” as being the first step to further organisations.
On the contrary, that organised limitation of production, with its consequent increase
of profits, has made competition keener than ever. The value of exported grey yarn
rose from 11.25d. in the years 1900–1903 to 13.55d. in the four following years,
537
while the number of joint-stock undertakings, which had only increased by
twenty-four between 1900 and 1903, had risen to ninety between 1904 and 1907.
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“Certainly the great trade boom of 1905 and succeeding years was ushered in by a
prolonged spell of organised short time in 1904, but trade booms are a little out of
favour in Lancashire just now. It seems pretty clear that the great reduction in the
output of yarns and cloth helped to dislocate the relations of supply and demand, and
by bringing almost unparalleled profits stimulated an immense excess of the means
of production.” For this reason, according to the Manchester Guardian,
manufacturers both in Oldham and Bolton were now (1909) against any “organised”
limitation of hours of labour.
539
In the wool trade there seems to be the same, or even a greater possibility
540 of
calling new undertakings into existence. Professor Clapham states
541 that it is still
common to find mills occupied by more than one manufacturer and firms starting
with small capital. The small trader rents a few rooms or perhaps a whole floor in a
wool mill; while looms belonging to two different firms and driven by machinery
which belong to neither are often found in one and the same factory. This system of
providing factory space, machinery and requisite power to firms with small capital
(the Tenement Factory or Machine Renting system) is naturally extremely favourable
to the growth of smaller concerns.
542 It has been a matter of much complaint of late
that this organisation is being exploited by speculators in order to persuade the hands
to make themselves independent without starting on a sound basis. In like manner,
the commission system, which exists in every department of the wool trade but
specially in spinning and weaving, encourages the rise and continuance of the small
capitalist as a manufacturer by the side of the large concerns.
543
It is the more remarkable that these conditions should be predominant in the textile
industry as it is precisely within the limits of the same industry in the last ten years
that the English trust movement has largely developed. Whilst in spinning and
weaving, on the whole, competitive conditions of trade are still to be seen, we find
in several finishing branches of the trade, as well as in some of its special grade
products, a marked concentration. This fact shows the impossibility of accepting
without qualification the statement often made,
544 that, as the manufacture of
high-class goods increases, the chances of a coalition will diminish because the
number of concerns will then be more numerous than in the earlier stages. It entirely
depends on how far the technical development of each grade has advanced. Under
certain circumstances it is just the high grades in which the particular impetus to
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concentration in the production of pig-iron than in the manufacture of steel rails.
Many facts could be adduced to illustrate the special difficulties of forming
monopolies in finishing trades. Monopolist associations find their progress hindered
where ever there is a great differentiation in the quality of the products of the
finishing industry. This is particularly noticeable in England. For many branches of
English industry have, in view of the competition of countries which can supply in
bulk articles of inferior value at lower prices, directed their attention more
exclusively to the production of specially highly finished goods. In this way
distinctive qualities and brands arise which give individual manufacturers so strong
a position against other competitors, that they reject all proposals for coalition. This
appears to be the case in the paper industry. The association of makers of paper for
newspapers has to face great foreign competition, but in highly finished English
papers on the contrary there are so many qualities made that, although there is hardly
any question of foreign competition, there appears also hardly any possibility of a
joint regulation of price.
545 Woollen yarns are in exactly the same case. Imports affect
yarns “which are either not spun in Bradford or whose manufacture does not pay
there.”
546 The quality of English woollen yarns is admitted to be the finest known, but
many very different kinds are made; in consequence, no monopolist organisation can
be formed, as Prof. Clapham expressly points out.
547 With reference to this particular
case he writes: “For as a rule only the producers of articles that come into fairly direct
competition with one another are easily moved to set bounds to the force of that
competition by means of joint action.”
Important as it is to recognise this condition of things, the fact must nevertheless
not be lost sight of, that sometimes where firms owing to the manufacture of special
brands hold an exceptionally advantageous position, the chances in favour of a
monopolist organisation seem particularly great, as such firms would have very little
fresh competition to fear if they were to raise prices by joint agreement. As we shall
see further on, many monopolist associations, in the woollen industry in particular,
owe their success to this fact. But we must remember that the monopolist position
arising from the possession of special makes is then always held and jointly exploited
by a not very considerable number of firms. In general, therefore, the question seems
to be whether a concentration of manufacturers of highly finished goods has taken
place or not, and whether new undertakings will increase competition with ease, or
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each has a reputation, coalition will be made just as difficult as it is made easy by the
existence of a few firms supplying well-known specialities.
In the case of many highly finished manufactures (and fine grades) we find England
confirming the view that it is comparatively easy to create new competing
undertakings if demand increases. As in other countries, the size necessary for a
profitable business in such branches is relatively small compared to the total
production of the country, and therefore there is less need of fixed capital than in the
case of half-manufactured goods. We find accordingly that, (i) the number of existing
undertakings is comparatively large; and (ii) it increases rapidly when demand grows
and profits rise — two conditions which make it extremely difficult to shut out
competition.
Examples are numerous enough. The Bedstead-makers’ Alliance, though its
collapse was partly due to the increase of foreign competition, had seen new factories
grow from 40 in 1891 to 56 in 1899, and its own importance diminish
correspondingly.
548 With worsted yarn it is the same. Here the non-existence of a
monopolist organisation is sufficiently accounted for by the fact that the
old-fashioned “family business” still preponderates, and that it is only quite of late
years that joint-stock companies have been founded.
549 In 1906 a meeting of the
worsted yarn spinners of Bradford was held to consider the question of organisation,
and less than 106 firms
550 were represented. But the number of competitors being so
large (and they all moreover held fast by their traditional independence), no
agreement could be come to. In the manufacture of tubes, the large number of firms
— 50–60 working concerns with a production of 300,000 tons — accounted for the
non-existence of an association. In addition, increased prices would mean at once
fresh competition. As Mr. Arthur Chamberlain said in 1902, “A great number of
people who had now gone out of competition, still had the requisite machinery, and
if there was any chance of making any plunder, there was no doubt they would
speedily reappear as tube manufacturers.”
As compared with other countries, specially with the United States and Germany,
the size of undertakings in many branches of English industry is relatively small,
because the need for vertical combination is less. In a country where protective duties
and monopolies of raw goods hinder the manufacturer of finished goods from
obtaining supplies of materials, and where, at the same time, it is impossible for the
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price of material, an intimate connection with raw production and half manufacture
is unavoidable. The most important of the few raw products of England are not under
a monopoly, and an artificial rise in the price of raw materials owing to protective
duties is out of the question. Accordingly, the process of combination has been a
much longer one in England than in countries where the industrial element saw in it
a means of protection against an abuse of power on the part of producers of raw
materials and half-manufactured goods.
Thus we find, for example, that in the English steel industry a steel works is by no
means always combined with a blast furnace. In Germany and the United States the
large steel manufactories are always combined undertakings, whereas Jeans in 1906
represents the combination of different branches of business only as being
“increasingly recognised.”
551 Even most important firms, such as Armstrong’s,
Whitworth & Co., David Colville & Sons, or the Steel Company of Scotland, do not
at the present time own any blast furnaces.
552 On the other hand, the large blast
furnaces are still dependent on the sale of their material. We shall later on have to
explain how a change appears to be taking place in this respect. It is only essential
here to state that until a short time back (and partly, indeed, up to the present time)
manufacturers of ingot-iron in England did not consider combination so pressing a
matter as did the manufacturers in other countries. As coal, iron ore, and pig-iron
were neither under a monopoly nor protected by a duty, the iron manufacturer
regarded the gains of his purveyors only as customary profit; in fact sometimes he
could obtain single materials at prices below what it would have cost to produce
them.
553
Only recently Lord Furness stated
554 that the marine engineering works under his
direction had closed their once profitable forging department because they “could
obtain forgings at considerably lower prices than they could either produce them
themselves or buy them in this country.” As vertical combination makes
ever-increasing demands on the capital of the united undertaking, the relatively small
amount of influence exercised by such combinations in English industry means that
it is easier to start competing works in England than in the United States or in
Germany. Further, whilst the vertical combination in the latter countries has often led
to a complete monopolisation of raw materials, this development, which would
entirely exclude competition in finishing manufactures, is non-existent in England.
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to follow the example given by a few of their number, and to acquire forests and
wood-pulp mills abroad. If the scheme were really able to make such undertakings
more profitable, it would force subsequent new mills to keep up the pace, and by
considerably increasing both the amount of capital necessary and the risk run, would
probably make it more difficult than before for any such mills to be founded. Yet
they might, though with difficulty, spring up. In the United States and in Germany,
however, matters are different. Monopolies of raw materials in all kinds of industries
make it impossible to start new works in any finishing manufacture. Witness the
American Paper Trust, which owes its power to the fact that, aided by high duties on
wood and pulp, it has monopolised the native forests and consequently lamed fresh
competition.
555 Witness again the steel trade in America and Germany, in which the
creation of new undertakings on a large scale is hindered by the monopolisation of
the deposits of ore,
556 or the soda cartel in Germany, which has combined with the
salt cartels in refusing to supply new works with salt.
557 Similar cases often occur in
countries where extensive monopolies of raw materials exist side by side with
finishing manufactures; but they are not to be found in England where there are only
isolated monopolies of raw materials, and even these, as we shall see later on, have
only a comparatively limited sphere of operation, the great mass of raw material
required by English manufacturers being imported duty free and at low freight rates.
It might be thought within the bounds of possibility to create a trust in English
finishing manufactures by the aid of a foreign raw material monopoly, and one such
attempt has been made by the American Borax Trust which owns a few refineries in
England. But generally speaking it has not been found possible by monopolising raw
materials to promote monopolies in remote stages of finishing manufactures
otherwise exposed to competition.
There are therefore a number of circumstances which serve to explain the continued
existence of competition in many English finishing trades. Two of these
circumstances — the existence of a large number of undertakings and the
comparative ease with which this number may be increased — are very marked in
one English industry in particular in which the conditions of competition stand in
sharp contrast to those in Germany and America. This is the tin-plate industry.
Inasmuch as foreign competition is in fact unknown and need not be theoretically
excluded for purposes of argument only, tin-plating offers an excellent illustration
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English or, more particularly the Welsh makers have a dominant position in the
world’s market. Exports rose from 271,000 tons in 1901 to 405,000 tons in 1907.
There are no imports from abroad. Germany is forced to import tin-plates from Wales
(export to Germany was estimated at 41,000 tons in 1907); and in America there is
a considerable market for purposes of high-grade manufacture in spite of high
protective duties. Welsh plates are exclusively used in British India, and in Canada
their position is equally safe as long as the American tin-plate industry cannot export
in large quantities.
558 Nevertheless, although Welsh tin plates, alike in the home
market and for the greater part in the foreign market also, hold such a position that
prices might be forced up without stimulating outside competition,
559 there is no trace
of a monopolist organisation. This is all the more striking as ever since 1862 the
tin-plate industry in Germany has possessed a syndicate in the
Weissblechverkaufskontor, and the American industry, which is of much more recent
growth having existed only since 1892, became subject in 1898 to a trust, the
American Tin-Plate Company, since 1901 a member of the Steel Corporation.
What is the explanation of this peculiar position? As regards comparisons between
Germany and England, it is at once noticeable that in Germany five works suffice for
the relatively small production of tin plates, and the creation of a cartel is, therefore,
naturally a simple matter. They have practically no German competitors. Tin-plating,
in spite of the protective duty, is not a very paying industry,
560 for the cost of the
necessary skilled labour is high, and as owing to cartels and duties it is so difficult
to obtain a supply of raw material that only a “mixed” works is in a position to make
tin-plate making profitable,
561 existing works have kept their monopolist position
undisturbed. Germany only manufactured about 47,000 tons of tin plates in 1905,
against England and Wales’s 644,000 tons, and had a correspondingly smaller
number of works. This is due to two reasons: first, in tin-plating trained manual
labour still plays the chief part, machinery being of less importance, and, therefore,
the size of a profitable business is relatively small; secondly, in Wales, tin-plate
works pure and simple, which buy tin-plate bars, are no worse off than larger
“mixed” works, as there are no duties to send up rates, and on the contrary
half-finished goods can often be bought from abroad at “dumping” prices.
562 This
enables the smaller capitalists to exist beside those who combine steel and rolling
works with tin-plating. These two circumstances together caused the production of
tin plates in England to be divided in 1906 among 74 firms, according to Rylands.
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In 1905 and 1906, when trade in tin plates was extremely good, the number of mills
and works increased considerably.
564 Many considerable difficulties must be met with
in projecting cartels among so great a number of undertakings. When the American
Trust was founded in 1897 the manufacture of tin plates within the Union amounted
only to 250,000 tons, and only about thirty-eight works had to be bought up in order
to control 90 per cent, of the production, many of which had been rash speculations
and were very nearly bankrupt.
565 In Wales, on the contrary, there are practically no
unprofitable works. All have an excellent type of workman at their command and a
firm hold on traditional markets. As an expert explained to the Tariff Commission
— “We cannot make a monopoly in the tin-plate trade, because it is divided up into
such small units.”
566 Even if a combination of the existing works were to be formed,
it would probably only attract fresh competition in view of the resulting rise in
price.
567 For trained workers, who are of the first importance in the tin-plate industry,
are abundant in Wales; and fresh tin-plate works make relatively small demands on
capital, so long as machinery is of less importance than manual labour and as new
undertakings can be formed in times of prosperity as tin-plate works pure and simple.
The main factors which make the suppression of competition among English
manufacturers at the present time impossible or in the long run inadvisable have now
been considered, and the general outline of the sphere of competitive industry in
England should be clear. But in the last ten years the limits of unrestricted
competition have been increasingly narrowed by a number of circumstances which










Perhaps the most far-reaching innovation in competitive industry during the
nineteenth century has been the appearance of what is called the concentration of
industrial units. The course of development has been by no means uniform, as a
review of any reasonable number of English industries shows. With rising demand
the number of separate makers may be permanently increased, as in cotton spinning,
even though as time goes on the average size of each separate unit is very much
larger than it was. On the other hand, we also find the peculiar position, sometimes
by no means new, that an increasing demand is satisfied by a continually decreasing
number of firms, the greater productive power of the single unit reducing from
decade to decade the aggregate number of firms.
Nowadays this concentration, which John Stuart Mill noticed in the case of gas and
railway companies, is not confined in England to staple industries. We meet it also
in other cases; in shipping, in both wholesale and retail trade, in hotel-keeping, in
newspapers, and in urban traffic schemes.
We are not now concerned with the historical origins of this general tendency, nor
need we investigate in detail its causes. It interests us only from the point of view of
industrial competition. We regard it merely as a special variety of industrial
development, one of many directions which manufacturing on a large scale may take.
Every factor which can exercise any considerable influence on the origin and
development of such an industry — changes in facilities for communication,
increased competition, new inventions and discoveries, and so on — can equally be
the basis of a concentration of industrial units. The primary result of enormous
industrial undertakings is the increased efficiency of each unit. If, however, the
circumstances of the case are such that the demand for the commodity in question
can be satisfied by fewer concerns of greater productive power, we then arrive at the
special case of a concentration of industrial units. The productive power of an
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goods actually produced in the industry, that production is gradually concentrated in
the hands of an increasingly small number of concerns. And just as a multiplicity of
undertakings makes it difficult to suppress competition, concentration, if combined
with a reduction of the competing undertakings,
568 makes it proportionally easy.
Nowadays concentration often appears at the very beginning of a new industry,
when the productive power of an economically profitable unit is such that a few units
alone suffice to meet the entire demand. But more usually it is the result of a lengthy
process, in which the technically more efficient overcome, after severe competition,
the less productive, and acquire their markets. The history of the English paper trade
is an interesting example. Statistics of the licences granted show that in 1801 there
were 413 paper factories; in 1811, 527; ten years later, as many as 564. Between
1803 and 1831 the amount of paper taxed in the year rose from about £31,000,000
worth to twice that amount.
569 In other words, the increase in the number of paper
mills was accompanied by a corresponding increase in production.
The next period shows a different picture. Between 1841 and 1845 there were still
on the average 497 mills, but the number then sank steadily. The following are the












The production of paper rose from 43,350 tons in 1841 to 773,550 tons in 1903, but
the number of mills fell from nearly 500 to 282. Continual improvements in
machinery, the inaccessibility of certain older works to markets, and the increasingly
strong competition of the more efficient mills were, according to Spicer,
571 the causes
of this concentration.
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In the production of pig-iron the tendency to concentrate appeared much later. From
1796 to 1880 the number of furnaces in existence rose steadily from 124 to 926, and
there was a corresponding increase in production from about 125,000 tons to about
7,700,000 tons. But after 1880, though production increased, the number of furnaces
fell — to 908 in 1884, 790 in 1890, and 514 in 1907.
573 Even more interesting,
perhaps, is the decrease in the number of working furnaces.
574
Year.  Furnaces working Production of pig-iron in tons.








The special cause of the tendency to concentration, in this instance, lay in the
changes in the construction of furnaces. They have been so often described in the
case both of Great Britain and of other countries, that it is unnecessary to re-state
them now, and, in any case, we are interested in the fact of concentration only. Many
firms or concerns owned more than one furnace, and therefore the figures given
above are no exact measure of the decrease in competition with which we are
concerned.
But statistics of particular districts show that a considerable concentration of
interests accompanied the concentration of ironworks. I will quote some of them. In
the most productive pig-iron district of Yorkshire, eighteen firms owning 92
furnaces, produced 1,747,000 tons in 1885; in 1907, there were only thirteen
concerns producing 2,537,000 tons. Of the 92 furnaces in 1885, Bolkow, Vaughan
& Co., owned 21; in 1907, they owned 25 out of a total of 77. During the same years
the number of furnaces in Durham fell from 60 to 39, while output increased from
730,000 tons to 1,144,000 tons. Of the 39 furnaces Bell Brothers, in Middlesbrough
owned 12, the remaining 27 were divided between seven other firms. Since 1885 the
total number of firms decreased by five.
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In Cumberland, too, a new era of concentration has commenced with the recent
reconstruction of the Workington Co., an amalgamation of four companies, either
entirely or as regards particular works. The new company embraces 22 furnaces out
of a total in the district in 1907 of 36.
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Even in the tinplate industry, in which there had been, as we have seen, relatively
little tendency to manufacture on a large scale, and where even now such
developments are far less advanced than in other industries, statistics of the number
of works show signs of concentration.
577










In 1880 the number of mills (of which many concerns owned several) was 369; in
1891 it reached 524, with an output of about 663,000 tons. When the output of
tinplates in England, which had been much reduced in the nineties owing to the
American protective duties, again reached in 1906 about the same amount (actually
681,000 tons), the number of mills had sunk to 453.
578 That was it is true owing to
the trade boom an increase on the previous year; but the general history of tinplating
in the last twenty years shows an unmistakable tendency towards concentration, even
though high profits produce a temporary increase in the number of mills and
undertakings.
The cases so far quoted illustrate movements towards concentration arising from
a permanent enlargement in the normal size of an undertaking. Where this increases
more rapidly than the total output requires it leads to an absolute decrease in the
number of works, and in most cases also of undertakings. It must be left to a history
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in each case to an increase in producing power, the economic circumstances which
made it profitable to adopt them, and attendant features of the movement: — the
extinction of inefficients through bankruptcy, their purchase and closing down,
amalgamations, and so on. We are only concerned with the contrast between the
development of concentration in recent times and the present day, and the absolute
increase in the number of works in the days when industry on a large scale
commenced at the beginning of the nineteenth century — a contrast which existing
statistics unfortunately only make possible in a few though not the least important
branches of industry.
Nowadays combination among works which produce the same commodity gives
rise to a further concentration — the so-called “horizontal” combination. Technical
changes in the process of manufacture or in productive power are in such cases either
absent or at least not decisive. Combination more often results from purely economic
causes. Separate undertakings hitherto working in competition combine to obtain
higher profits by uniting all existing works in one concern. Where this kind of
combination arises there is very probably a simultaneous concentration of plant; and
it is also conceivable that technical improvements are made in the works of the united
undertaking. But while concentrations like that in pig-iron could be regarded as
exclusively due to increased productive power, horizontal combinations are the result
of systematic efforts on the part of manufacturers to organise more completely the
production and sales of all works concerned, concentration of plant being only one
means among many.
Mr. Macrosty has collected a great deal of information concerning horizontal
combinations and the resultant concentration of undertakings in British industry in
his exhaustive book. He shows how the organisation of many works into a single
combine has developed in the most diverse spheres of industry, in fact practically
everywhere. That leaders of industry well understand the advantages of such
combination and make it the centre of their efforts in organisation may be seen, apart
from Mr. Macrosty’s instances, from a remarkable speech made in 1908 by Sir
Christopher (now Lord) Furness. As director of one of the largest firms in England
for the manufacture of ships’ engines, Richardsons, Westgarth & Co., Limited, he
suggested on the 29th of December 1908, a fusion of that undertaking with various
other similar concerns. To him this might well have appeared as a mere repetition of
a proposal which had led to the foundation in 1900 of the firm of which he was thenHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 151
a director — a combination of Th. Richardsons Limited, Sir C. Furness, Westgarth
& Co., and William Allan & Co., representing a paid-up capital of £790,000
sterling.
579 The new amalgamation was intended to embrace a number of
undertakings which had together supplied no less than 1206 ships with engines
having 2,150,000 horse-power in 1902–1908. The plan, up till now unrealised,
580
would be of no greater importance than hundreds of similar combinations, but for the
very incisive description given by Lord Furness of its various advantages, which, in
consequence, may therefore be taken as typical of all horizontal combinations. They
were as follows:
581
1. A large number of materials at present either bought from the firms with whom
it was proposed to combine or produced at purchase prices could be provided much
cheaper under a combination. Substantial profits could only be made by engine
makers in the production of separate parts and details if it was carried on on a large
scale. “The production of marine machinery and the mass of detail connected
therewith involves so many trades, each requiring a separate department, the
specialised production in bulk under highly concentrated management becomes
practically impossible for the average engine builder; but under an adequate scheme
of amalgamation the entire proposition is simplified. . . . The detail alone in
connection with a yearly output of 172 sets of machinery is enormous, and were it
standardised and manufactured under modern conditions profits would be obtained
which, under present conditions, are quite impossible.”
2. Great economies would result in the actual making of engines and boilers. “Each
builder had some points of excellence, either in design, arrangement of parts, quality
of material or of workmanship which in combination would yield greater excellence
... Again, each firm has an expensive staff producing designs practically identical
with those of its competitors, as well as pattern shops producing equally identical
patterns.” As designs and patterns for a cargo boat’s engines cost about .£500 to
produce, the importance of the saving suggested is obvious.
3. Economies in the organisation of the works and of deliveries would follow.
Expensive overtime would be abolished, or only resorted to very exceptionally,
owing to a better division of work among the various shops. Similar relief could be
given in event of local pressure, and there would also be no reason why ships should
not be engined at the port in which they were built, whereby each of the amalgamated
works would save insurance, towage, etc.Hermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 152
The advantages which Lord Furness attributed to this scheme of horizontal
combination figure in dozens of prospectuses of large amalgamations, especially in
textile and steel amalgamations, sometimes in a more exaggerated, sometimes in a
less detailed form. If the combination is carried out and the promised economies
achieved, a new industrial unit is formed which, as a rule, outdoes all former rivals
both in the range of its production and the lowness of its cost of manufacturing. In
any case it represents another victory for concentration.
There remains to be mentioned the form of concentration known as the “vertical”
combination. As we have seen, this is much less common in England than in
Germany or America. Owing to the absence of the tariff duties, of high freights, and
monopolies in raw materials which increase the cost of supplies of raw materials and
half-manufactured goods abroad, the necessity of vertical combination is less
imperative for the English manufacturer, and in any case in finished articles vertical
combination as a means of monopoly is practically unnecessary. It is used merely to
suppress ordinary middlemen’s profits and to increase the profits on the last stage of
production by combining with it the various intermediate stages. As a rule therefore
it follows a concentration of plant or a horizontal combination. This is especially the
case in the high-grade finished goods, in which it only becomes profitable to take
over the production of raw material or half-manufactured articles, as Lord Furness’s
remarks on marine machinery works clearly show, when a very large concern is
formed, or many undertakings are amalgamated. In lower grades, however, an
ordinary modern firm can usually profit from vertical combination, and we find it,
for instance in recent developments of the steel trade, as a result of the increasing
expansion of separate concerns.
582
Such “mixed” undertakings are also to be found in shipbuilding. Messrs. John
Brown & Co. Ltd. use their own ore and coal, and provide all engines and steel ships’
fittings from their own workshops.
583 In paper making again, as mills steadily grew,
the largest — Lloyd’s — took to producing cellulose also. It has fifteen machines
against nine at most in all former mills.
584 In newspapers it is the same. Lord
Northcliffe, the largest newspaper proprietor in England, declared in 1907 that a rise
of ¼d. per lb. in paper prices would cost his company (the Amalgamated Press Ltd.)
more than £70,000 a year;
585 and accordingly they have bought forests in
Newfoundland and erected mills for manufacturing cellulose and paper there.
586 The
great soap firm of Lever Bros, has had a very similar history. Their output has risenHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 153
from 20 tons a week in 1886 to 2400 tons a week in 1899. Between 1895 and 1899
to secure their large needs in the way of raw material more cheaply the firm set up
an office for collecting copra in Sydney, an oil mill in Polynesia, a mill for extracting
oil from cotton seed on the Mississippi and another for Egyptian cotton seed at Port
Sunlight.
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Experience of German or American “vertical” combinations would lead one to
expect that such combinations would greatly influence the movement towards
concentration in England. But this is not so. As we have seen, the economic urgency
of “vertical” combination in the land of free trade, low freights, and no monopolies
in raw materials is less, and therefore the “mixed” works do not necessarily force the
remaining undertakings to follow their example. In Germany and America the large
firm which has grown to be a “mixed” undertaking can usually manufacture the final
product at such a much lower cost that only similar combination can save the rest
from its competition. This consideration and the fear of not being able to combine
later when all raw material is completely monopolised generally leads to the rapid
“vertical” combination of more and more firms. As all are not in a position to meet
the large capital demands of “vertical” combination, where a distinction between
“simple” and “mixed” undertakings arises, it tends ultimately to concentrate
production in the hands of the latter. But in England few traces of this connection
between “vertical” combination and concentration are as yet to be seen. The “simple”
rolling works have not yielded to the greater strength of the “mixed” works. Cheek
by jowl with Messrs. Brown & Co. there are firms like Armstrong’s or Vickers, Sons
& Maxim, whose production begins with steel, and by the side of Messrs. Lever a
number of important firms which buy all their materials;
588 and while in Germany
most large paper mills own their own wood-pulping plant,
589 in England there are
only two such firms, and their organisation is not by any means regarded by the other
large mills as in every way to be imitated. Possibly at some future time “vertical”
combination will lead to a “horizontal” concentration of firms in some industries, if
not generally, owing to the suppression of “simple” undertakings by the great
“mixed” works. But for the moment there is little sign of it, and no change is
probable so long as the above circumstances continue to favour “simple” works. It
is not “vertical” combination that causes the concentration of plant and
undertakings,
590 but, vice versa, concentration of plant or horizontal combination that
leads to vertical combination. In other words, vertical combination is one of theHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 154
economic advantages which may possibly be obtained by these two forms of
industrial organisation.
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This conclusion is of great moment for its bearing on the importance to the growth
of monopoly in England of the movement towards concentration which we have
described above. As we have already seen, the significance of concentration in the
history of cartels or trusts lies primarily in the fact that a decrease in the number of
rival firms makes it easier to suppress competition. Secondly, the difficulty of
founding a new undertaking increases in the exact proportion in which that
undertaking — to be an effective competitor — requires a large amount of capital
and a wide sphere of activity, and the more certain it must be, as will be explained
later, of finding a profitable market for the great increase of commodities which it
adds to the total output of the trade. “Vertical” combination has hitherto had but little
influence in England (unlike other countries) on the concentration of undertakings
concerned in a given branch of production. It can therefore be neglected for the
moment in considering the conditions necessary for the creation of monopoly.
Concentration of plant and “horizontal” combination, on the other hand, have proved
to be very important antecedents to industrial monopolies in modern England. Both
by diminishing the number of competing firms and by adding to the difficulties of
new competitors they increase the general possibility of monopoly in an industry. But
it by no means follows that they will in every case lead to the rise of a monopolist
combination. To enumerate, as Mr. Macrosty does, numerous cases of concentration
of works which have nothing in common with monopolist control of the market, in
a book on the “Trust Movement” is to ignore the fact that concentration and
monopoly are two different things. Waring and Gillow’s, to take one of his examples,
and one that represents the result of several amalgamations,
592 may be the largest firm
of furniture manufacturers in England; but it has in no way a monopoly in furnishing
and decorating, and in view of the great number of similar firms in existence no
likelihood of forming one. The inclusion of such firms in an enumeration of English
trusts merely because they are notably large undertakings is as confusing as the
identification formerly so common of all the various kinds of combinations of
interests, e.g., ordinary English associations, with syndicates and cartels. It would be
as reasonable to see the advance of the trust movement in every large hotel company
or in every large stores.
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monopoly. But monopoly or trust or cartel implies the preliminary exclusion of
competition as such, either completely or to a considerable degree. Even highly
concentrated undertakings need immunity no less from foreign than from domestic
competition if they are to create a monopoly. In the pig-iron industry, for instance,
works and businesses have been concentrated on all sides, but up to the present
foreign competition has prevented any monopolist combination from gaining a
footing. Similarly the effectiveness or otherwise of domestic competition depends on
the degree of concentration attained in each particular instance. Two cases must be
distinguished. Concentration may be adopted as a means to permanently greater
production in each factory or undertaking, which may finally result in the acquisition
of a monopoly or something very like it by the undertaking which proves to have the
greatest efficiency. Lord Furness’s plan would not only have created an undertaking
of greater efficiency than the aggregate of all the individual undertakings it
amalgamated. It would also have created an undertaking exercising a monopolist
control over the production of ships’ machinery on the North East coast. The
horizontal combinations made by each individual undertaking in its own particular
branch of trade would have ended in a final “ efficiency “ combination, formed to
reduce the cost of production, but at the same time a “monopolistic combination.” In
this case the movement towards concentration would have run its full natural course
before ultimately culminating in monopoly. But long before this stage is reached
manufacturers may seize upon concentration as a possible means of creating
monopoly. Concentration of works or horizontal combination reduces them to a
relatively small number, say twenty or thirty, and in given circumstances a
monopolist organisation is then possible without any increase of economic efficiency
either immediate or prospective worth mentioning. In the first case, concentration
aiming at increased efficiency leads directly to the monopoly of the survivor; in the
second, it merely results in the possible systematic suppression of home competition
by reducing the number of competitors and facilitating their combination. In either
case the movement towards concentration — if concentration of works and
horizontal combinations aiming solely at increased efficiency are included under that
term — must have reached an advanced stage.
If on the other hand the number of existing works or undertakings is very high, as
in the paper trade, even a good deal of concentration would find it difficult to
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of factories but, given increased prices and profits, the rise of new factories is
relatively easy as in tin-plating, the individual manufacturers must see from the
beginning that the absolute suppression of mutual competition in order to reach high
monopoly prices may, under certain circumstances, involve greater risks to their
future than its continuance.
Concentration, therefore, only leads to the rise of cartels and trusts under given
conditions, one very important factor in which is foreign competition. Where
freedom from such competition coincides with certain possibilities of development
by industrial concentration and horizontal combination, the ground is prepared for
monopoly.
We must now examine the actual history of monopolist combinations in the light








If we review English industries from the standpoint of their relative freedom from
foreign competition, we shall find that they fall into three groups. The first group
consists of industries sheltered only conditionally from the foreigner; — industries
helped by no special advantage in production over other countries, but enjoying the
natural protection of freights; industries only subject to foreign competition on rare
occasions when protected syndicates are compelled to dump; or, finally, industries
in which foreign competition only takes the form of imports of inferior qualities or
of substitutes. Wherever such circumstances or a combination of them arise,
competition between manufacturers usually keeps prices under the limit which would
pay the foreign exporter, though it would allow a monopolist organisation to take
advantage in its prices of the freedom from foreign competition existing within that
limit. The second group comprises industries holding an unconditional monopoly
against the foreigner, and in which a monopolist organisation in fixing its prices and
regulating its production, will have regard to consumption, to the rise of other home
competition, to the possibility of re-imports, and so on, but not to foreign
competition; in other words, industries in which either imports are impossible for
technical reasons, or in which decisive advantages in the quality of goods, or
extremely low cost of production, secure a monopolist position to the home trade.
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assured, as it always may be, by international agreements. We will commence with
the consideration of various monopolist combinations in the first group, starting with
one closely connected with the production of raw materials.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
All the evidence we have so far considered shows how comparatively rare it is
nowadays for an English industrial monopoly to be protected from foreign
competition by freights. But there are certain trades in which the relatively high cost
of transit, where distances are considerable, favours the English manufacturer. The
case of minerals would naturally suggest itself, but we have already seen that these
are not very numerous in England. There can be no question of protection in the case
of iron, for the superior quality of Spanish and Swedish iron more than covers the
extra cost of freights, while cheapness of production alone is enough to secure coal
and salt from foreign competition in the home market. But in the cement industry,
which is entirely dependent on the supply of clay and chalk, freights are of some
importance.
The industry is concentrated in the Thames and Medway valley, near to the chalk
pits of Kent and Essex, which produce three-quarters of the entire output.
593 It is
therefore favourably situated with regard to supplies of raw material, and owing to
the two rivers, the proximity of the sea and of a great consuming centre (London) can
find an outlet for a considerable part of its produce at a very small expenditure on
freights. The coincidence of all these factors gives cement makers better facilities for
production and sale in this district than perhaps anywhere else in the world.
594 The
English makers, with their usual conservatism, for many years neglected possible
improvements in quality, and accordingly suffered increasingly severely in some
foreign markets from German competition. After 1900, however, English processes
began to improve, and at the present time experts consider that English cement is
fully comparable to that of other countries, both in quality and in cheapness of
production.
595
When there is a good demand for cement in the world’s markets, and consequently
no dumping from Germany, Belgium, or France, the Thames-Medway district is
effectively sheltered from foreign competition by its low rates of freight. For a long
time strong competition between the rival manufacturers prevented this advantage
being fully utilised. But in the late nineties there appeared to be considerableHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 158
likelihood that this competition would be suppressed. Thirty-one firms, one of which
had a productive power of 160,000 tons or 10 per cent, of the entire output of 1899,
controlled 89 per cent, of the total production,
596 the concentration being no doubt
due to the bad market conditions of the nineties. Improvements in machinery since
1872 and the almost complete displacement of manual labour made considerable
capital necessary for the foundations of new concerns and thereby impeded their
rise;
597 and finally the universal boom in the cement trade since 1897 removed any
fear of dumping.
598 The prospects of the Portland cement trust, founded in July 1900
under the name of the Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers, were accordingly
exceptionally bright, although the frequency of chalk and clay deposits put any
scheme of forming a monopoly of supplies out of the question. The trust included 27
of the above 31 firms, and had cartel agreements with the remaining four.
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At the present time the “outsiders” have increased in number, but the trust remains
the dominant factor in prices, so long as it is secure from foreign competition. The
import of cheap “natural cement” exercises, however, a moderating influence.
Unknown till 1895, it rapidly increased after 1897 and latterly amounted to between
£150,000 and £300,000 annually. It was in no way caused by the trust’s operations
on prices; it commenced at the moment when cement commanded a price it had not
reached since 1892. England both exports and imports an increasing amount of
cement, the explanation being that the imports are of an inferior quality. Natural
cement can, in point of quality, in no way compete with Portland cement, but owing
to the high price of the latter, it is used for cheap buildings as a substitute. Statistics
of the value per cwt. of the exports compared with that of the imports also show how
much less valuable the imported cement was and still is. Those who required
Portland cement at any price found no substitute in natural cement, cheap though it
was, and the trust was therefore in so far not damaged by it. But it no doubt gave
those who were less particular the opportunity of becoming independent of the high
prices which ruled in the early days of the combine.
The further fall of prices between 1902 and 1905 itself followed by a decrease in
imports may therefore have been accentuated by an excessive increase of prices on
the part of the trust. But the reduced demand for cement at the time in England as in
other countries, for instance Germany,
600 must have led in any case to lower prices.
Mr. Macrosty,
601 failing to take into consideration the conditions prevailing before
1900, states that, “for all their millions the Associated Manufacturers could notHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 159
maintain prices,” but that fact proves nothing as to their monopolist endeavours to
influence them.
The trust could never have dreamt that it could permanently fix an absolute
standard of price: all that it could possibly do was to make prices reflect more closely
than they had done in the days of competition the protection from the foreigner
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given by freights. In this it was successful in good times, as the high prices of 1900
and 1901 show; and it cannot be doubted that the prices would have subsequently
fallen even quicker and lower if the trust had not existed. Mr. Macrosty declares that
the trust reduced its prices, but tried to delay their fall by restricting production as the
demand decreased.
603 In any case, whatever may have been the limitations on its
power, the trust retained an influence on prices and production which the separate
firms never had in the days of mutual competition.
604
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
The state of foreign competition in the English steel and iron trade is very peculiar.
Taking the trade as a whole there is a marked excess of exports over imports.
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Exports amounted in 1893 to about £20,200,000, and, apart from occasional lapses,
have risen steadily to £46,500,000 in 1907. Imports in 1893 were worth rather under
£4,000,000, even in 1907 only just £7,000,000. But the far greater importance of
exports must not be taken to mean that England is secure in all branches of wholesale
iron manufacture from foreign competition. We have shown already the importance
of foreign competition in the English market in the case of unmanufactured steel,
imports of which (ingots, billets, bars, etc.), though still very slight in 1890, increased
largely after 1900, and have since 1904 made up one quarter of the entire value of
imported steel and iron — a fact with which English manufacturers must reckon not
only in times of admitted “dumping,” but also in ordinary years.
606 Assuming that
“blooms” and “billets” represented about three-quarters of the imports of
unmanufactured steel,
607 about 450,000 tons were imported in 1905. In the same year
the home production may be estimated at about 680,000 tons,
608 which clearly shows
the importance in this case of imports. Other imports, for instance plates and sheets
of all kinds, give very different results. They were 71,928 tons in 1903, only 68,765
tons in 1905, the year of the largest total import of foreign steel; 82,000 and 56,000
tons in 1906 and 1907. If we assume with Jeans
609 that the total production of plates
in Great Britain in 1905 was about 2,000,000 tons, tin plates and black iron platesHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 160
being excluded, the small relative importance of imports as compared with those of
half-manufactured iron is clearly seen. And while England exports no
half-manufactured iron, the exports in 1907 of ship, bridge, boiler, and other crude
iron plates alone amounted to 232,622 tons, and that of galvanised plates to 467,889
tons.
It must be admitted that in times of dumping import figures of comparatively small
seeming may hide very serious competition with home producers. In 1902 and 1903
English manufacturers of ship and boiler plates certainly felt dumping very much:
610
ship plates sank in Cleveland from £8 7s. 6d. in May 1900 to £5 7s. 6d. in December
1903.
611 But even in such times, as Jeans expressly insists, the danger of dumping is
much greater for producers of half-manufactures than for those of heavy
manufactures. And while, after the tide of dumping ebbed in 1903, a not
inconsiderable import of half-manufactured goods has remained, the imports of
plates and steels are still, as we have seen, so small in comparison with the home
production that in ordinary times they can hardly be regarded as competing at all.
Competition being thus limited, the prospects of a monopolist association for the
manufacture of ships’ boiler plates have not latterly been unfavourable. The rising
demand since about 1905 has kept particular countries, especially Germany, from
dumping, and agreement among the English masters particularly in this trade would
very largely contribute to profiting from the favourable state of the market.
No insuperable difficulties were to be found in the condition of the home trade.
There was, it is true, mutual competition between several districts, Scotland, the
north of England, and the north of Ireland, each more or less equally favoured by
position. But within each district only a small number of firms made ship and boiler
plates, and the desire to monopolise the local market soon brought makers together.
612
Local monopolist associations like the Scotch Steelmakers’ Association, founded as
early as 1886 by the union of the four leading firms, arose. The Association
practically abolished local competition, in the hope of thereby becoming better armed
against freebooters from rival districts. The other districts followed suit about
1900;
613 and the union of the comparatively few masters in each district prepared the
way for a wider organisation, when, at the end of 1903, the period of “dumping”
ceased.
The monopolist organisation, which thus arose and exists to this day, devotes its
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Scotch Steel Makers’ Association and the north of England makers, have since 1904
entered into agreements which secure each party the undisputed right to certain areas,
and thereby make it possible to maintain prices within those areas. Scotland
withdrew from north of England markets, and received in return Belfast.
614 The effect
of this arrangement was not long hidden. An Irish firm had remained outside the
“combine” and undercut their prices in Belfast, with the result that they were forced
to sell much cheaper than on the Clyde and in the north of England district where the
understanding could be maintained. The combine accordingly commenced to “dump”
in Ireland, and the Clyde shipbuilders complained that this policy gave an advantage
of £2000 on every 7000 tons ship to their Irish rivals.
615 In 1908 the Midland steel
makers also came in. The Midland consumers struggled, we are told, in vain against
the prices of the local association. They sent their orders to the Clyde makers, and the
following extract from the ‘Iron and Coal Trades’ Review’ for September 1908
shows the result.
616 “The English makers drew the attention of the Scotch makers to
the position, and the latter, out of loyalty to their compact, have raised their
quotations for plates in the English districts concerned by 2s. 6d. a ton. This will
force the English consumers back to their old supply. The new quotation is actually
2s. 6d. a ton over what is named for local deliveries in Scotland, and is about los. a
ton above what is asked on exports for foreign markets. It is fully five years since this
understanding originated, and year by year it has gradually extended its borders until
now it is the most important of the kind in the country.”
Differentiation between home and foreign markets is not here, as in the case of
several English combines, a mere unfounded rumour nor the exceptional concomitant
of one or two export contracts. On the contrary, trade papers regularly quote both




1st Jan.  10th March.  8th June.  16th Sept.
Boilerplates, £7 7 6  £7 2 6  £6 17 6  £7 2 6 
Ship plates,    6 12 6   6 7 6  6 2 6  6 10 6
Scotch Export Prices.
1st Jan.  1st April.  1st July.  1st Sept.Hermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 162
Boilerplates, £6 18 9 £6 18 9  £6 15 0 £6 17 6
Ship plates,    6 0 0  5 15 0 5 12 6 5 15 6
It seems at first strange that export prices of this kind are possible in the home of
free trade without encouraging reimportation. But the geographical distribution of the
exports must be remembered. Of the 200,000 tons of plates exported from England
in 1908 the great majority went to India, Japan, Norway, Australia, Canada, and
similar countries
618 whose distance involves high freights for such heavy articles. In
this case, therefore, home prices could be maintained above export prices by the
amount of return freights, whereas, in the case of raw iron exports, which go mostly
to Germany, Holland, France, and Italy, even a monopolist combine would find their
maintenance a difficult matter. The most important condition of success was, of
course, the control of home prices by the suppression of competition. The question
became a very burning one at the end of the steel boom in the winter of 1907, and as
soon as the first signs of falling demand were felt, works were closed under a general
agreement, and compensation paid to their owners by the remaining firms.
619
It is difficult to form an opinion of the policy of the associations in the matter of
prices. In 1906 the secretary of the Iron Trade Association stated
620 that “a very
remarkable improvement took place in the nominal prices of finished steel
manufactures, and these were generally adhered to, manufacturers being assisted in
keeping to their list rates by the firmer and more binding agreements amongst
themselves.” And it is a fact that Cleveland bars (which were not in the combine)
only rose from £6 2s. 6d. to £6 15s. between January 7, 1905, and January 7, 1906,
while ship plates rose from £5 17s. 6d. to £7, and boiler plates from £7 2s. 6d. to £8
5s. When prices sank all round in 1907 plates went down more slowly, and with
much longer pauses, than raw material. The East Coast prices were:
621
Haematite Ship  Plates  Price
per ton. per ton  Unchanged for
£. s. d.  £. s. d.
January 1907,  4 2 6 7 10 0
October 3 18 0 7 10 0  8 months.Hermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 163
November  3 16 6 7 0 0
December  3 9 0 6 10 0
February 1908,  2 17 0 6 10 0 3 months
March  2 19 0 6 5 0
June  2 17 0 6 0 0
December  2 l6 0 6 0 0 7 months
These figures show that the price of regulated ship plates only followed that of
unregulated crude iron hesitatingly and at a considerable distance. Shipbuilders
complained
622 loudly of the “high” prices of raw material; “although to secure any
orders at all for new ships they had to cut prices very low indeed, it was long before
the respective combinations of English and Scotch steel manufacturers which act in
unison would meet the situation.” Their complaint shows the influence of the
monopolist organisation. How far it is easier now than the days of more open
competition to maintain the price of finished steel in a falling market can only be
seen with certainty when prices have further developed.
The manufacturers of galvanised plates, one of the chief English steel exports, are
organised in very much the same way as those of ship and boiler plates. There is a
similar body, the National Galvanised Steel Makers’ Association, with a similar
origin from local associations, and a similar history of attempts to control prices and
production in the year of falling markets. In January 1908 a meeting of the
association adopted a price of £12 10s., free on board, Liverpool, as a basis, and this
price was maintained unaltered throughout the year in the Midlands as well as in
South Wales and the north, a fact, as a trade paper put it, which bore witness “to the
smooth working of the Association.”
623 It must be admitted that the small number of
the important firms in each district made it comparatively easy to abide by the
agreements that had been made,
624 but the fact remains that prices maintained a
steadiness for a whole year of bad markets to be sought in vain elsewhere in the
entire iron and steel trade.
The tin-plate bar combine, the South Wales Siemens Steel Makers’ Association,
has to give much more consideration to the pressure of possible foreign competition
in fixing its prices. In this case the conditions are very favourable to a common
organisation. Production is practically concentrated in South Wales,
625 whose
tin-plate industry is the main consumer; while, according to Rylands, the number ofHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 164
firms making tin-plate bars in South Wales was in 1906 only thirteen. For some years
German dumping, on which much valuable light was thrown by the German enquiry
into cartels,
626 rendered a monopolist combination of these firms pointless. When this
ceased in 1904, the cartel movement began to spread among producers of bars. In
1906 a definite organisation was set up by the founding of the South Wales
Association. Complaints soon arose that the association had driven up prices.
627 But
falling markets and renewed German competition made it impossible to continue
successfully the device of a minimum price so well known in other branches of the
steel trade, and Bessemer bars which stood at one time in 1907 at £6 10s. sank in
January 1909 to £4 8s. 9d., an even more pronounced drop in prices than that in the
other branches of steel which we have described.
628
It would be natural to add here some account of the rails cartel, which is of very
great importance among English steel trade associations; but in view of the fact that
it depends on an international agreement the details may be postponed. Nor shall we
now consider smaller local associations aiming usually at turning a local advantage
in freights to the best profits which exist in various branches of the trade, or the
undoubted fact that the big firms in each district to some extent “ work together” and
have understandings as to prices in many large orders. Such understandings, which
always exist where production is concentrated in a few hands, have nothing in
common with real monopolist organisations. They are of merely local effect or only
brief existence, perhaps for some acute crisis. The really important steel monopolist
combinations have all been reviewed.
The conclusion which we may draw from this general review is that, as matters
now stand, a by no means negligible part of the steel and iron trade is organised on
monopolist lines. Ship and boiler plates, galvanised plates, tin-plate bars and rails,
represent in all a yearly output of about 3 to 3½ million tons, and the syndicated
products are therefore considerable in amount. On the other hand, it must not be
forgotten that the entire crude iron trade, together with manufacture of billets, blocks,
iron bars, strap iron, angles, tubes, tin plates, and similar articles, are still free from
any form of cartel, though in some cases it seems imminent.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Here again the impetus necessary to create a cartel was given by the decline of
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methylated spirit were imported into England: in the following years, mainly owing
to changes in production and markets in Germany, imports fell to 334,000 gallons in
1904 and to only 4300 gallons in 1907–8. At the same time the home production rose
from 5,388,000 gallons in 1903–4 to 6,455,000 gallons in 1907–8.
629 Increasing
immunity from foreign competition, due to the constantly rising price of foreign
spirit, soon led to a combination of the few competing firms. For many years
concentration had been at work. The Distillers’ Company, for instance, which was
mainly concerned with whisky distilling, was due to a fusion of seven Scotch firms
in Edinburgh as far back as 1877. And it was now, therefore, only necessary to bring
eight large distilleries into line to control the entire manufacture of industrial spirit
in the United Kingdom.
In November 1907 seven of the eight existing firms founded the Industrial Spirit
Supply Company,
630 with a capital of no more than £1000, the shares being taken up
by the constituent firms. The eighth remaining firm entered into an agreement with
the new company. The loose compacts already existing were replaced by the definite
regulation of output and sales. The company managed the entire industrial spirit sales
of all the firms in the cartel, as no spirit could be bought for methylation except
through it. It regulated the production of each firm according to an allotted quota
proportional to the number of shares it held, and fixed the common prices. It further
distributed orders among the individual firms after duly considering freights, a
practice which was expected when the cartel was founded to produce considerable
economy. A difficulty arose from the fact that a number of distilleries themselves
manufactured methylated spirits, while others sold their spirit to finishers through
agents who required to be paid; but the resulting advantage of the “mixed” distillery
was met by a provision in the articles of association that it must pay to the funds of
the cartel an amount per gallon produced equal to the agent’s commission.
The founding of this cartel immediately resulted
631 in agreements among buyers as
to a minimum price for methylated spirit. The circle was thus completed, and definite
monopolist organisation from raw material to finished product achieved. After the
approved fashion the cartel at its foundation foreshadowed steady, moderate prices;
but within two years its success gave rise to loud complaints of its operations. It was
accused of not lowering its tariff as it should have, in view of the provisions of the
Finance Act of 1906, which reduced the duty on industrial spirit, and of having, on
the contrary, raised the price of methylated spirit from is. 8d. to 2s. 2d. since theHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 166
passing of the Act. The London distilleries put the blame on the high price of raw
materials, especially maize, but the Manchester Guardian’s correspondent estimated
that the manufacturers, in spite of that, succeeded in obtaining “a highly satisfactory
difference between price and cost,” due solely to the strong position of the cartel.
Once again the sole restriction on the manipulation of prices by the cartel is the
possibility of foreign competition. The trade circular found comfort in this in its
account of the cartel’s foundation for the fears it very clearly felt on behalf of the
ultimate consumer. “Happily there is a constant check at present existing in the
German article, which will be always on the watch to come in if the price here of the
British article is unduly pushed upwards.
632... At present the combine would be quite
safe at some pence higher, but it is quite likely that in another six months to a year
the volume of German production may again bring down the figure over there to a
dangerously low point.” The combine had always been prepared to lower prices
under pressure of foreign competition, but for the moment it had none to face, for raw
potato spirit which cost 16.90 marks per 100 litres rose in 1907 to 28.20 marks.
633
The high German prices enabled the associated English producers to raise their
prices in a way which would have been hardly possible with a simultaneous reduction
of the duty in former competitive days.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
Although, as we have seen, the paper trade had never offered a hopeful field for
monopolist combination on account both of foreign competition and of the still
considerable number of competing works, in 1900 a fusion of 31 wall-paper
factories, under the name of the Wall-paper Manufacturers Ltd., was effected.
According to Mr. Macrosty,
634 the trust had working agreements with three other
firms, and controlled about 98 per cent, of the production of wall- paper and other
decorative materials. In 1908 only seven manufacturers, according to Mr. Philips’
statement, appeared as outsiders to the trust.
635 This branch of the highly finished
paper industry was therefore distinguished from the rest of the trade by close
concentration of undertakings, and consequently suited for the formation of a trust.
It was also the least threatened with foreign competition. Experts have told me that
most English wall-paper makers, owing to the high quality of their goods and the
peculiar dimensions current in England, have nothing to fear from the foreigner,
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if the price of the latter became very high. This also explains the fact that while
England imports and exports wall-papers in about the same quantity, the value of the
exports is considerably greater. This is especially true of imports from Germany. In
1908 they amounted to 19,000 cwts., valued at £37,000, while the total English
exports were 83,000 cwts., valued at £217,000. At the same time the possible
importation of certain qualities from Belgium and Holland reduces the scope of the
trust’s operations on prices to a fairly narrow limit. It has to content itself with
hindering such decline of prices as might result from home competition.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
On the whole the electrical industry shows far fewer signs of trust or cartel building
in England than in Germany or America. It belongs, generally speaking, to the sphere
of free competition. It is especially subject to foreign competition. Imports of
electrical fittings and apparatus (excluding machines and wires) have risen from
£242,000 in 1897 to over £1,000,000 in the years 1905, 1906, and 1907. In the same
three years the imports of machines were worth between £500,000 and £600,000. The
predominance of foreign countries is due firstly to the greater reputed utility of
German, Belgium, or American goods (a fact often neglected or underestimated by
complaining British producers, but supported by adequate expert testimony),
636 and
secondly, to the economic advantages of foreign countries which enable them to
produce and place on the market various electrical goods at a cheaper rate than the
English makers.
637 The causes of the backward state of the electrical industry in
England are various. Some find the main cause that checked its development in the
over-favourable purchase terms granted by the legislation of the early eighties to local
authorities.
638 Others attribute it chiefly to the want of technical education.
639 Prof.
Chapman recalls
640 the fact that production in England is not connected with so
important a demand as in America and Germany, and that therefore less use has
necessarily been made of division of labour and of technical improvements. To which
we must reply that it almost seems as if it were the other way round. It is not the
comparatively small total output that explains the backwardness of the English
electricians, but the want of technical skill which prevents them from enlarging their
market, especially abroad, and delivers them more and more over to their rivals.
Finally, many manufacturers attribute it to the high wages prevalent in England, to
dumping, and to systematic favouring of foreign makers by English local authorities,Hermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 168
and accordingly demand a protective tariff.
641
Whatever the real reason may be, the English electrical industry is certainly not in
a position to shake off foreign competitors, and far from fixing their prices in the
English market, has to try to adapt itself to the low prices of German, Belgian, and
American firms. There is no doubt that the tenders of British firms for large orders
have never yet been lower than those of foreigners;
642 so that foreign rivalry has made
illusory any prospect of raising prices by a general suppression of competition, and
the attempt has, therefore, never been made, not even by means of an association to
regulate tenders.
Apart from this decisive proof of the hopelessness of combination, the average
capital of an English electrical undertaking is so much less than it is abroad that there
seems very little possibility of suppressing competition. Mr. Hirst, a representative
of the General Electric Company, has recently drawn public attention to the degree
in which the various firms specialise, a fact he attributes to the extreme subdivision
of municipal orders. As a result, each single undertaking represents a smaller
concentration of capital than the large German combined works.
643 The large number
of undertakings, — which is no doubt also to be explained by the backward state of
technical developments — would therefore be a considerable difficulty in the way of
a monopolist union, even if foreign competition were smaller.
These general characteristics accentuate the exceptional position of the one branch
of the English electrical industry which exhibits at the present time the conditions
necessary for creating a monopolist organisation. The cable industry — under which
term we include, for simplicity’s sake, the production of current conductors, power
cables, telephone and telegraph cables, electric wires, and so on — is, unlike all other
branches of electricity, still far superior to its foreign rivals.
644 It has also a
considerable export trade. The total value of electrical exports (excluding machines
and iron or steel telegraph and telephone wires) amounted in 1908 to £1,942,106, of
which wires and cables alone accounted for £1,225,934.
645
For this foreign market England has chiefly to thank its colonies. They require a
very superior quality. And other countries, whose production is largely restricted to
cheaper and comparatively inferior wire, have not been able to satisfy the demand.
Moreover, in England itself consulting engineers prefer English wires,
646 which have,
therefore, in practice the advantage of a monopoly in the English market.
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simplified by the fact that in this case, again in contradistinction to the general
condition of the electric industry, only a few large firms have to be considered. Their
size, originally considerable, has much increased in the last ten years. The
well-known Callender’s Cable and Construction Company has now a turnover of
£1,000,000, as compared with only £100,000 to £150,000 ten years ago. “A small
firm,” their representative recently stated, “cannot do electric cable work. To begin
you must have; £500,000.”
647 Moreover cables can be standardised, which further
adds to the ease of a union of competitors.
The Cable Makers’ Association started as early as 1898. It was made clear that
further competition would lead to depreciation of quality, and this was to be avoided
by fixing a minimum price.
648 At the present time the association includes sixteen
firms,
649 but some of them are amalgamated, and the number of separate firms is,
therefore, really smaller. From what is known of the association it may be taken that
it controls 90 per cent, of the total production. In any case the outsiders cannot check
the fixing of a minimum price, which is the real function of the combine.
650 The
installers of electricity, who are the chief buyers, have arrangements of a somewhat
peculiar kind with the combine, inasmuch as they receive a fixed discount on
purchases from firms connected with the combine if they are members of the
Electrical Contracting Organisation, an association embracing the whole country.
651
In other words, there is a counter-organisation of consumers, occupying by virtue of
combination a stronger position in face of the combine than each individually could
obtain.
652 But this attempt to modify the combine’s control of prices has not
suppressed complaints of excessive charges.
653 In view of the considerably superior
quality of the English product, it is very difficult to establish a comparison between
the English and foreign prices,
654 but it is ominous for the combine’s control of prices
that in recent years there has been a not inconsiderable importation of foreign cables
and wire, while formerly the English market was supplied by home makers alone.
The imports were of inferior quality, but the much cheaper foreign wire seemed, in
view of the home prices, more and more to attract certain consumers in spite of its
inferiority, and in this way, as in the case of Portland cement, a competing substitute
began to threaten the combine. In 1905 the original standardisation had to be
abandoned, and members were allowed to manufacture inferior qualities, to be
known at sales as Non-Association Cables.
655 This state of affairs still continues.
So far we have considered a number of monopolist associations in which theHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 170
decisive factor was the possibility of foreign competition. In many cases it could be
shown that to exceed the price at which it became profitable to import led to bitter
disappointment for the promoters. Before passing to the group of associations
enjoying what we have called unconditional immunity from foreign competition, we
must emphasise the fact that, strictly speaking, the distinction is only relative. There
is no industry which, when prices reach a certain degree of exorbitance, can remain
immune. Even the German potash industry, for instance, which is based on a product
mined from a natural state in Germany alone, would, if prices were high enough,
have to fear the importation of foreign artificially produced alkalies. But long before
this point was reached, the high prices would cause such a slackening in the demand
or such an increase in competition that no monopolist organisation could start such
a policy without greatly damaging itself. It is this fact, that there are industries in
which the independence of the monopolist is limited by other circumstances long
before foreign competition comes into play, and in which therefore monopolist
associations can fix the maximum price which suits them without considering
possible importation, which we have in mind in using the term unconditional
immunity from foreign competition.
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Of the chief mineral raw products of England, three only — coal, stone and earth,
and salt — occupy monopolist positions in the home market through low cost of
production and favourable market conditions. We have seen the reasons which
prevent an organised attempt to profit by this position in the case of the first two, but
English salt works have been for years ruled by monopolist associations.
Like coal, salt has remained, in spite of growing production abroad,
656 an important
export. In the last fifteen years a yearly average of from £400,000 to £500,000 worth
has been exported from the United Kingdom; while even when prices were high, as
in 1888 and 1889, importation seems to have been out of the question.
So far as foreign competition was concerned, all the necessary conditions for the
rise of a monopolist organisation were therefore fulfilled; but this only served to
bring into greater prominence the difficulties which the home trade offered for any
such project. The great number of salt deposits seemed to render a monopoly
completely impossible, while for a long time salt businesses were not so large as to
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only came with the keener competition of the eighties. Works which, to reduce the
cost of production, provided their own transport began to be differentiated from those
which did not do so. Though it is not possible to give statistics to prove that this
development led to industrial concentration, nevertheless the combined undertakings
occupied such a commanding position against other works that most of the smaller
firms were compelled to join them to escape annihilation. Sir A. Mond, whose
knowledge of the circumstances is complete, tells me that it was this that commenced
attempts to form a combine. As salt, unlike coal, was practically concentrated in one
county, Cheshire, it was relatively easy to form understandings, and this culminated
in 1888 in the formation of the Salt Union, a trust of sixty-four firms embracing
about 90 per cent, of the production. The number of firms included in the trust was
comparatively large, but it must be remembered that they were by no means all of
equal weight, so that the number of really important competitors joining the combine
was far smaller than these figures would at first suggest. The prospectus of the
Union, which enumerates
657 among the property of the undertaking such things as
steamers, boats, locomotives, railway lines and trucks, quays, and landing-stages,
shows how far separate firms had developed industrial combination in the matter of
transit. The immediate result of the formation of the Salt Union was an enormous rise
in the price of salt. If we compare the prices shown by the value of the exports we










Allowance must be made for the great increase during these years in the price of
coal, which represents 80 per cent, of the cost of production. But while the pit price
of coal in Cheshire only rose from 6s. in 1881 to 8s. 6d. in 1890, the works price of
salt rose in the same period from 6s. 0¾d. to 10s. 3d.
659 The combine could not, it isHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 172
true, permanently maintain the high prices, and in the nineties they fell again
considerably. But up till now they have not again reached the low level of the
eighties, though the export price sank temporarily to only just above 13s. in 1898.
Higher prices and annually improving profits, however, led to an increased number
of outsiders. When the Union was formed the directors anticipated an output of
2,000,000 tons, the total production being then (1887) 2,206,000 tons.
660 In 1907 the
total output of the United Kingdom was 1,984,656 tons, to which the Salt Union
contributed only 909,000!
661 But as a very considerable portion of the country’s
output of salt was still concentrated in the Union, no insuperable difficulties existed
to agreements between them and the outsiders. Such agreements began at the end of
the nineties, and became more definite after 1900, when the Union and the outsiders
actually agreed upon a division of production between them.
662 In 1905, however,
these still fairly loose compacts came to an end, and an immediate fall in price
followed, export prices sinking from 16.36s. in 1904 to 14.22s. in 1906. But the
prophecy of the Union chairman in 1905 that “outside makers would see that it would
be more profitable to work half or two-thirds of their pans at a profit than work the
whole at a loss,” was soon fulfilled. In the autumn of 1906 both interests combined
to form the North-Western Salt Company, a syndicate which now regulates the sales
both of the Union and the outside makers. According to the statement of its first
chairman, Mr. G. H. Cox, at the annual meeting of the Salt Union on the 27th March
1907,
663 all the salt-makers and wholesale dealers, with a few exceptions, joined the
undertaking. As in the case of the Spirit Supply Company the share capital is small
(£10,000 in £1 shares). Each member has an allotted quota of production, a “basis of
tonnage,” and the actual output of each firm is dependent on the total output fixed,
a system which vividly recalls the Newcastle Vend. Each firm is represented by one
director in the syndicate, the Salt Union on account of its importance having two.
The effect of the syndicate was soon seen. As early as the second half of Sept. 1906
a trade paper announced
664 that “a meeting of the [N. Western Salt] Company was
held at which the prices of salt were reviewed, and where ever the absence of
contracts made it impossible they were increased by small amounts ranging from 3d.
to 6d. per ton.” Export prices rose from 14.22s. in 1906 to 15.52s. in 1907, an
increase partly justified by the higher prices of coal, but never approached before the
days of the syndicate; and the profits of the Salt Union increased from £87,000 in
1906 to £127,075 in 1907, the output of salt being practically the same. This was theHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 173
largest net profit since 1896.
665 Although the Union’s “efficiency” combination
increases the demands made on new undertakings, the possibility of new rivals will
always influence the salt syndicate’s regulation of prices. It is undoubtedly the case
that monopolist organisations in the English salt industry have sensibly affected
home prices. When the syndicate arose in 1907 it was stated at the general meeting
of the Salt Union on the 27th March that “a thoroughly sound and practical working
scheme for regulating the tonnages and prices of the salt trade as a whole had been
found.” In 1909 the Union reported
666 that “the North-Western Company which
regulated prices had worked effectively.” It had “carefully considered the
circumstances attending the trade at home and abroad, and had from time to time
arranged prices accordingly, so that they might rest assured that no markets had been
lost by an attempt to exact too high prices. On the contrary, especially low ones had
been agreed to in several instances where there was a prospect of opening out fresh
channels of trade or retaining old ones in the face of competition.” The report clearly
shows how absolute the power of the syndicate over prices is, and recognises its
expression in the different treatment of different markets according to the interests
of the company. That English salt-makers dumped even before this date can certainly
be proved; and at times complaints against them were as rife on the other side of the
Atlantic as among English manufacturers at the dumping of American trusts.
667
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
The English textile industry is, so far as the greater part of its products is
concerned, very firmly entrenched against foreign competition. Certain branches like
silk weaving may be exceptions, in certain cheaper qualities competition from abroad
may have much increased of late, but such facts cannot in any way overshadow the
economic superiority of this very important branch of English manufactures. The
Reports of Mr. Chamberlain’s Tariff Reform Commission, it is true, bring these
discouraging signs so much into the limelight that one is almost induced to regard
them as more than mere exceptions. To quote but a few of the Commissioners’
opinions from their Report on the woollen industries,
668 we find it, for instance, stated
that “Great Britain has lost one branch of trade after another, until there is now
practically no foreign market in which the firms who have given evidence before the
Commission feel themselves secure.. .. The export trade of British woollen
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goods, or of raw materials and half-manufactured articles.... The profits of the home
trade have diminished by increased competition amongst themselves and by foreign
importations. The home trade, therefore, has tended to become more insecure during
recent years. This state of insecurity makes it more and more difficult to get new
capital into the trade, to build new mills, or to maintain in the proper state of
efficiency those that already exist.” The unsophisticated reader of such statements,
innocent of the fact that they must be intended to prove that English textiles need
protection at any price, might actually believe textiles to be “ going.” But he will gain
quite a different impression if he studies the export statistics of textiles rather than
the ex parte statements of certain selected firms, which could by no stretch of
imagination be regarded as representative of the textile trade. The average annual
exports in round millions sterling were:
669
Exports. Imports. 
1893–1902. 1903–1907. 1893–1903  1903–1907.
Yarns and cotton goods,  67.7  91.2  5.0  9.2
Woollen  goods,  23.5 28.1 13.3 13.2
Other  goods,  11.7 13.4 19.2 19.3
Total,  102.9 132.7 37.5  41.7
These figures show, in the first place, that English textile exports have of late years
considerably increased, and have risen much more in the aggregate than imports, and
secondly, that it is just in the most important export branch of textiles (accounting for
three-quarters of the whole textile exports) that importation, which in the last five
years only represented about one-sixth of the value of the export in the ten chief
textile trades, is almost entirely negligible. English textiles, as a whole, are therefore
not exactly “overtaken” or “endangered” or “driven from the field” by foreign
competition. But the real importance of the statistics can only be seen when we
remember the kind of exports in question. English textile manufacturers have been
wise enough to turn lately more and more to the making of high-quality goods, in
which they are unsurpassed in any other country; and this has enabled them to
compete even behind the high tariff walls of America and the Continent while
preserving their English market in such goods unchallenged.
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phenomenon and admitted their correctness
670 that it is here only necessary to draw
attention to it. A further proof may be added, though it is one which at first sight may
raise suspicions, as it comes from the mouth of the Tariff Commission. In view,
however, of the Commission’s object it is especially important to notice that even
they had to recognise the world-wide superiority of English textiles in high-grade
goods, and we may quote their statement, which is clearly quite disinterested, as a
remarkable testimony to the truth. Their Report, in dealing with Bradford, says:
671 “In
certain classes of goods witnesses state that Bradford manufacturers can beat any
producer in the world.” Similarly, with regard to Huddersfield a witness stated:
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“The export trade in the very best goods has not suffered to any great extent; there
is a superiority in the make which is so great that the public abroad will buy the
goods whether they cost 10 per cent, more or 20 per cent, more.” The Commission
represents such facts, which could hardly be passed over in silence, as being merely
of minor importance, and implies that England only retains her former textile
superiority in luxuries. But as the witnesses were largely persons who manufactured
or dealt in secondary qualities — these being the only sufferers in the English textile
trades and the only protectionists — the evidence gives the impression that the
industry chiefly produces goods of the same value as the German, Belgian, or
American articles. The authorities we have cited above, however, all show that the
great majority of English textiles reach a quality beyond that achieved abroad, and
this not merely in the matter of special articles or fancy goods. The whole English
industry is up to this standard of excellence, and only sinks beneath it in rare
instances where the manufacturers lack skill and adaptability.
673 Those kinds of
foreign woollen and worsted yarns, for instance, which are yearly consumed in
Bradford, the centre of the wool industry, are not produced in Bradford at all,
674 and
do not compete with the main home production. It is the same with woollens. In 1907
woollens made up £5,600,000, or more than half the total value of all wool and
worsted imports. They cost 1s. 6.24d. a yard, whereas the three most important
exported woollen cloths cost an average of 43. 11.6d., 1s. 11.17d., and 3s. 7.44d. a
yard, and represented a total value of £8,000,000. If we turn to cotton, we find the
import figures show that cotton yarns varied in the last five years from 9.80d. to
11.74d. per 1 lb., while the export prices in the same period were from 11.74d. to
15.21d. per 1 lb.
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goods, a world-wide superiority in most of its products is one of the main
foundations of the monopolist associations now existing in the trade. Given the
possibility of excluding home competition an association can always be formed. As
we have already seen, this possibility does not always exist, because in the lower
grades of both the cotton and the woollen and worsted industries the number of
separate undertakings is so great, and the creation of new undertakings so easy, that
the systematic restriction of competition and the raising of prices by a monopoly is
out of the question. But the conditions in high-quality textiles are quite different.
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One of the most successful combinations in the textile industry is the Fine Cotton
Spinners’ and Doublers’ Association. Founded in 1898 by the amalgamation of
thirty-one firms, it soon after acquired further undertakings and practically controlled
the whole English production. The association’s prospectus itself claimed that the
business had a kind of “monopoly value,” and emphasised the fact that the
old-established reputation of the amalgamated firms for expensive yarns “ placed an
obstacle in the way of new competitors.” As to foreign competition, “the spinning
and doubling of the finest counts require large experience and excessive care, and it
can be only successfully carried on where the workpeople are skilful and highly
trained. It is doubtless for this reason, coupled with the climatic advantages of Great
Britain, that this branch of the cotton trade has not suffered appreciably from foreign
competition.”
676 Owing to the comparatively small number of competing firms and
the difficulties facing new competitors, this advantage can be fully used. The fact that
though dozens of new mills started spinning during the great boom of 1907, they in
no way competed with the fine yarns of the association shows that the expectations
of the prospectus were not unjustified.
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￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
The Fine Cotton Spinners’ Association arose out of the competition of a
comparatively small number of firms of equal strength. In the derivative sewing
thread trade concentration developed in quite a different manner. A single
undertaking, J. & P. Coats, had grown from small beginnings in 1826 to a limited
liability company, with £5,750,000 capital in 1890. In 1895 and 1896 four other firms
of similarly extensive character were amalgamated with J. & P. Coats, with whom
they had for many years been allied through a sales association. In 1897 most of the
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the English Sewing Cotton Company, which, after the inclusion of further firms in
1899, had a share capital of £3,000,000. The relations of these two great rivals were
smoothed by the fact that Coats held some of the new company’s shares. At the same
time an American thread trust, “The American Thread Company,” was formed, both
Coats and the English Sewing Cotton Company holding commanding interests. The
English thread trust, which now owned important factories in Spain, Canada, Russia,
and other countries, besides America, thus acquired an international character.
Conflicts as regards sales between the rival large firms were, it is true, not entirely
obviated by the holding of shares in common. But the decision of the Sewing Cotton
Company, whose position was far less assured than that of Coats, to sell their
products in association with the latter through the Central Thread Agency, brought
greater unity. As in the salt trade the syndicate with its common sales led to a close
connection between the trust (Coats) and the outside makers, here concentrated in a
single undertaking (The Sewing Cotton Company). The strength of the combine in
foreign markets is due to the special nature of the articles it sells. “Our strength,”
declared the Report of the Sewing Cotton Company in 1908,
678 “lies largely in the
fact that the names and brands of our various goods are asked for by consumers in so
many parts of the world.” This is even more true of Coats. “In spite of foreign tariffs,
and of foreign competition, we hold our own.”
679 Undoubtedly it exercises a great
influence on prices, and knows that it can fix them at its will without being hindered
by any consideration except the elasticity of the demand, as the above report shows.
“As far as possible, we have avoided a policy of high selling prices that would tend
to lessen consumption or dissatisfying our customers.” Whatever the customers may
have thought of the prices, their monopolist nature is shown by the fact that they
resulted not from the workings of competition, but from systematic regulation by the
chief makers.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
In the bleaching industry the trust, the Bleachers’ Association, depends for its chief
protection against external competition on its monopoly of the water supply.
As the association’s prospectus puts it, “the great and ever-increasing difficulty of
obtaining a sufficient water supply makes the position of established bleaching works
very strong, whilst the laws against the pollution of water work against the erection
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possessed by the works round Manchester to make agreements as to prices long
before the formation of a closer organisation in 1900 in the Bleachers’ Association,
a union of fifty-three firms. Similar circumstances led to the formation of the
Bradford Dyers’ Association in 1898, which also resulted from the organisation of
an existing local monopoly. The conditions which favoured this development are
clearly set out in the prospectus.
680
They were (1) freights, which secured undertakings near Bradford from external
English competition; (2) the necessity of close local connection between dyers and
their customers, a factor which enhanced the value of this advantage in freights; (3)
the special qualities and abundance of the water supply; and (4) the existence of a
limited class of workmen for high-grade work. On these grounds the Dyers’
Association considered their position “almost unassailable.” As go per cent, of the
production was in the hands of twenty-two firms, the formation of a combine was
easy. In 1903 thirteen more firms joined, and the monopolist organisation became
complete. In this case, therefore, a much more complete concentration took place
than in bleaching.
The Dyers’ strong position and their intentions as regards prices were to a certain
extent revealed in the 1898 prospectus, which, though like that of the sewing thread
combine attempting to reassure consumers, bore emphatic testimony to the possibility
of regulating prices without competition. “Whilst it is apparent that the inclusion of
about 90 per cent, of the entire trade within this Association amounts to what is
practically a monopoly, the directors recognise that the interests of the Company are
largely identical with those of the manufacturers and merchants of the district, and
though there are no doubt cases in which some readjustment and regulation of rates
are clearly reasonable... it is no part of the present scheme to inaugurate an era of
inflated prices.” Similar language was used by the chairman of the company in
1904:
681 “We have ever refrained from the adoption of those forcible methods which
are a temptation to the executives of large organisations. We have never taken unto
ourselves the role of monopolists.” But the buyers do not seem to have declared
themselves entirely content with the prices actually charged. On the contrary there
were so many disputes that the Bradford Chamber of Commerce managed to get a
central agency between the combine and its customers established. This agency, the
Bradford Piece Dyeing Board, was composed of merchants and of members of the
association, and aimed at forming price agreements running for considerable periodsHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 179
of time, and harmonising the interests of both parties. 
Mr. Clapham, who justly calls the Bradford Dyers “the most successful of British
industrial combines,” quotes a number of facts showing their commanding position
in regulating production and markets, and he rightly explains the creation of the
above agency as due to the imperative necessity for merchants to cultivate “friendly
relations” with this powerful organisation.
682
An interesting account of the association’s attempts to differentiate prices is quoted
by Mr. Macrosty
683 from the Yorkshire Post. Contracts were made with merchants
under which they were bound to send all the goods which they required to have dyed
to the combine. The merchant might make exceptions, but he had to enumerate (i) the
classes of goods to be excepted, (ii) the outside firm in whose favour the exception
was made, (iii) the amount of goods to be left them, and (iv) the reasons for so doing.
If he agreed to these conditions, the combine could see at once the strength of its
position in each branch of the trade, and adopt its different scales of prices
accordingly. But after a while dealers began to regret such contracts, and this
ingenious system of attacking outsiders came to an end.
The cotton and wool dyers’ combine, the Cotton and Wool Dyers’ Association,
formed in 1900 by the amalgamation of forty-six firms, is less powerful. As the
association dyes all kinds of yarn, not woven materials, and does not, like the
Bradford Dyers’ Association, make special articles of particular reputation, the
original position of the separate firms was not so secure as at Bradford; whilst any
manufacturer using yarns could make himself independent of the combine by erecting
his own dyeing works, especially if he only made plain cloth and simple blue or black
stuffs.
684 This branch of dyeing is moreover scattered over several districts — the
combine has works in Lancashire, Yorkshire, and Glasgow — which makes it more
difficult to make arrangements with new outsiders than in a locally concentrated
industry like that of Bradford. It is, therefore, not unnatural that the cotton and wool
dyers have been much less successful financially and in fixing prices than the
Bradford dyers.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
The bleachers’ and dyers’ associations threw but little light on the tendency to
industrial concentration. The associated firms represent of course but a small number
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whether the immense size of the united undertaking in fact impedes the rise of many
new competitors. The difficulty of founding new firms is due far more to the peculiar
circumstances of the water supply, the demand for known patterns, and the need of
a special race of workpeople. It was facts such as these which secured to the not very
numerous existing works a monopolist position, and considerations of what was the
most efficient unit of size for a bleaching company or dye works.
With calico printing matters are different. Forty-six manufacturing firms were
included in the Calico Printers’ Association when it was founded in 1899; and this
would at first sight lead to the conclusion that there had been no very strong
concentration, none at least at all comparable to that in the steel and iron trades. But
we can prove
685 (what is not always possible) that these forty-six firms were of very
varying competitive power. In all they owned 830 printing machines and produced
about 85 per cent, of the calico printed in England. Seven of them owned 350
machines between them and represented 36 per cent, of the total production.
Gartside’s alone owned 74.
686 As early as the end of the nineties many undertakings
no longer paid, and by June 1905 no less than 20 factories were closed. The number
of undertakings of serious moment in 1899 was therefore much smaller than might
be supposed from the list of firms included in the association. It further appears, if
we investigate the dates at which the associated undertakings were founded — and
this is typical of the movement to concentration — that 37 of them were founded
before 1860, 5 between 1860 and 1880, and 4 after 1880. To all appearances the most
recently founded were smaller concerns, for they only employed 6 or in one case 13
machines. Possibly they supplied some particular demand. These figures only include
firms still existing after 1898, and even so are not complete, but they clearly show
how slowly in recent years the number of firms in the calico trade has increased.
Concentration and the survival of a very small number of the most efficient
undertakings facilitated the combination of the majority of existing works. On the
other hand, the Calico Association is now an “efficiency” combination with which
no single firm, even if of suitable size for economic working, could easily vie. The
expense of acquiring new inventions and discoveries, or of securing the best
designers and prickers is excessively great for a single firm; whilst the combine, by
supplying the needs of a number of works at one and the same time, is in a position
to satisfy these important requirements in calico printing at the very lowest cost.
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competition. It fixes the world’s price and, especially in specifically English qualities,
holds a monopoly in the home market. Under the regime of the association exports
have increased. Between 1897 and 1899 the average annual exports of printed cotton
goods were about 800,000 to 1,000,000 yards, between 1905 and 1907 1,000,000 to
1,200,000 yards. The considerable rise in the prices of exported printed cottons since
1898 is especially remarkable. The following table shows the export prices of those
cotton goods whose manufacture is controlled by trusts, in bleached, dyed, and
printed pieces, compared with the import price of cotton and the export price of
ordinary cotton yarns.
Year. Import price Export price of Export price of cotton
of cotton per lb. cotton yarn per lb. pieces per yard,
bleached. dyed. printed.
d. d. d. d. d.
1895 4.l6 8.46 2.21 3.30 2.53
1896 4.96 9.48 2.31 3.36 2.58
1897 4.48 9.06 2.26 3.39 2.60
1898 3.85 8.34 2.20 3.18 2.49
1899 4.80 8.77 2.21 3.16 2.43
1900 5.59 11.61 2.43 3.54 2.64
1901 5.51 11.15 2.46 3.57 2.73
1902 5.44 10.49 2.46 3.46 2.68
1903 6.00 11.74 2.54 3.54 2.74
1904 6.71 13.12 2.63 3.84 2.91
1905 5.68 11.99 2.67 3.78 2.86
1906 6.67 13.88 2.81 4.02 3.00
1907 7.08 15.21 2.89 4.35 3.15
We do not know what proportion the cost of raw materials bears to that of the
finished goods, and we cannot, therefore, judge from these figures whether the
increased price of the manufactured goods was entirely justified by the rise in the
price of raw materials or not. It is clear that the increases in bleached, dyed, and
printed goods are primarily explicable as a natural consequence of the exceptionalHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 182
price of cotton, but whether the trusts have engineered a more than corresponding
increase in prices is mostly uncertain. It is remarkable that the export price of
bleached cotton goods, which until 1900 followed the fluctuations of cotton and of
yarn exports, since that year (in which the trust was founded), has risen steadily and
independently of the fluctuations of raw materials. But it will be some years before
the trust’s effect on prices can be really judged; more especially we must wait till the
prices of raw materials sink again to see whether the manufactured goods fall as low
as they would have in the days of competition, or whether the monopolist
associations can then maintain higher prices.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
The monopoly of the home market held by English textiles is obviously due to their
excellence and their comparative cheapness to produce. Several other English
industries temporarily enjoy similar advantages, owing to peculiarities in the demand
which exporters in other countries working to a more uniform standard cannot
satisfy. This is the case in locomotive building. Certain American engines were at
one time sold in England, but the conditions of traffic made it impossible to use them
to full advantage, as would be done in America, and the attempt to import was not
repeated.
687 The special requirements of railway companies’ engineers as regards
construction hamper makers by preventing uniform standardisation,
688 but they also
make foreign competition difficult. That is the reason why, as experts testified before
the Tariff Commission, foreign engines are only imported for English use in quite
exceptional cases; and why the representatives of the industry desired no kind of
protection in the home market.
The number of locomotive works thus monopolising the home market was in 1908
only eleven; but as many railway companies own their own works, these eleven
works only cover part of the demand.
689 Three undertakings were amalgamated in
1903 into the North British Locomotive Company. Of the 20,840 workmen engaged
in 1908 in the above eleven works, the North British alone employed 7,192, and five
other works about 11,000, so that these six firms accounted for nearly the whole
production of locomotives.
The North British Locomotive Company certainly occupies the dominant position
which in America would be held to justify the name of trust. Its representative before
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when the trust problem was discussed, though he spoke of it as aiming solely at
economies in working. In a case like this, which is concerned with special orders, it
is however very difficult to measure in prices the exclusion of competition, whilst in
any case the policy of the trust is still subject to pressure from outsiders, even though
these are not numerous.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
Whisky is another of the articles which enjoy a monopoly in the home market
owing to certain peculiar qualities. It is a “national drink” as well as an important
export in which there is no foreign competition.
The concentration of whisky distilling has been slow but steady. The “Distillers’
Company Ld.,” of which we heard in connection with the Industrial Spirit Syndicate,
and which has now matured into a trust, started as early as 1877 with the
amalgamation of six Scotch firms. In 1902 and 1903 the company bought up three
more distilleries, and acquired half the shares in the most important Irish distillery.
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In 1907 it purchased the Vauxhall Distillery Company, representing a share capital
of £376,000, thereby increasing its possessions to seventeen distilleries in England,
Scotland, and Ireland.
691 In Scotland, the chief distillery district, it had only two
competitors, with whom it before long came to an understanding as to common
prices.
692 As a result the Scotch Combine, as it was called for short, proceeded in the
autumn of 1907 to raise the price, an action which called forth some interesting
remarks from the correspondent of the trade paper.
693 “The advance of twopence per
gallon in the price of new whisky reported last month was sensational enough in its
way, but not content with that it is now rumoured that the distillers meditate a further
advance of a penny a gallon. One thing certain is that the distillers can advance prices
by another penny just as easily as they advanced it by twopence last month Users will
have to pay it, and get it back from their customers as best they may.” This appears
to mark the crowning achievement of the company’s systematic efforts continued for
several decades to form a combine. Here again the essential condition for success
was that the number of firms in this important industry was for technical reasons so
small that the amalgamation of seventeen firms secured to the company a
“dominating position” over the whole whisky production of Great Britain.Hermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 184
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The prospects of industrial monopoly in England have recently been improved by
a circumstance which points to a great development of cartels and trusts in the future
Industries hitherto exposed to foreign competition car now seek protection in
international agreements. This opens up a possibility of securing the English market
to the English producer, free trade notwithstanding, ever where English goods do not
surpass foreign goods ir cheapness or quality. But even in these cases it has sc far
been an essential preliminary that concentration ir England should exclude
competition among home producers, and that similarly close monopolist association:
should have been formed abroad with which international agreements could be made.
This condition was fulfilled at an exceptionally early date in the case of steel rails,
which were concentrated earlier than the rest of the heavy iron trade in the hand of
a few immense undertakings. Everything consequently favoured combination among
the chief producing countries.
In the early eighties there were in England 18 to 20 firms which rolled heavy
rails.
694 In 1906 there were only 9 left, though production was about the same.
695 A
similar process of concentration has taken place in all other rail-producing countries,
especially in the United States.
696
As early as 1883 the English manufacturers formed an international rail syndicate
with Germany and Belgium.
697 The syndicate several times broke down, but latterly
became more and more a permanent institution for the regulation of the international
rail market. In 1905 the United States, England, Germany, Belgium, and France were
all members. In May 1907 the syndicate was renewed for five years, and since then
Russia also has joined.
698 Great Britain, in which all the works except one belong to
the syndicate, enjoys under the agreement the fullest security from the competition
of its most important foreign rivals. Each country retains its own home market, while
the export trade is so divided that each member of the syndicate receives a region in
which he is free from competition. Naturally this agreement exercises a considerable
influence on prices in England. When steel rails rose in 1907 from £6 15s. to £7, after
costing £4 to £5 during the three preceding years, while at the same time American
home prices were only £5 12s., a good many Englishmen began to realise
699 that, free
trade notwithstanding, the English price was no longer fixed by rates quoted in other
exporting countries. Prices were clearly favourable for the export of American rails
to England, but though a considerable number of rails were in fact exported fromHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 185
America in 1907, none of them came to England. This was in sharp contrast to what
occurred in 1900 and 1901. Then, too, English prices had far outstripped American,
the average price in 1900 being $36.01 in England against $32.29 in America.
700 As
a result, American export statistics showed a growing and hitherto unknown export
of rails to England.
701 In November 1900 a trade paper stated
702 that “for some time
past the British Steel Rail Makers’ Association have kept prices up at £7 to £7 5s. per
ton for ordinary heavy sections, but the Americans have been recently underselling
them, and now the home makers have relaxed their conditions, and given freedom
to makers to lower their prices at once. This has been immediately done, and some
makers are quoting as low as £6 net for heavy sections.” In 1907 the difference in
price between American and English rails was even greater, and, as in 1901, America
exported about 300,000 tons; but the whole of Europe only received a beggarly 474
tons! — a clear testimony to the international syndicate, whose arrangements barred
export to England.
The division of the export trade will also greatly affect English prices.
703 If the
regulation of international output is such that English producers can export the
greater quantity of their goods, it is easier to maintain a high home price than if
foreign orders have to be divided with other countries. The amalgamation of two
important rail makers by the foundation in 1909 of the Workington Iron and Steel
Company has lately strengthened the syndicate in England, and the exclusion of
domestic competition seems, therefore, more than ever assured. But the position of
the international association is weakened by the appearance of Canadian exports. As
yet no agreement has been made with this newcomer.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
The present position of British soda manufacture is in so far peculiar that most
works still use the Le Blanc process, which in other countries has been more and
more discarded. The United Alkali Company, formed in 1890 out of forty-eight firms
of which three were salt-makers, at the time controlled, according to its own
statement, almost the whole of the Le Blanc works. Since then it has acquired further
chemical and salt works and copper mines in Spain, and now represents a capital of
almost £9.000,000.
704
Two facts have, however, exercised an important influence on this combine, which
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first, the growth of soda industries abroad, and especially in Germany, based on the
admittedly far cheaper ammonia process; and secondly, the increasing importance of
the ammonia process in England itself — the chief opponent of the United Alkali
Company in this latter respect being Brunner, Mond & Co., whose capital increased
from £200,000 in 1881 to £2,789,650 in 1906.
Competition having thus become considerable, an international agreement became
very desirable in the eyes of the company, and in 1900 the first steps were taken.
705
It was not, however, till 1906 that an agreement for regulating prices and markets
which did not fall to pieces on the first opportunity, was arranged. At present, owing
to the understanding between the English combine and the continental makers on the
one hand, and the close connection between Brunner, Mond & Co. and the Solvay
Works, which dominate the German cartel, on the other, peace seems better assured
than it used to be.
706
In the case both of the United Alkali Company and of Brunner, Mond & Co., the
production of raw materials is practically combined with manufacture. Working costs
are, in consequence, exceptionally low, and the expense of founding new works to
compete in manufactures considerably increased. It is hardly likely that new Le Blanc
works will be set up in England, as the Le Blanc process has only proved to be
superior to the ammonia process as regards certain bye-products.
707 Nor is it much
more probable that a competition of equal strength will rise up against Brunner,
Mond’s ammonia business, which is firmly established and admirably managed. Mr.
Macrosty shows that in 1904 and 1905 — after the international agreement — there




The history of the international tobacco monopoly is very different from that of
rails or soda. The struggle was much more intense, one might almost say more
dramatic, and its result led to a far closer form of organisation, an international trust.
The rise of this Anglo-American Trust has been described from the English side by
Mr. Macrosty, in its connection with the American Tobacco Trust by Mr. Jacobstein,
and recently, in even greater detail, in an official American Report.
709 It will be
sufficient to quote their conclusions.
On the ground that the American trust, the American Tobacco Company, wereHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 187
endeavouring to capture the English market by price cutting, the thirteen chief
English firms united in 1901 to form a defence organisation called the Imperial
Tobacco Company. This company had a capital of £11,957,022, and bought up
several more firms in 1902. After a sharp struggle with Ogdens Limited and the
British Tobacco Company, which had been bought and reorganised by the
Americans, the Imperial Tobacco Company came to an agreement with the Trust.
From 1902 on the company, now amalgamated with Ogdens, was left in undisputed
possession in England,
710 while the Trust was given a similar immunity in the United
States. A new third company, the British American Tobacco Co., conducted the
export trade, the Imperial Co. holding one-third of the shares and nominating six
directors, and the American Trust two-thirds of the shares and twelve directors. So
far the object of this common undertaking has been to form branch trusts in the great
import countries, Australia, Canada, and South Africa, possibly following herein the
example of the American Trust, which formed a branch trust in 1902 in Cuba — the
Havanna Tobacco Co.
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The English tobacco monopoly is therefore organised as follows: The English
combine has an unchallenged outlet for its goods in the United Kingdom, as the
American Trust has in the States. In certain organised foreign markets mutual
competition is further prevented by their common representation, the British
American Tobacco Company. The possibility that this division of markets might be
rendered nugatory by the intervention of a third party was foreseen in the agreement
of 27th September 1902, and it was laid down in paragraph 18 that “None of the
parties should sell any tobacco products to any person, firm or company, who they
had reason to believe would export the same to the territory in which the sellers had
agreed not to sell such goods, as herein provided.”
The following diagram furnished to me shows the organisation at a glance. I have
added some figures:
American Tobacco Company (100,000,000$ common and 80,000,000$ preferred
stock).
Imperial Tobacco Company Limited (capital, £15,496,154).
British American Tobacco Company (capital, £6,100,000).
The British Tobacco Company Ltd. (Australia) £4,500.000.
The Imperial Tobacco Company of Canada, $11,000,000.Hermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 188
The United Tobacco Companies Ltd. (S. Africa) £800,000.
By the formation of this combine the English tobacco manufacturers gained the
exclusion of the greatest, and in many articles the only, foreign competitor. The
peculiarities of the English consumption of tobacco and tobacco products had for
years made America the chief source from which leaf tobacco was imported. While
Germany, during the period 1895–1905 drew the majority of its import from the East
Indies, Brazil, and Cuba, and only about 17 per cent, of the total from the States,
England drew 83 per cent, of its tobacco leaves from North America. As tobacco
manufacturing extended and became cheaper in America, the export of certain
manufactures to England naturally increased continually. In 1902 it represented a
value of $1,403,482; in 1906, though the total American export showed no decrease,
it had fallen to $333,584.
712 Clearer testimony to the effect to the mutual
understanding could not be required.
Once more the decisive factor was that in both countries production was strongly
concentrated. In the States the Trust controlled the following percentages:
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1891 1902
Cigarettes and Small Cigars,  88.9  82.8
Smoking, Chewing, and Snuff Tobacco,  7.1  70.2
Plug Tobacco,  2.7 71.2
Fine Cut Tobacco, 4.1 73.7
Cigars,  —  14.3
It will be seen that its position was very much stronger in 1902 than in 1891, when
it dominated one branch only. It was this increased strength that enabled it on the one
hand to attack the English market, and on the other hand to make a peaceful
agreement with its rivals, which would have been inconceivable if American
production had been split up among many undertakings.
In England a similar concentration had taken place, as the fact that in 1904 the
Imperial Tobacco Company (which then included eighteen undertakings) represented
half the total production,’
714 shows. Of the purchase price of the thirteen firms
amalgamated in 1902 in the company, £6,999,221, or more than half, was for the
great firm of W. D. & H. O. Wills in Bristol. Some of the existing outsiders, such asHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 189
R. & J. Hill or Gallaher, are important firms, but, as the years following the
formation of the combine showed, the outsiders also could only maintain themselves
against the combine by means of amalgamation and the erection of greater business
units
715 — a process which must in course of time lead to agreements between them
and the combine, and even, perhaps, to a further expansion of the combine.
One cause of concentration in tobacco manufacturing has been the increased use
in recent times of machines. “Wherever possible,” says the American report,
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“machinery has been substituted for hand labour, and the greatest success of the
combine has been in those lines of the industry where the greatest use of machinery
is possible. In little cigar and domestic cigarette production, where almost all the
processes are performed by machinery, the monopoly of the company was more
readily established than in any other branch except snuff.” The monopoly was the
least complete in cigar making, where hand labour is still extensive. The same thing
undoubtedly influenced concentration in England, though the monopolist use of
patents was not so prominent as in America.
A second reason lay in the fact that as the potential productivity of undertakings
increased, the necessity of developing production on a large scale by every possible
means also grew. Every big firm endeavoured by advertisement to obtain the
wholesale consumption of its goods. The change has been described recently by Mr.
Archer, a director of the large firm of Hill mentioned above, in the following
words:
717 “When I was first in business some thirty-five years ago competition among
tobacco manufacturers was almost entirely as to who could produce the best quality
and the best value for money, and considerable experience and practical knowledge
of the business were necessary for success. All this is completely changed, and now
competition seems to have resolved itself into a question of who could afford to
spend the most money on advertising.”
Both in buying new plant and in advertising the Imperial Company had, owing to
its large capital resources, considerable advantages over the relatively small outsider.
In addition the English combine has formed its own purchase company in Kentucky,
the Imperial Tobacco Company of Kentucky, through which it bought raw materials
more cheaply than through middlemen.
718 The American Trust and the various
foreign Régie agents have exercised considerable influence on the prices of raw
tobacco in virtue of their position as buyers en gros,
719 and the English combine has
now also begun to offer planters relatively more favourable terms than the smallHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 190
separate firms.
Quite recently the company’s advantageous position compared with outsiders has
been further improved by the formation of planters’ associations in America. In West
Kentucky and Tennessee the planters of black tobacco, for which England is the chief
market, have united, and the Burley tobacco planters in Kentucky and Ohio have
followed suit.
720 This is probably the first time that monopoly has arisen in
agriculture, and it has only been carried through by the “nightriders” by means of the
extreme forms of compulsion, even at times including assault and battery on
recalcitrants.
721 Whatever the means employed, there certainly followed an
exceptional rise in raw tobacco prices, which the American Trust had tried to keep
down. Good Burley tobacco which in October 1902 cost only $7.50–8.40 per 100 lbs.
rose in the autumn of 1907 to $10–12.
722 Such a state of affairs was far more
favourable to the English and American combines which had no reason for mutual
competition than to the outsiders. Monopoly was faced by monopoly, not by single
firms. In fact, latterly it has looked as if the combines by taking over the greater part
of the planters’ association’s crop intended to make difficulties for competitors in the
advanced stages of manufacture.
723 In spite of their original purpose of defence
against the large buyers, the planters’ association will probably come to a lasting
agreement with the combines and Régie agents, by which the latter’s position against
outsiders would certainly be greatly strengthened.
Not much can be said of the policy of the English combine with regard to prices.
Though its influence must undoubtedly have been considerable, its exact weight is
obscured by the difficult question of the raw tobacco supply. At a recent meeting the
chairman of the company took the rather surprising ground that its policy had to some
extent been the salvation of the outsiders. “The company,” he maintained, “had
shown a liberal spirit and a desire to put up prices, so that other people could not say
that it was bearing down rates and forcing sales at prices which were in some cases
simply ruinous.”
724 This attribution of excessive virtue to the combine seems a little
unconvincing, especially as it represents the reply of the chairman to a possible attack
which he apparently felt difficult to meet.
The preservation of an undisputed internal market by means of international
agreement opens up a new possibility for monopolies in England. It is the newest of
all causes which aid in the formation of cartels and trusts, and the last which we shall
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conditions under which large industrial monopolies can nowadays arise in England,
and for this purpose we have taken the history of the most important and most lasting
syndicates, cartels and trusts as our guide. No attempt has been made to describe
associations whose monopolist character is as yet but slightly developed or whose
persistence may still be open to doubt; for we were not concerned to give a detailed
and exhaustive picture of all combines past and present, but rather to extract from a
consideration of the chief instances some conception of the circumstances which at
the present day, after so many years of unadulterated competition, fix the limits
within which monopolist organisations are possible in English industries.
Before the results of this examination can be summarised, one further question
remains. The financial success of a monopolist organisation depends primarily, but
not solely, on a more or less definite control over production. The fact that by
co-ordination or amalgamation production can be monopolised does not in itself
show how the new association will profit by the advantages of its situation. Its
structure and detailed equipment — its form, its administration, the number.
relations, and capacity of its directors, the division of output and sales between the
various members, and the financial position — are here all important. Two problems
of organisation have been especially important in the history of English combines,




All the types of monopolist organisation known to the experience of other countries
are to be found among the chief English monopolies. We see every stage of
monopolisation, from loose understandings terminable at any moment or the more
definite agreement for a fixed period, to the yet closer unions of the syndicate with
a common place of sale and common regulation of production and the amalgamation
into one undertaking of all the firms in favour of monopoly; that undertaking in its
turn perhaps forming new syndicates and cartels with important outsiders. Each
variety is distinguished from its predecessor in order of completeness by the greater
number of functions formerly exercised by separate firms which it usurps and
subjects to a common monopolist control, until, finally, in the “horizontal”
combination, every single function is transferred to the trust.
The general experience in Germany has been that problems of organisation are
more complicated in associations of independent makers than in amalgamations and
trusts. Once private interests are sunk in a single undertaking, the difficulties of
settling the form of administration seem to be nothing compared with those of the
time in which the directors are continually faced with the thorny questions of division
of production, consumption by a member of the association, common places of sale,
and so on. In England, too, in former times, the Newcastle Vend, which was an
association pure and simple, was much more complicated in organisation than any
of the monopolies of modern times.
But at the present it is not the cartels and syndicates which prove in England the
most difficult to organise, but the trusts. In Germany combinations are usually
composed of a large number of undertakings gradually amalgamating into a trust; in
England they have, as a rule, only a few members. As many examples have shown
us, the possibility of raising prices by monopoly is much smaller than in countries in
which natural monopolies in raw material, protective duties or high freights on
competing goods, make such a policy especially attractive. It is, therefore, relatively
difficult to unite the 30, 40, or 50 interested parties in a combine; much more difficult
in any case than where the probable monopoly profits of each are so high as to
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independence. Accordingly, it has been found imperative in England to form a trust
where, as in textiles, salt, soda, and Portland cement, many undertakings were
affected. On the other hand, where there was only a very small number of firms, and
private interests opposed to association were slight, monopoly has been achieved by
a mere association in spite of the fact that the prospective profits were small. In the
steel trade, especially in ship plates, boiler plates, and rails, in industrial spirit, and
in cables, monopolies have been firmly established by such means.
As these syndicates and cartels only include a small number of members, usually
of about equal power, their organisation offers far fewer difficulties than on the
continent, where cartels embrace works both “simple” and “mixed,” and of unequal
economic and financial stature. But the organisation of English trusts, which have in
several cases involved the amalgamation of a great number of firms, each working
under different conditions, has often proved to be very much more complicated, for
instance in the textile industry.
In this case every single firm had to be allowed a large measure of independence
as a branch of the trust. The English Sewing Cotton Company left each member its
own individuality. Every partner or director of a former firm remained responsible
for his own branch in addition to becoming a director of the whole trust. The
organisation was in every way the opposite to the highly centralised firm of Coats,
and its initial failure to rival the success of the latter was not least of all due to this
division of powers. It was not until the company was reorganised with the help of Mr.
Philippi of Coats’s, and provided with central management and a common place of
sale for all works, that an end was put to the evil system by which each separate firm
went its own way without a thought for the interests of the whole. It was the same
with the Manchester Bleachers. According to the prospectus, each firm was to deal
personally with their own customers, direct their own works, and even receive a
percentage of the profits. But the most loosely knit of all textile trusts was the Calico
Association. It had a directing body responsible to the shareholders of 70–80 persons,
128 “vendors” of the 46 firms forming the combine each retaining the right to run
their works for five years independently of the managing directors, and, finally, a
number of managing directors. Although the association represented a financial
amalgamation, in its inner constitution it resembled a badly organised cartel far more
than a uniformly constructed trust.
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might perhaps claim this scrupulous retention of individual functions even after the
formation of a trust as a further proof of their thesis. But this interpretation of the
case is hardly justifiable. The peculiar organisation of the textile associations is
explained by the simple fact that certain firms enjoyed a special repute which it was
not desired to destroy; and accordingly their outward form was preserved, certain
persons cognisant of the special wishes of customers were secured for the trust, and,
no doubt to encourage sales, manufacturers were often assured a special share in the
profits of their former works in the form of percentages. The decentralisation merely
meant that the amalgamating firms possessed advantages for the sale of their special
products which they did not wish to surrender, and which the trust did not wish to
lose.
Economic advantages, therefore, sufficiently explain the form of organisation
which the textile associations first adopted. Experience was necessary to prove that
the immediate attractions of decentralised management were overshadowed by its
drawbacks, and that important gains expected from the combination of undertakings
could not be realised under this system. Economies in directors’ fees, the allocation
of production to the most efficient, and of orders to the most favourably situated as
regards freights, the limitation of output in times of over- production, and the other
advantages of combination, could only be effected if the trust was centrally managed.
Accordingly, after a few years, the textile monopolies were reconstituted. The
Bleachers altered their articles of agreement in 1904, the Calico Printers, though not
apparently with finality, and the Sewing Cotton Trust, in 1902.
We have already seen that while the movement towards concentration may well
have in all cases an innate tendency to monopoly, inasmuch as monopoly may arise
at very different stages of concentration and combination, we must carefully
distinguish two separate series of events. The continual expansion of single works
and firms may lead to concentration and to monopolist organisation, without that
process culminating in a permanent trust. This is what we find going on to-day in the
great development of concentration in the textile monopolist associations since their
re-organisation. Their annual reports are full of the “policy of concentration.” The
English Sewing Cotton Company’s Report of the 25th July, 1907, for instance,
enumerates the following results of “concentration.”
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1. A linen thread mill was sold to round off the trust’s sphere of business. 2. The
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had sufficient reserve productive capacity at other mills to enable them to deal with
the trade conducted at that branch.” 3. The plant of the Belgrave Mill at Oldham was
removed, and the site and buildings sold. 4. Finally, “a further concentration took
place by the transfer of the business of R. F. & J. Alexander & Co., carried on at
Duke Street, Glasgow, to one of the other branches of that company.” A special
account of such transactions was kept (Closed Works Account). Contemporaneously
with this policy of concentration output was centralised by the connection of the
Sewing Cotton Co. with Messrs. Coats, and the system of common sales established
in 1906 through the Central Thread Agency. The net profits of the company have
since greatly increased, though, for the most part, this is due to the improved market.
The net trading profit, which had been £170,829 in 1904, and only £92,614 in 1905,
rose to £254,846 in 1907, and was maintained in 1908 with a falling market at
£251,938.
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In the Calico Trust the question of reform dragged on for years. We have already
mentioned the first change in 1902. Acccording to Mr. Macrosty, this made the
whole business more prosperous,
727 but recently an even more centralised
organisation has proved necessary. The main advantage of the reorganisation in 1902
was the consolidation of the board of directors, which was reduced to twelve or
fifteen persons. But the report proposing the reform explained that to entrust the
management to these directors alone would exclude
728 “a large number of men of
ability and ripe experience, possessing an intimate knowledge of all the important
matters upon which the Board would have to decide,” to the great detriment of the
association. Accordingly, beside the board, an executive committee was set up,
besides various “advisory committees” of suitable persons, who, without being
independent of the directors and the executive committee, were to assist them in
special questions of production, markets, and their organisation. These committees
had each their special province — factory output, designs and styles, concentration,
prices, retail, purchase of stuffs, chemicals, coal, etc. The report of 1902 shows very
clearly the efforts that were made to reduce the former number of independent
persons connected with the direction of the association and to centralise the
management in the hands of a few directors. But it also shows that, whether because
“men of experience” had to be kept or because a division of labour was really
necessary in an industry with so many branches, the structure of the undertaking was
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and management of the association went to modify matters, there remained a division
between the functions of the directors and executive on the one hand and the owners
of the individual mills on the other. In fact the very division was expected to
strengthen the directors’ impartiality. “The directors and executive having to protect
the interest of the Association as a whole, it is undesirable that they should be
connected with the management of any particular branch or section, as their opinions
might be influenced thereby.” It was also thought impossible to break with the system
by which each owner shared in the profits of his own mill. Percentages were indeed
abolished, but the report explained that “a system of payment by results” would be
introduced in some other way. The main change, therefore, was the reduction in the
number of directors, which made it easier to arrive at decisions on general questions,
and the creation of advisory committees which, to some extent, served to focus the
main common interests of the individual mills. On the other hand, each firm retained
its own customers and its own market, and kept the management of its business
pretty fairly in a water-tight compartment.
In 1908, however, the association produced very unsatisfactory financial results,
and another attempt was made at closer centralisation.
729 Since 1908
730 the chairman
of the directors had been a man who had had a large share in the organisation of
Coats & Co., who had reformed the Sewing Cotton Company, and who had been
chairman of the advisory committee during the reorganisation of the Calico
Association in 1902, Mr. O. E. Philippi. As in America, so in England, a new type
has arisen, the “ Trust Organiser,” whose personal knowledge of organisation in all
its forms and shapes makes him indispensable in every emergency. Since Mr.
Philippi’s accession to the Calico Association the idea of completely concentrating
the control of production and sales in a single central body as in the other textile
associations seems to have carried the day against the desire of retaining for each
firm its own individuality.
The well informed Manchester Guardian stated at the end of February 1909, that
“the system of branch trading” has produced generally unsatisfactory results. “Under
the old system of working it was not possible for the head office to obtain a
sufficiently intimate knowledge and control over the work of the branches, and in
spite of all the checks that could be devised there has admittedly been much internal
competition, overlapping, and waste of energy and expenditure.” In future there was
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and the separation between the management of individual mills and the board of
directors concerned solely with the general administration of the association was to
cease. Output would be divided among the mills from a single central point, marked
by the sole office of the association, a special division of the central office dealing
with the supplying of each particular market. This result would be a great advance
on the centralisation of the trust’s organisation, and its realisation may be awaited
with great interest.
At the same time the revised constitution of 1902 has led to some considerable
efforts at concentration. “With fewer works and fewer machines than we employed
at first, we have printed [in 1907] a greater number of pieces and we have provided
these at a greater rate per machine per hour.”
731 Other signs of concentration were
seen in 1906,
732 in the purchase of Northrop machines, 20–24 of which could be
worked by one operative,
733 in the closing of inferior mills and the sale of mills no
longer worked, and finally in the buying up of various outsiders.
Where, as in the Calico Association, comparatively numerous separate works have
to be amalgamated, concentration in organisation is naturally a slower process than
where only a few large concerns have to be fused together;
734 yet in such cases it is
all the more necessary and often the surest preventative of over-capitalisation, an
infirmity to which the large industrial undertakings of modern times are particularly
liable.
We have already pointed out that the formation of a trust can come and has, in fact,
come in England at several quite different stages of concentration. If the trust arises
whilst the competition of numerous less efficient concerns still exists it to some
extent anticipates natural development. Manufacturers hope to avoid the ultimate
result of the movement towards concentration, and, without fighting the competitive
struggle to the death, to enjoy the advantages of the surviving fittest. In other words
to limit the total production of all existing firms to a few working at much lower cost
owing to technical expansion, economies, and so on, and to fix prices on a
monopolist basis by the suppression of many competitors. If competition is
unrestricted, this consummation is achieved by the gradual extinction at a heavy
capital loss of the less efficient firms; but if a trust is formed these firms are bought
out at prices depending on the trust’s expectations of profit from the new business.
Supposing those expectations are not fulfilled, the combine has an ever-increasing
dead weight of over-capitalisation round its neck and its entire financial success isHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 198
endangered.
The Calico Association appears to be an instance in point,
735 owing largely to the
failure of its organisation to save as much by concentration as was expected when the
shares were allotted. Another instance is the Portland Cement Association, the
ordinary shares of which had, according to the ‘Economist’ in 1908, never paid a
dividend.
736 Apparently in this case the poor financial results were due to the
importation of cheap natural cement, which prevented the trust from realising the
prices of which its founders had dreamt. In a third instance, that of the Salt Trust,
both these two factors combined to produce over-capitalisation. The trust
overestimated its monopoly, and was painfully awakened to the truth by new
competition and falling prices; and when at the end of the nineties it had come to an
understanding with the outsiders, serious deficiencies in organisation again appeared,
inasmuch as the Salt Union guaranteed each outsider joining the cartel a certain
output, and suffered accordingly in times of short demand. Possibly this arrangement
was the only means of salvation open to the trust, which in 1898 and 1899 paid no
dividends either on ordinary or preference shares. For five years it at least paid
preference dividends. But in 1905 and 1906 difficulties began once more. Net profits
again did not suffice for a dividend. The North-Western Salt Company was founded
to help the union by including in one association all the interested parties, without
imposing such onerous conditions on the union. After a ten years’ pause, the ordinary
shares paid a dividend in 1907 and the preference shares one of 8 2/3 per cent, the
largest since the union started in 1889.
The causes of over-capitalisation are numerous. Anticipated increase in price
proves impossible. New competitors arise, foreign or domestic. New processes of
manufacture are discovered — a potent factor in the poor financial success of the
Alkali Company. Organisation is bad. But all of them come to this; that whether
because it is harder to monopolise output and sales than was expected, or because the
monopoly is not so energetically used as it should be, the rosy views taken of the
prospects when a combine is started are not in practice realised. It is the story of the
older monopolies once more. They too suffered from over-capitalisation and their
founders also, the “ projectors” as they were then called, to gain the grant of a
monopoly and its protection by duties and by prohibition of import took upon
themselves financial responsibilities which they could not discharge, and which
finally destroyed them and their projects. As Mr. Price says of Mansell’s glassHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 199
monopoly,
737 “a large proportion of this [capital] was water, for at least three patents
were bought up which would have possessed no value if markets had been open to
all. And Mansell had bought out his own partners upon the basis of the speculative
value of monopoly.” Monopoly making is always a speculation; but the more
irredeemable capital liabilities have been piled up, the greater will be the discrepancy
between the original capital basis of an industrial monopoly and its actual results in
the gloomy days of continued ill-success.
Very many English combines have not, of course, met with these financial
difficulties. In textiles, for instance, Coats & Co., the Fine Cotton Spinners’ and
Doublers’ Association, and the Bradford Dyers’ Association prove what financial
successes monopolist associations can be. The Dyers’ prospectus in 1908 stated that
in every year from 1900 to 1907 “the net amount available after payment of the
debenture stock interest has been more than twice the amount required to meet the
dividend on the preference shares, and the profit-earning capacity of the Association
has steadily increased.” Similar success has crowned the efforts of the Tobacco Trust,
and the American Trust has no reason to regret its financial partnership with the
Imperial Co.
738 After paying debenture interest at 4½ per cent, 5½ per cent, on
cumulative preference shares, and 6 per cent, on preferred ordinary shares, the
combine could still lavish on the unpreferred shares remaining 4 per cent, in 1903,
6 per cent, in 1904, 8 per cent, in 1905, 10 per cent, in 1906, and 12 per cent, in 1907
and 1908. It must, however, be remembered, in judging such prosperous results, that
the English combine was an amalgamation of only thirteen firms, of the first rank and
of great size. It included no small and financially feeble outsiders, bought up solely
to prevent competition. And it was in consequence spared the disappointment openly
expressed at a meeting of an over-capitalised textile combination in 1901 which drew
from a director the following comment: “Some seemed to object that certain small
firms had been bought, but in forming a big association like that they were bound to
a large extent to take the bad with the good.”
739 Here we see once more the danger
already alluded to which a combine runs when it buys up at high prices businesses
which would undoubtedly collapse within a visible time under the stress of
competition. Under such conditions the attempt to precipitate by a trust the monopoly
which must in the natural course result from the slow but steady concentration of
plant and business frequently leads to a financial fiasco. The position is different if
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only a few very efficient undertakings survive.
It appears, therefore, that the monopolies resulting from the combination of a few
very powerful firms are also the most successful financially. One of the most
flourishing monopolist associations, for instance, in English industries is the Whisky
Trust, in which a single firm engineered concentration for several decades, not by
buying up inefficient competitors, but by entering into partnership with the strong
survivors of a very bitter competitive struggle. The history of Coats & Co. is similar.
If they had from the beginning bought up weak outsiders, they might well have
suffered the disadvantages of over-capitalisation, which, in fact, appeared in the
amalgamation of those same outsiders into the English Sewing Cotton Co.
It would also seem that large separate firms associated only in a cartel are more
likely to pay their way in such cases and increase their profits than a trust including
under the same financial control a greater number of firms of an inferior though
productive type. No doubt an over-capitalised trust may be able gradually to close
inferior works bought up at a heavy cost in favour of the better works, but this retards
that increase of productive power by the reduction of working expenses, which is the
more desirable for a trust, because the cheapening of production is one of its main
defences against the rise of smaller undertakings, and goes to secure its monopoly.
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The basis of English cartels and trusts is in every case concentration, the restriction
of increasing production to an ever decreasing number of factories and undertakings.
Add to concentration immunity from foreign competition, and all that is essential for
the creation of monopolist associations is given. To explain the real importance of
concentration in connection with English monopolies, it is only necessary to contrast
the conditions which characteristically precede monopoly in Germany, America, and
other countries with those in England. Concentration has been at work abroad too;
but while in England the movement towards monopoly only begins when the number
of producers has shrunk to 40, 30, 20, or even less, foreign monopolies have often
been formed at a much more elementary stage of concentration, and in some cases
even when both production and the number of producers were increasing. What is the
explanation?
We have considered two lines of enquiry bearing on the possibility of industrial
monopoly. We asked under what circumstances could English manufacturers
maintain a monopoly in their home market against foreigners, and we asked under
what circumstances could they suppress domestic competition. We must now
examine the results of these enquiries.
1. As to immunity from foreign competition.
England is much more exposed to foreign competition than are protectionist
countries of considerable size like Germany and America in most of their industries.
She has no protective tariff, the protection she derives from freights is comparatively
insignificant, and she produces relatively few minerals enjoying natural monopolies
in her own or the world’s market. The only exceptions in the last case are coal, stone,
and salt; and while a monopoly in salt has actually proved possible, internal
competition has so far made it impossible in the other two. As a whole, therefore, the
three factors which in other countries, where cartels and trusts arise, appear as the
essential conditions of most industrial monopolies, are unimportant in England.
Where immunity from foreign competition exists, it is due in the first place to the
fact that many English industries are for various reasons able to give the home
consumer cheaper or better goods than the foreigner can. This may be the result ofHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 202
natural advantages, such as climatic conditions, etc., in the case of textiles, or of
tradition and training as in tin plates, in which the inherited skill of generations of
operatives is important, or finally, in many recent cases, as we have seen in various
branches of industries, because England has turned more and more to the production
of higher grade goods, and thereby secured a predominance over other countries. But
wherever it is the case, wherever English manufacturers can offer home or foreign
buyers cheaper goods or better qualities than any other countries can, they can also
by combination utilise their monopoly either to force up home prices to the level of
import prices or, in the case of goods in which there is no immediate fear of
competition, to fix prices “autonomously,” that is to say without paying any special
attention to foreign sellers.
In the second place, immunity may be due to international cartels and trusts, though
here again England’s position is different to that of the other contracting parties.
Being protected from foreign competition by tariffs or freights, the main advantage
to them of an international association lies in the creation of an undisputed foreign
market. To English manufacturers, on the other hand, the chief gain, to which the
reservation of a foreign outlet is only secondary, is in the closing of the home market
to the foreigner.
In most cases, therefore, the facts which give industries immunity from foreign
competition in England are different from those which do so in Germany or America.
And the difference is of far-reaching importance.
(a) Industries which enjoy a monopoly at home owing to tariff protection, or which
are situated in places remote from foreign export centres, can usually increase prices
very largely if competition is suppressed. The difference between the price of English
and German pig-iron in Ruhrort, allowing for duty and freight, is 21–22 marks per
ton;
740 in Pittsburg it is 7 dollars or about 28 marks.
741 At times this difference has
amounted to 33 per cent, of the price in Germany and America. In high grade
manufactures the protective effect of freights is generally less, but those of tariffs
increase. In 1902 the duty in America increased the price of tin plates over the Welsh
price by $1.28 on a commodity the average price of which for the year in New York
was $3.94 per 100 lbs. Moreover, it is clear that in times of over-production, when
there is competition among the home makers, prices even in protectionist countries
can sink beneath the world’s price. For instance, pig-iron was 2 or 3 dollars cheaper
in Pittsburg in 1897 and 1898 than in England. When this happens, a monopolistHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 203
combination can raise prices in good times by even more than the amount of the duty
and freight. In 1902 Pittsburg pig-iron prices were $10 higher than in 1897.
But in England in industries which, with prices at a certain level, can escape regular
foreign competition, the difference between the import price and the minimum
amount to which home competition can depress the home price is nothing like so
great. No doubt, in theory, as Prof. Liefmann says,
742 prices can in England also sink
“far below the limits” within which an import trade is possible. But where this is not
due to the special quality of English goods, or to special natural or acquired
advantages in production, it is only true of industries which can produce more
cheaply than abroad, and in which the foreign manufacturer, protected by a tariff and
aided by a cartel, is satisfied with small profits on his export trade; so that when the
world’s demand is small the difference between the home competitive price and the
import price is not very great. When the world’s demand rises and the competition
of protectionist exporting countries diminishes, the gap of course increases. But as
Dietzel was the first to point out,
743 the difference in price between times of great and
slight demand is generally much greater in protectionist than in free trade countries,
and accordingly even when import prices rise the English monopolist cannot increase
prices to the degree which his protected compeer can. 
(b) There remains the case of commodities in which a monopolist increase in price
is not dependent on this difference between the import price and the low English
competitive price. Where England has natural or historic advantages for production
or a world wide reputation owing to the manufacture of special qualities, no
immediate question arises. Importation would only begin to limit the monopoly price
when home prices were quite exorbitant Long before this point is reached another
fact, the possibility of finding a market, commences to exercise a moderating
influence. Now English monopolist organisations differ from those of Germany and
America in that they are primarily concerned with high grade manufactures, and they
have to reckon with quite different effects on demand of increased prices to those
which result in raw materials and half manufactured goods. In most countries, bodies
like the German potash cartel, the Chilian nitrate cartel, the American petroleum,
borax, and copper trusts, and the monopolist combinations in raw zinc, which on
their own merits, quite apart from tariffs or freights, entirely control the home
market, are all connected with the production of minerals. Provided persons
interested in such branches of production combine, a considerable increase on theHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 204
existing competitive price is usually possible without provoking any appreciable
decrease in demand. The maintenance of the rise of course depends on whether fresh
competition can spring up, and under certain circumstances the increase is only
possible in the early days of a monopoly. But the tendency of cartels and trusts
largely to increase prices without troubling as to any possible fall in demand can be
clearly seen in certain monopolies of raw or only slightly manufactured materials.
The minute investigations of the American Trust Department show that the
Standard Oil Company in fixing their prices, considered the possibility of
competition only and that the idea of causing a disastrous fall in demand by
enormously high prices in undisputed areas never entered their heads. “The evidence
is absolutely conclusive that it is the policy of the Standard Oil Company to take full
advantage of competitive conditions to impose the highest prices possible. Having
a monopoly at home, it has charged such prices as it could thereby extort, and the
American consumer has to pay these prices.”
744 In December, 1904, the same oil cost
in Delaware 7.7 cents per gallon, and in Colorado, where the expense of refining and
selling could not have been more than about 3.5 cents greater, 16.2 cents, carriage
being in both cases excluded. The company had no competition to face, and profited
thereby to increase its price by nearly 100 per cent.
745 Yale tells us
746 that
“independently of any price” the consumption of borax in America is constant. The
Borax Trust accordingly directs its policy solely towards not stimulating outsiders by
its excessive prices to work mines hitherto regarded as worthless. When the German
thorium nitrate manufacturers had monopolised the Brazilian monacite beds, they
combined to raise the price of saltpetre from 34 marks per kilo in 1902 to not less
than 53 marks in 1904.
747 The German potash cartels, in spite of their continually
increasing membership, maintained the price of 80 per cent, chloride of potash,
which sank in 1878 to 9.2 marks, at a yearly average of 14.25 marks from 1896 to
1906.
748 And if we turn to England, we find that the Salt Union on its formation in
1888 forced up the price of ordinary salt from 2s. 6d. to 10s. 6d. a ton,
749 and might
well have maintained this price for a considerable period without affecting demand
had it not provoked fresh competition and over-production.
The Salt Union was, however, an exception. It is the only English industrial
monopoly resting on the natural scarcity of a mineral product, and producing a raw
material the consumption of which would only fall if prices were very high. The vast
majority of English industries which are protected from foreign competition byHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 205
economic advantages manufacture high grade goods and articles of exceptional
excellence or specialities. Every increase of price in such cases is at the risk of a fall
in demand, followed by the increasing consumption of similar goods of poorer
quality. This is especially true in textiles, — one of the chief industries organised on
a monopolist system — the most important of whose seventeen monopolist
combinations we have passed in review. In 1907 the whole English textile trade —
especially the high grade lines — was faced with the unpleasant fact that while raw
materials rose, a corresponding increase in the price of manufactured goods was
impossible if sales were to continue undiminished.
750 The Report of the Sewing
Cotton Co. stated
751 that they “aimed always at holding our trade, and to do this
prices to the consumer could not be put up in proportion to the abnormal prices
secured by the spinners during the last year.” It is, of course, questionable whether
monopolist influence on prices did not have its effect even without such
“proportional” increase, but the possibility of demand falling was clearly considered.
In other commodities the danger is that higher prices will drive consumers to inferior
but cheaper articles. Both the Portland cement trust and the cable cartel have had
clear evidence of this; and probably other monopolist combinations have had similar
disappointments which have not been generally known in public.
752 The experience
of countries which have more trusts and cartels than England bears out the view that
an advantageous increase in price is far more difficult to effect in finishing trades
than in raw materials and half manufactured goods, and that “ a small market and a
high price” is a far less lucrative policy in the former than in the latter, in which the
repressive force of rising prices on the demand is relatively small.
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To sum up the relation of foreign competition to English industrial monopoly. In
England there is no protective tariff, freights from abroad are insignificant, and
minerals which can be easily monopolised and which command a monopoly in the
home market are very few. Hence the formation of a monopoly is far less generally
possible than in Germany or America. Within a small sphere there is no doubt more
or less complete immunity from foreign competition; but even if home competition
can also be suppressed or restricted, the raising of prices by monopoly is more
limited in range, and therefore generally less profitable in results than in countries of
tariffs, high freights and mineral monopolies. This circumstance reacts of course on
the factors which settle whether or not it is possible to suppress home competition.
2. From Adam Smith onwards political economists have pointed out that the fewerHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 206
the competitors, the easier it is for them to combine. The observation is correct; but
it does not at first sight explain why in two industries in which the conditions
favouring the monopolisation of production are otherwise the same the numbers
combining are very different; why, for instance, in one trade 100 persons can form
a cartel, while in another 50 cannot see their way to share the chances of monopoly.
The secret lies in the ratio of existing competition to the advantage to be attained.
The greater the advantage of combination, the earlier a large number of competing
firms will agree to give up their various private interests for the sake of what they can
only achieve by united action, or the sooner a trust maker will resolve to buy up all
rivals even at prices which many of the separate undertakings would never fetch in
the ordinary market. Per contra the smaller the advantage to be derived by each from
a cartel, the smaller the monopoly profit to the trust maker, and the more necessary
if there is to be a monopolist organisation at all that the number of undertakings in
the combine be small. A cartel or trust formed of a very few undertakings may offer
only a relatively small increase in profit compared with a larger operation. On the
other hand it offers the great advantage that only a few persons need decide on
partnership or on the sale of their works. The actual suppression of home competition
turns therefore on the number of manufacturers and the anticipated monopoly
advantages accruing from combination.
754 The estimate formed of this advantage by
the competing firms or the trust maker, as the case may be, depends on the answer
to two questions: What can under favourable circumstances be the monopoly profit,
supposing competition to be restricted to suit existing conditions? and Can this
monopoly profit be maintained in the future, without risk of its decreasing through
the rise of fresh competition?
(a) That in industries protected by high tariffs or freights or based on a natural
monopoly of raw materials a large number of undertakings can under certain
circumstances unite in one organisation has been frequently proved in the history of
monopoly. The clearest example is the German sugar industry.
755 The German sugar
cartel of 1900 (‘Deutsches Zuckersyndicat’ and ‘Syndicat der deutschen
Zuckerraffinerien’) embraced no fewer than 450 refineries, differing very greatly not
only in situation, size and plant, but also in their connection with agriculture, in their
organisation, and so on. All divergencies were, however, sunk in the general desire
to take advantage of the chance of profit offered to a monopoly by the customs and
financial policy of the empire and not to waste it by domestic competition. TheHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 207
combine was accordingly formed. The moment, however, these advantages
disappeared or diminished through the abolition of export bounties and the reduction
of the customs duty under the Brussels Sugar Convention, the cartel collapsed. In
Russia 171 out of the existing 215 refineries formed a similar syndicate in 1887 to
raise by means of import duties and export bounties the prices which over-production
had depressed.
756 Similar motives united an equally considerable number of firms in
the Spirit Ring; and the 96 members of the first coal syndicate in Rhenish Westphalia
in 1893 were induced to abandon competition in order to profit from the protection
given by inland freights by adopting a system of allotted districts.
757 When the
syndicate was renewed in 1903, 100 independent collieries announced their
adhesion.
758 The protected stoneware trade, represented by about 100 firms on the
Saar, the Rhine and in Lorraine, founded in 1899 the Association of German
Stoneware Manufacturers (Vereinigung deutscher Steingutfabriken) which covered
about 97 per cent, of the total output, and straightway carried out a 10 per cent, rise
in prices.
759 The Union of German Wire Nail Makers (Verband deutscher
Drahtstift-fabrikanten) had 81 members at the time of the Kartellenquête and
controlled about 90 per cent, of the output.
760 In America between 1870 and 1872
there were 200 competing petroleum refineries. Enormous profits were to be made
if such industry with its worldwide predominance could legally, or if need be
illegally, be formed into a monopoly by obtaining possession of a large number of
refineries and oil wells. The possibilities overshadowed the difficulties of buying up
so many interests, and according to a recent calculation the American petroleum trust
has acquired not less than 215 undertakings since 1870.
761 In American tobacco it
was partly the position of the trade in the world’s markets and partly the high duties
on cigars which made a trust so attractive. Between 1890 and 1904 the founders of
the trust acquired 180 undertakings,
762 more than half of them between 1899 and
1903, after M’Kinley had reintroduced the high rates which the Wilson tariff had
somewhat reduced. The Pittsburg Coal Co., the great bituminous coal trust of
Pennsylvania, was the result of an amalgamation of 140 competing firms which
exploited the monopolist position of the district.
763 We may add to these instances
one: which we have ourselves had cause to investigate at first hand, the old
Newcastle Vend with 76 to 128 members between 1835 and 1844. As we saw, the
union of this large number of competitors in a cartel was due to their hope of
exploiting the high protection given them in the southern markets by the cost ofHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 208
freights. As soon as this protection diminished, most of the members left the
combine.
The possibility of increasing profits by monopolist association is, as we have
shown, much smaller in England than in Germany or America. And the importance
of the present-day concentration of plant and business interests lies in the degree in
which the steady decrease in the number of competing firms encourages combination
to exploit even small monopoly advantages. Almost without exception English
cartels and trusts have arisen in industries to a certain degree free from foreign
competition and considerably concentrated; while the smaller the profit to be derived
from monopoly the greater the necessity of few competing firms. In the steel trade,
which was at one time very much threatened by foreign competition, the decrease in
competitors had to be very extensive to make a monopoly conceivable, but at the
present time when in each district only a dozen firms at most survive it is a familiar
phenomenon. With textiles it is the opposite. Monopoly in some cases is the result
of the association of thirty to fifty firms, a large number for an English combine. But
textiles were far less subject than heavy steel goods to foreign competition, and
accordingly the difficulties of uniting so many interests were outweighed by the great
advantages promised by a monopoly. One apparent anomaly should be noticed. The
greatest number of undertakings ever included in the original scheme of an English
monopoly was the sixty-four firms of the Salt Union in 1888. Unlike all the other
English cartels and trusts which we have considered, the union exploited mineral
deposits possessing within a very high price limit a monopoly in the home market
against foreign producers, and producing a necessary article of general consumption.
What was hopeless in coal was realised in salt. A coal trust, though likely to gain
large profits from a monopoly, is made impossible by the numerous districts between
which the total production is divided, and the exceptionally large number of
independent collieries. Salt is practically concentrated in a single county, and in the
hands of far fewer makers. But the Salt Union is in this an exception, and an
exception proving the general rule. Though in other countries monopolist
combinations may, in certain circumstances, be formed out of an imposing array of
independent undertakings, in England, under the conditions of production and
distribution which have prevailed for the last thirty years, the advantages of
monopoly can only be exploited by a cartel or trust when the number of competing
undertakings is small, usually not more than a dozen or so.Hermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 209
(b) The degree of advantage does not, however, depend on the immediately existing
number of competitors — which may obviously not remain unchanged. Every
industrial monopoly must from the beginning face the problem whether its enhanced
prices may not call fresh competition into existence, and the answer to this question
in its turn depends very largely on the immediate prospects offered by the trust or
cartel. If they are good, if, for instance, a heavy customs duty can be exploited,
founders will elect to make hay while the sun shines and trouble little about the
impending danger of competition. But if even the initial chance of profit is small, the
probable immediate rise of competition, if profits increase, will much diminish the
readiness of manufacturers to combine. The advantages to be gained, in themselves
small, are hardly worth fighting for if they are but temporary. No doubt the seventy
odd makers of tin plates in S. Wales could come to an understanding which would
produce a certain rise in English and international prices. But as it would be
comparatively easy to start new tin-plate foundries, the capital cost being small, the
permanence of the rise would clearly be doubtful, and there is little inducement to
form a monopoly. In England, where the chances of monopoly profit are in any case
slight, the question, how long competition can be suppressed is specially important
for the would-be monopolist. What are the factors on which his decision rests?
In the first place, the way in which fresh competition will develop. Most foreign
cartels and trusts are either directly based on the monopolisation of raw materials or
indirectly control the raw materials they require. Fresh competition in opposition to
such monopolies must usually produce at higher cost .than the combine; for if the
monopolists control the districts which produce raw material cheaply, are favourably
situated for markets and so on, new competitors must either buy what is left over, the
monopoly not being complete, at higher prices fixed according to the profits of the
combine; or develop dearer and less accessible supplies of raw material; or if they are
engaged in the further manufacture of monopolised raw materials, buy them in the
market instead of producing them themselves. In such cases production is only
possible where the conditions are less favourable, so long as the monopoly price
offers a safe return even to firms working at heavy cost, and so long as the more
favoured undertakings, or in the case of a trust, undertaking, make a surplus profit.
I have tried elsewhere to describe the actual working of this process in the typical
case of the American iron industry in 1905.
764 As was there shown the United States
Steel Corporation found an increasing number of outsiders springing up in variousHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 210
branches of its activity. These produced at a higher cost than the corporation owing
to the comprehensive monopoly of raw materials and the impossibility for various
reasons of a vertical combination, and apart from the over-capitalisation of the trust
were economically in a less favourable position. In the production of pig-iron for
steel outsiders only competed so far as to possess furnaces which worked when
demand was high and were put out when prices were low, as, unlike the trust and the
large “mixed” concerns, they could throw away no profits. They were in fact, as Prof.
Liefmann justly says, reserve factories. Such outsiders are not loved by combines; but
as they produce at higher cost, they are not formidable. They are always in danger of
making a loss at prices which yet pay the combine, and of being forced either to close
down or to submit to the monopolists. In such cases, therefore, the monopoly has
some degree of future security.
But where increased monopoly prices will call forth other undertakings which can
buy their raw materials at the same price as the monopolists, and can produce as
cheaply, the position is very different. In certain circumstances which we shall shortly
see, if existing firms form a monopoly and raise prices, they merely stimulate the
foundation of new concerns which can depress prices again to the basis obtaining
originally without thereby gaining less or losing more than the monopolists. The
latter have accordingly to reckon on the rise of fresh competition capable not only of
existing so long as it shares the monopoly profits, but also while in competition with
the monopolists of keeping its profits low, it may be lower even than those of the
separate firms before combination. It was on the existence of such conditions that the
classical economists based their doctrine of the equalisation of profits. If they, in fact,
always governed industrial monopolies, monopoly could not at the present time exist
in England, for as we have seen, monopolised raw materials are practically
non-existent. They are at any rate unknown in almost all the monopolist organisations
which we have considered. The textile trusts, the steel combinations, the whisky and
industrial spirit makers, the cable cartel, the wall paper trust, and the other
monopolies may all have to face outsiders who — with certain exceptions and apart
from the natural fluctuations of the market — can obtain raw materials and other
necessities for production at the same prices as the combines, and can work them up
in their factories at approximately the same cost. Even in the case of minerals like
salt and cement, the natural supplies are so great that neither the Salt Union nor the
Cement Association ever attempted to monopolise them. Yet all these cartels andHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 211
trusts, and others not here discussed, started with the well-founded expectation of
permanently suppressing competition or at least maintain their existing “incomplete”
monopolies.
A few years ago an authority on American economic conditions, Dr. Vogelstein,
expressed the view
765 that “inelastic capital resources are the point at which
monopoly, pure and simple, and a preponderatingly monopolist economic system
with legal freedom of trade meet.... The possible monopoly of cartels and trusts rests
almost entirely on the natural scarcity and inelasticity of an element of production.”
Whether this generalisation can be legitimately drawn from the position of American
trusts is, as we shall see, doubtful, though most of them certainly fulfil the condition
laid down. For England, the theory is certainly incorrect. The question of a natural
or artificial inelasticity of supply is here quite unimportant, special cases excepted.
In England it is the size and productive power of an undertaking which produces a
tendency to monopoly. The large capital investments which concentration encourages
make the foundation of competing firms increasingly costly and difficult. Further,
and this is perhaps the more important fact, every new competitor fit to keep pace
with the gigantic creations of concentration means such a very large increase in
production that to find a market there must either be an enormous increase in demand
or an immediate drop in prices to a level unprofitable to both the new firm and the
monopolists.
The moment the increase in the productive power of an economically profitable
business outstrips the growth of the demand, the tendency among existing
undertakings to form a monopoly is checked. This has very often occurred in England
where concentration of industrial units, horizontal and even vertical combination
have of recent years immensely increased the capital resources and productive power
of individual undertakings. To compete with firms representing 10, 20, or more per
cent, of the entire output under conditions of production and distribution as
favourable as those which their enormous organisation gives them, requires a
certainty of finding a profitable market for a correspondingly large output. Assuming
that the necessary materials can be acquired at the same cost, any one who can raise
sufficient capital can set up an opposition firm producing at approximately the same
cost. But if demand rises slowly he is digging his own grave. If a combination of
these enormous concerns has further resulted in a trust or cartel, the demands on the
fresh competitor become even more excessive. Even with a monopoly, attempts atHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 212
greater efficiency persist, and sometimes the very size of the combination, witness
the case of the Calico Printers or of Lord Furness’s project, helps to decrease working
expenses by better organisation of production and distribution. Naturally a new
competitor need not by any means be prepared to equal the combine in productive
power, for very possibly some of the combined firms are not of an economically
profitable size. But it must at least be of the same productive power as the firm
working most cheaply, and that alone implies a very great size where an industry is
highly concentrated.
766 And if the advantages of combination have reduced the
average cost of production to the combine to a level below that at which the cheapest
producing firm can work in isolation, the new competitor must produce on a large
enough scale to try conclusions on this basis. He must make his undertaking larger
than the biggest of these combined in the monopoly, and thereby add to the risk of
not being able to find a market for the increased output.
Let us take a hypothetical case.
Case I. — Assume an output of x goods per firm, the actual cost of making being
£7. Assume further a selling price, if there is only one producing firm, of £31, and
that every additional x reduces it by £2. With twelve firms, therefore, the price is £9,
and the addition of a thirteenth firm will drive the price down to the unprofitable
level of £7. Accordingly, twelve firms, producing (12 × x) goods, and selling at £9
would be the largest number that could exist, assuming that no further competition
could arise unless it were possible to sell at a profit. But now let us assume these
twelve firms organise a monopoly, and, by reducing output, force up the price to £11.
At once a new firm can spring up, and without hurting itself reduce the price to £9
again by its additional output. The attempted monopoly has failed; in fact, if the
original twelve firms again put their full output on the market, there will be
overproduction and a general fall of prices to below the cost of manufacture. The
attempt to form a monopoly would therefore be ill advised.
Case II. — Let us now, however, assume that concentration produces an
amalgamation of each group of four firms, each unit, owing to increased efficiency,
producing (4 × x) goods at £24 instead of £28 (4 × £7). On this basis a new comer
will have to produce (4 × x) goods and will in consequence depress prices even more
than before. If, instead of reducing the price by competition to £9 for x goods, the
three new groups formed out of the former twelve firms now combine, a new firm
will not pay till prices reach £15 for x goods. At any lower rate the additional outputHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 213
would drive prices down too low for there to be any profit. At £15 the new supply
would produce a reduction to £7 for x goods, and make a profit of £4, the cost of
manufacturing (4 × x) goods being £24. The unit of manufacture being increased, the
monopolist combination could merrily drive up prices to £13, provided it kept in
mind the danger of fresh competition, and that competition was governed solely by
abstract reasoning.
The actual degree to which the monopoly would be worked depends, of course, on
the amount of output which produces the largest total profit. In case II. the combine
producing at £72 (£24x3) would rather sell (10 × x) goods at £13 per x goods, than
(12 × x) at £9, or (11 × x) at £11, and would regulate its output and price policy
accordingly. Suppose now, demand increased. In principle the position is unchanged.
In case I, with twelve separate firms, if, instead of (12 × x) goods (13 × x) goods
could be sold at £9, a new firm would spring up. In case II the monopolists would
primarily profit by the increase in demand to sell their otherwise unproduced (or
possibly dumped) 11th or 12th x goods at £13, and no fresh competition would arise.
But if demand continued to increase till a 13th x also could be sold at £13, a new firm
would pay, as its additional output of (4 × x) goods would only reduce the price to
£7. So strong a demand would therefore reduce the limit up to which monopoly, with
due regard for security from competition, could raise prices. An understanding with
the outsider would, of course, again enlarge the monoplist’s range.
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It must be remembered that we are only dealing with a tendency, and a tendency not
often realised, if only because the founder of a new undertaking does not always
know in advance what its influence on prices will be, or will not recognise it until
mutual competition degenerates into economic suicide. At the same time not only the
theorist but the student of actual industrial history will find the recognition of this
tendency instructive. We have seen that the formation of monopoly depends largely
on the number of existing manufacturers, and now we see why it did not result
earlier, even where that was small. It is not the absolute number of competing firms
which is decisive, but rather how far they could maintain a monopoly if they
combined. If a relatively small concern is economically profitable, so that a slight
increase in demand or price gives a new competitor a fair chance of existence,
existing makers cannot maintain a monopoly even if they can obtain it. A monopoly
is only conceivable when concentration has steadily increased each single concern’s
share in the total output. Whether the innate tendency of every such concentration toHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 214
lead to monopoly actually develops to the extent that the permanent existence of a
cartel or trust is possible, depends on the degree of concentration and the nature of
the demand. Organisation to exploit its advantages is only attractive if existing
undertakings are so large that for many years it will be unprofitable to set up a fresh
undertaking in spite of an anticipated increase in demand.
In the desire to emphasise the protective effect of concentration, other factors which
have in England worked in the same direction have for the minute been neglected.
It is necessary, therefore, to recall the fact that the trust and cartel movement has
often arisen in industries in which concentration was by no means the only security
for a permanent monopoly. In the salt industry, though monopoly, it is true, first
appears with the expansion of private undertakings resulting from the acquisition of
transport and the consequential concentration, yet there was still a relatively large
number of rival works in existence and the increased monopoly price at once
stimulated further competition. In this rather exceptional case the possible profits of
monopoly were great, and the question of their permanence was therefore of only
secondary importance. Nor must it be forgotten that in a few cases, even in England,
inelastic supplies of the requisites for production — for instance water-power in that
of the Bleachers’ Association — can check competition. The Bleachers’ Association
included more firms (53 in all) than any other of the textile monopolies, and showed
therefore a much smaller degree of concentration than was necessary for most
English trusts and cartels. Finally, the reputation of an established firm, with its own
accustomed makes and regular clientele, or the inherited skill of a special class of
operatives, form in certain circumstances an element in a monopoly which must not
be undervalued. Firms enjoying such advantages can sometimes, even if the
protection of concentration is still insignificant, form a combine without fear of
immediate competition. But the protection of a tradition is immeasurably smaller
than that of inelastic material resources, which makes it hopeless ab initio for a
competitor to obtain what he requires for the purposes of manufacture at the same
price as his antagonist. When the supply of such things, which exercises so much
influence on the erection of monopolies in Germany and America, is so little limited
as in England, the essential protection from fresh competition must lie in
concentration, though naturally even in England subsidiary inducements can
accelerate the day on which concentration will actually result in the formation of a
monopoly.Hermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 215
It remains to draw a few conclusions. The development of cartels and trusts in
English industries is restricted within narrow limits by three facts, the absence of a
protective tariff, the comparative insignificance of freights, and the rarity of slowly
reproduced mineral products likely to form national or international monopolies.
Manufacturers can only set about the monopolist organisation of an industry when
it is free from foreign competition, owing to the lowness of the cost of production,
to the manufacture of special qualities, to traditional dexterity, or to international
agreement. Even in such cases, monopoly is subject to certain conditions. On the one
hand the profit is relatively small, compared with what it is in countries which are not
without the three features mentioned above; and on the other hand the industries
affected are such that their materials can be acquired at equal or even less cost by
others, whereas many of the most important monopolies abroad are in industries
whose materials cannot be multiplied at will, and can be monopolised. Therefore,
even where prices could be raised so far as foreign competition is concerned, a
successful monopoly can only be established when, in the first place, the number of
competing firms is relatively very small; and in the second place, when the rise of
fresh competition, even if prices are good, is either out of the question or only to be
expected after a considerable period. Both conditions can only arise under the
existing industrial organisation after concentration — in other words, when the
number of undertakings decrease while production increases, and the most
satisfactory economic unit can satisfy to an increasing degree the total demand for a
given class of commodities. Concentration of works and undertakings is the
foundation stone of English cartels and trusts. The conditions which made monopoly
possible in other countries, even where concentration was but slightly, if at all,
developed, being wanting in England, until the recent growth of concentration it was
inconceivable. England presents the curious contradiction that, in the days when
cartels were unknown in Germany or America, she had quite a modern cartel in her
coal trade, based on freight advantages. When the rest of the world was being satiated
with cartels and trusts, free trade, the improvement of transit — a very important
factor in so small a country — the transition to the preponderating production of
manufactured goods from imported raw materials and similar causes kept her from
monopoly. The change came gradually after about 1870, in many trades even later,
with the growing tendency of industrial capitalists to concentrate production in a few
undertakings. For those who wish to study the effect on monopoly of thatHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 216
concentration by itself, all other influences being excluded, England now offers the
ideal field of inquiry. There alone it is seen over a whole economic area, with nothing
to obscure its working.
The same tendency must doubtless be counted among the chief factors of
monopolisation in other countries also. But numerous examples show that in those
countries monopolies were conceivable owing to other conditions, even without
concentration, or arose at a comparatively early stage in its development. And further,
given strong concentrating tendencies, their influence is hidden by the ‘ existence of
other conditions of monopoly. For instance, the fact that a Bessemer Steel Rail
Works in America requires an annual output of 400,000 to 600,000 tons to pay, and
that existing concerns had as early as 1903 a theoretical productive power of over
3,000,000 tons, must certainly dissuade people from starting new works. They would
need to be confident of finding a market for the additional output of the new works
not only during a boom but in average years, while in fact in years of depression the
consumption of iron rails often fell far below 3,000,000 tons (1903, 2,100,000 tons;
1908, 1,350,000 only!). This state of affairs must, of course, have aided existing
concerns to maintain a monopoly, but its effect in actual fact was almost entirely
overshadowed by another factor, the monopolist control of the iron ore deposits,
which gives existing undertakings a power that practically precludes the rise of new
Bessemer Steel Works, even if such a thing were in itself profitable.
In other countries commercial policy, transport facilities, the chance existence of
slowly reproducible minerals forming a national or even world-wide monopolies, and
other similar factors not essentially connected with the natural development of
modern industrial capitalism can cause monopoly. Its rise under such conditions is
not peculiar to a certain advanced stage of capitalism. Like the early cartels in
English coal and copper mining, and so many German cartels and American trusts,
such monopolies may be short-lived phenomena vanishing with the disappearance
of some accidental or temporary condition. In England, on the contrary, the creation
of monopoly is directly connected with the most modern development of industrial
capitalism, and is its logical consequence. The recent rise of cartels and trusts must
therefore be regarded as essentially the pure result of that economic law which we
have called the movement towards concentration.
There is no reason why the recently invented international cartels should not
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countries, inasmuch as international agreements have the same practical effect as a
protective tariff. But up till the present time, as we have found, they have only
appeared where concentration was already in a highly advanced stage.
In dealing with the sphere of free competition we traced the possibilities of
concentration in England, its rapid progress in some industries, its complete
non-existence in many, and the probable continuance of that state of affairs in the
near future. We have seen, too, that owing to the absence of those artificial aids
which stimulated it in other countries, concentration developed comparatively late
in England, and that English industry as a whole by no means represents the most
advanced type of combination now in existence.
Very different would the picture be if England broke with the free trade system.
Protection would increase the number of trades in which the creation of monopoly
would depend solely and singly on the amount of home competition. A great many
industries in which at present concentration has very largely reduced the number of
firms, but in which foreign competition has so far prevented a monopolist
combination, would, under a tariff, straightway be in a position to found cartels or
trusts. As it is, many industries threatened by foreign competition now find it easier
than it used to be to suppress home competition; and in proportion as this is so, the
probability that protection would be the last thing requisite for a monopoly increases.
In any case, the prospects of monopoly building in such industries would be much
brighter than in the days when the main problem was to suppress domestic rivals. For
this reason, free trade is much more important as a defence against monopoly than
it used to be. Moreover, duties on half-manufactured goods and raw materials
stimulate vertical combination, and so artificially hasten the tendency to
concentration. Finally, a tariff would, as in other countries, encourage the
monopolistic combination of far more firms than is now possible, because the
attraction of monopoly would grow with the possibility of profiting by the protective
duty, and therefore monopolies would be conceivable in England even where little
or no concentration had taken place. British tariff reformers are so well aware of this
connection that they often desire a protective tariff simply as means to creating trusts
which they consider to be the most advantageous form of industrial organisation —
a view strongly criticised on economic grounds by Prof. von Schulze Gavernitz.
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Whether sound or not, this project has no great influence on the practical
development of English economic policy. It is true that some struggling EnglishHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 218
industries look upon a trust protected by a tariff as the remedy for dumping by
foreign cartels and trusts, but the great bulk of the people, warned of the effect of
trusts on prices by the experience of other countries, display no sympathy with such
schemes, and the argument that trusts and cartels should be “encouraged” by
protective duties will never carry weight with the English masses. Free traders no less
than tariff reformers value the advantages of combination as a matter of organisation;
but they maintain that under free trade alone can monopolist organisations produce
desirable economic results. This opinion finds support among English, German, and
American economists alike. It rests on the argument that under free trade a
monopolist combination cannot aim at raising prices, which must sooner or later
provoke foreign competition, but only at reducing expenses, and thereby increasing
profits. The facts which we have considered, however, show that foreign competition
may be neglected in considering English industrial monopolies entirely in some
cases, and in the rest up to a certain degree. The aim of such combinations is, at least
in part, nothing more nor less than to profit more by freedom from foreign
competition than would be possible if home competition continued unchecked.
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because they result from concentration it is an undoubted characteristic of English
cartels and trusts that by economies and better organisation they produce especially
large reductions in the working expenses of an undertaking. In many cases this may
have been the chief object of the founders of great combines. But that does not alter
the fact that even such combines, if free from foreign competition and strongly
entrenched at home, occupy a monopolist position, which no one prevents them from
using. As we have seen, this commanding position is not so strong, especially in the
matter of prices, and its profits are not so great as in countries with high tariffs or
heavy freights or natural monopolies in minerals. But we have also seen from
examples that it may have effects not in principle different from those of trusts and
cartels in other countries.
It is admittedly a matter of very great difficulty to estimate the effects of English
cartels and trusts on prices. In protected countries import price plus freight and duty
are the measure of monopoly price, and it has been proved that in certain
circumstances a trust or cartel has succeeded in raising the former competitive price
by the whole amount of the duty. But in England prices often stand below the import
price in spite of a monopoly rise, or, again, they develop quite independently of
foreign prices and themselves fix the price in foreign markets, in which case noHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 219
measure of the prices of English monopolists can be gathered from a comparison
with foreign prices; while the absence of accounts of expenses makes it impossible
to compare prices and costs before and after the rise of monopoly. The history of
various cartels and trusts points, however, to the following tendencies.
In the first place, the fixing of prices exclusively by competition is in general
superseded by a more or less entire autonomy of the monopolist combinations, even
where there is no complete monopoly. The decisive factor in prices in the particular
industry affected is the price of the cartel or trust, whose power is no doubt definitely
limited, but whose influence on prices is large and systematic. We find it almost
universally stated in the reports of trade papers and similar documents that
monopolist combinations “raised,” or “reduced,” or “tried to maintain” prices. In
other words, prices no longer depend merely on the results of unrestricted
competition.
In the second place, monopolist combinations usually achieve their avowed aim of
raising prices above competitive prices. For this purpose cartels (for instance, the
Spirit Cartel and the Salt Union) generally adopt the well-known device of assigning
to each member a given quota of the authorised output; looser combinations rely on
agreements to limit production, more particularly when demand falls. The object is
often greater steadiness of prices, but the result is also a higher level of prices than
competition would have allowed.
Finally, monopolist combinations show their influence in the division of markets
so characteristic of trusts and cartels in other countries. In the steel trade we find not
only a division of markets by nations within which there is a fixed normal price, but
also systematically reduced prices for export. Such “dumping” is always possible
where an English monopolist combination sells its products in distant markets, and
therefore, as in the case of the Salt Trust, is protected from reimportation by high
freights. And the history of the Bradford Dyers shows how even that combination
tried to maintain different prices for certain classes of goods in different places
according to the strength of its position.
Such a policy in prices, which is very different from what prevails under
competition, can only be undertaken by monopolist combinations. Nearly all of them
have announced in their prospectuses that “price cutting” would be abolished. Very
often they guaranteed not to use their monopolist position in developing prices, or,
as the Dyers’ Trust expressed it, not to “assume the role of monopolists.” TheHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 220
industrial spirit cartel was represented to be “a quite innocent combination of
manufacturers to prevent the depression of prices.” Similar assurances accompanied
the foundation of every trust that announced its appearance openly. Even Lord
Furness thought it necessary to explain in connection with his projected trust in 1908
that they were not aiming at an “artificial level of prices”; and Messrs. Coats once
declared that they did not intend to get higher prices than those of the separate
undertakings (of which they were in amalgamation), but that marked improvement
in prices must naturally result where they had been unduly (sic) depressed by unfair
and immoderate (sic) competition. Explanations of this kind make it obvious that it
depends solely on the will of the monopolist combinations to put in practice a
monopolist regulation of prices; and who is to guarantee the consumers that when a
large monopoly’s founded, and perhaps over-capitalised, the possibilities of
monopoly will be neglected, and that the interested parties will take advantage only
of the cheapening of production resulting from the amalgamation? It is sufficient to
read the following passage in the report of the Calico Printers’ Trust advocating a
reorganisation after three years’ existence:
“The disadvantages referred to ... make themselves felt in most cases where a
business is converted into a public company, and to a greater degree when a large
number of businesses are combined and sold to the public. The necessity of meeting
outside competition is no longer felt to the same extent, and the incentive to work the
business economically in order to obtain an adequate return on the capital employed
is seriously lessened. Too much reliance is placed on the possibility of obtaining
higher prices, whereas it is in the case of a public company of the greatest importance
to supervise every item of expenditure.” Unfortunately it is not often that a trust is
driven to such admissions about itself. It can only happen when, owing to even
monopolist prices not giving the desired return, efforts must be made to increase
profits by reducing working expenses.
Mr. Macrosty’s contention that the higher prices obtained by English trusts and
cartels can only be attacked if it can be proved that competition prices are healthy
prices seems to me open to criticism. It depends entirely on what “ healthy prices”
as an economic term is to mean. Apart from practical impossibilities there is little to
be gained theoretically by the calculation of the excess of prices over cost of
manufacture to which he pins his faith. Very often we have to deal with a monopoly
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in the survival of the fittest, for the very purpose of saving from sudden extinction
firms which can no longer face the prices produced by competition. In such a case
higher prices would be justified on the basis of normal profits by the higher cost of
production compared with more favoured works. But whether the continued
existence of such firms is economically desirable is no more settled than whether a
nation should or should not preserve its decaying industries by protective duties.
On this ground alone — and others might be added — it seems to me that a general
verdict on the economic effect of the actual prices obtained by English monopolist
organisations is impossible, though there is no doubt of their monopolist trend. And
to my mind its main importance lies rather in the methods adopted than in’ the actual
level of prices reached.
For the first time since the earliest days of capitalism a large section of English
trade has become overrun with monopolist organisations. What in those days rested
on legal privilege, is now, though trade is free, the natural result of economic and
more particularly capitalistic development. The analogy is not complete, for the
monopoly of the present day is not full fledged, but rather competition reduced to
semi-monopoly. Yet it is true to say that at a higher stage of development capitalism
has returned to the form of organisation peculiar to its infancy, with closely similar
results. In the seventeenth century the privileged entrepreneur, the “monopolist,”
regulated prices “at his pleasure.” Now it is the cartel or trust which so far as it can
“fixes” prices in large areas on monopolist lines. Separate rates rule in separate
markets according to the degree of monopoly obtained, just as in the seventeenth
century the monopolists fixed district prices for salt. As in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries the grant of monopolies artificially increased the power of
certain capitalists and forced capital to concentrate by uniting in the hands of a single
person or company the few existing capitalist concerns, so now cartels and trusts
outstrip concentration, and attempt to obtain at once the monopolist advantages to
which concentration would ultimately in the natural course lead. Undertakings spring
up financially dependent on the speculative value of anticipated monopoly profits,
and as hazardous as the old monopolies for whose patents courtiers had paid too
heavily. Again we are faced with the question, Does the consumer or finishing
manufacturer actually benefit by the reduction of cost promised when the monopoly
is started, or is it true, as Davies said in 1641, that “the interests of the subject and the
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long-forgotten problems marks the ebbing of the age of competition whose
everlasting continuation no man doubted for a whole century, and the beginning for
a second time of an age of industrial monopoly.
It is strange that not only the man in the street but the majority of politically and
economically educated Englishmen are so slow to recognise this development. For
nothing is more unpopular in England than any kind of monopoly. Neither the
German consumers of syndicated coal nor the American victims of the Beef Trust
showed half the fury of the peaceable English citizen when told that Mr. Lever
wished to form a soap monopoly. The actual project was not a monopoly at all; but
a few half-penny papers represented it to be so, and the British consumer, believing
what he was told, supported the retailers so manfully that the Lever scheme had to
be abandoned. Clearly a temporary outbreak of the anti-monopolist conscience whose
origin we have already traced to the anti-monopoly agitation of Stuart times.
Generally speaking Englishmen believe in what may be called the “natural”
necessity of competition. The teaching of the classical economists is in their blood.
Not that individualism kept manufacturers from coalition! As we have seen, they
were ready enough for monopoly where there was a prospect of monopoly profit. But
concrete possibilities of monopoly were till lately very rare, and the conservative
mind of the Briton not interested as a manufacturer or consumer remained
incredulous. Even so excellent an economist as the present editor of the ‘ Economist’
still holds that high profits must call forth fresh competition, and cannot reconcile
himself in his book to a belief in the permanency of English monopolist associations.
In 1849 John Stuart Mill, with only a few examples before him, wrote of businesses
“carried on upon so large a scale as to render the liberty of competition almost
illusory,”
770 but Mr. Hirst, for all his great knowledge of modern industrial
conditions, still refuses to recognise that the very size of modern concentrations may
to some extent give them a monopolist position.
On the other hand, the effects of trusts and cartels in England have not been so
marked as to provoke popular opposition, and in consequence they have aroused little
political discussion. In 1908 Sir G. Parker asked in Parliament whether a committee
of enquiry was not desirable, and was informed by the Prime Minister that he was
aware of the existence of such combinations, and that in some cases their effect
might be prejudicial to the public, but that he was not at present prepared to grant an
enquiry. It was no accident that the question came from a conservative tariffHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 223
reformer. It was hoped by pointing to the existence in England of powerful
monopolist combinations “in spite of Free Trade” to destroy a claim which had
hitherto contributed not a little to the popularity of that doctrine. The present majority
in Parliament and the Government
771 do not seem to be inclined to raise such
questions, and many Liberal members connected with cartels and trusts may well
derive some personal comfort from the negative attitude of their party. There have
been no official or Parliamentary reports on English cartels and trusts. In America the
Government have caused detailed enquiry to be made into the Tobacco Trust and its
policy, but no such light has been turned on to the British Tobacco Trust — which
is practically the same concern — or on any other monopolist combination. This may
be because of the narrow limits within which monopoly can regulate prices in
England as compared with America or Germany. But whatever the explanation the
result is that the standpoint which regards all these cases as manifestations of the
same tendency to organise on monopolist lines is only slowly gaining ground.
The nation which was the first to abolish by a great outburst of energy the
restrictions set on the development of free competition in industry still believes that
it has won that freedom for all time. It will, therefore, perhaps be some time before
it too becomes convinced that in large spheres of industrial production a change in




(‘Report of the Select Committee on the State of the Coal Trade.’ House of
Commons, 2nd August, 1836, pp. 7–9.)
It was handed in, and was as follows: Articles of agreement made this day of I^3S,
between the several persons whose names are subscribed, being owners or lessees of
certain collieries within the counties of Northumberland and Durham.
1st. The owners or lessees of each of the undermentioned collieries, will by a
written document appoint a representative, with full powers to act for such colliery,
and to bind the owner or owners during the continuance of this agreement.
2d. That the representative shall have such an acquaintance with the general
management of the concerns, and the money transactions of the colliery he
represents, as to be able at all times to state correctly the quantity of coals sold, and
the price actually received for the chaldron or ton, of both round coals and small, and
shall be responsible for any irregular allowance or other deduction from the price at
which his coals ought to be sold, or for any other violation of either the letter or spirit
of this agreement.
3d. That the owners or lessees shall have the power of changing their
representative, upon giving notice in writing to the chairman.
4th. That a committee for the Tyne, consisting of nine members (selected from the
representatives), shall be appointed by lists to be sent from each colliery, to act for
one year, subject to re-election at the expiration of every 12 months; but though it is
desirable that the committee should consist of the number above stated, for the
purpose of settling the basis for the respective ports and collieries, the committee
shall nevertheless be competent to form among themselves a sub or execute one for
the purpose of carrying the provisions of this agreement into effect, so that such
committee shall not consist of less than three for the Tyne.
5th. That five constitute a quorum, that the votes be taken by ballot, and that the
decision of the majority shall bind the parties to this agreement in all cases, except
where an appeal is allowed.Hermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 225
6th. That the parties to this agreement will adopt the existing basis; for the
collieries, whose quantities are now fixed, till such quantity shall have been objected
to by the committee or the representatives, and finally settled by the referees, and in
settling the quantity to be allowed to any colliery, the committee or referees to be
guided by the powers of working and leading proportion of the different sorts ot coal,
their respective selling prices and facilities of shipment. But that in estimating the
powers of the respective collieries for the purpose of fixing the basis, such portions
of their respective powers as are applied to the producing of coals sold, foreign or
land-sale, shall not be taken into the account.
7th. That impartial reference shall continue to be the great leading principle on
which the arrangements of the trade must be governed, and that it must be applied to
settle the quantities between the different ports or rivers, forming parties to this
agreement, as well as between individual collieries.
8th. That before an appeal be entertained from a river or district, a majority of the
representatives of the collieries of such rivers or district must have declared their
conviction of the propriety of it, and have made such request in writing to the united
committee.
9th. That the dissatisfied river or district shall name their referee, and that the
united committee shall do the same, and that those two gentlemen shall name a third
as umpire, previous to their entering upon the inquiry.
10th. That the whole expense shall be equally divided between the appealing part
and the trade at large.
11th. That the referees shall have power to reduce or to augment the quantity of
such appealing river or district, and such decision shall be final.
12th. That the above principles which are to guide the reference in the case of rivers
or districts, shall be applied to individual collieries appealing from the decision of the
respective committees in the district to which they belong, except that it shall not be
necessary for any individual colliery to obtain leave of the committee of the river to
which it belongs, to make an appeal from their decision.
13th. That as soon as this agreement shall be signed, the rivers and districts shall
be at liberty to appeal to the present united committee, but in case no appeal is made
previous to the commencement of 1836, that then no change of basis as between the
rivers or districts shall take place, except at the commencement of each year, and then
only in case the river or district shall have given four months’ notice to the thenHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 226
existing united committee of their intention to make such appeal.
14th. That in the case of individual collieries, they shall be at liberty to appeal also
as soon as the agreement shall have been signed; but in case no appeal is made
previous to the commencement of 1836, then no change of basis shall be made
except at the termination of any six months, and then only on the representative of
such colliery giving three months’ notice previous to the ist day of January and the
1st day of July in any year to the respective committees of his intention to make such
appeal.
15th. That the decision of the referees shall take effect in the case of rivers or
districts from the commencement of the year, in the case of individual collieries from
the commencement of the six months succeeding the period when he shall have given
such notice.
16th. That the committee or referees shall have power to summon the parties to this
agreement, or their agents, to answer any interrogatories, and to produce any
documents necessary to enable them to give full effect to this agreement, but such
power not to justify calling for the private accounts of the colliery.
17th. That the parties so summoned shall, for non-attendance or refusal to answer
or produce such documents, forfeit £20, to be returned only in cases where an appeal
to a general meeting of representatives the majority shall decide in favour of the party
appealing, the committee at such meeting not to vote upon the appeal against their
decision; the votes at such meeting to be taken by ballot.
18th. That the relative prices of every description of coal be fixed by the committee
and the representatives of each colliery, subject to an appeal to referees.
19th. That no colliery, without leave of the committee, shall vary the fixed price
agreed on between such colliery and the committee, as the selling price of that
colliery, under a penalty of 53. for every chaldron so sold, subject to an appeal to
referees in case of dispute.
20th. The committee in concert with the committee of the Wear and Tees, and the
other parties to this agreement, shall make such issues of round coal from time to
time, as may be necessary to meet the demand.
21st. Any colliery where particular difficulties of shipment may be reasonably
apprehended at particular seasons of the year, or other causes, may be allowed such
quantity, from time to time, in anticipation thereof, as the committee shall deem
proper; any colliery thinking itself aggrieved by the refusal of such leave, the claimHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 227
to be decided by reference.
22d. All coal to be sold by weight, either by the ton of 20 cwt. or the chaldron of
53 cwt.; any colliery found by the inspector giving over-weight to be fined 2s. 6d. for
each and every cwt. of excess on an average of 10 waggons; every colliery to have
a weighing machine, in proper order, in a convenient situation, under a penalty of
£20.
23d. Any colliery exceeding the issue beyond 100 chaldrons, or 2 per cent, upon the
basis, to finish a ship, shall forfeit for every chaldron so exceeding 53., and such
excess shall also be deducted from the issue to the colliery for the next month.
24th. That each party shall deposit, in the hands of trustees, a promissory note,
payable on demand, to the amount of £20 per 1,000 on its respective basis, as a
security for the payment of fines and the general performance of this agreement, the
committee to fix the amount of fines in every case not specially provided for; the
trustees to consist of the chairman and the committee.
25th. That the inspectors of the Tyne, Wear and Tees, shall, as often as the
committee of either river may deem it expedient, examine together the measure of
all the collieries of the different ports comprehended under this agreement, that the
weight per chaldron may be kept moderate and uniform, as provided in rule 22d.
26th. No freighting or upholding freights or prices to be permitted without
permission from the committee of the river or district in which the respective
collieries are situated under a penalty of 5s. per chaldron on the quantity of coals so
vended, subject to reference.
27th. That all the parties to this agreement shall strictly adhere to such regulations
as to the sale of coals in London by the coal-factors as the united committee shall,
from time to time, agree upon.
28th. That if, at any time, during the continuance of this agreement, the united
committees shall deem it expedient, for any temporary purpose, to grant an additional
issue of coals to the markets upon the coast, they shall have power to do so under
such modifications and upon such terms as they may consider expedient.
29th. That it be imperative on the committee to enforce the penalties incurred under
this agreement, and collect the same once a month, and pay the same to the
Newcastle secretary for the general purposes of the trade.
30th. This agreement to commence on the 30th day of January 1836, and to
continue from year to year, during the pleasure of the parties hereto, any of whomHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 228
may withdraw, on giving six months’ notice, in writing, to the united committee
previous to the end of any year after the first year, and thus terminate this agreement.
31st. If circumstances should arise to render it expedient that this agreement should
terminate otherwise than before provided for, and that, at a meeting of the
representatives of the three rivers, and the other parties to this agreement, called for
that purpose, four-fifths of the parties hereto shall so think it expedient, then this
agreement shall terminate.
32d. No party to be bound by signing these rules until they shall have been agreed
to and signed by the proprietors of every colliery upon the Tyne, and until the
coal-owners of the Wear, Seaham, Tees, Hartley, Cowpen and Netherton, shall have
signified their willingness to act in concert with the Tyne committee upon the general
principles of this agreement.
33d. That in case any difference of opinion should arise between the respective
committees, or any individual coalowner and the committee of the district to which
he belongs, upon the construction of any of the above articles, or upon any other
point not herein provided for, that the same shall be submitted to reference..,
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(Report of the Eighth Annual Ordinary General Meeting of the Shareholders of
Richardsons, Westgarth & Co. Ld. Held on Tuesday, 29th Dec. 1908).
The usual routine with regard to our annual meeting has this year been interfered
with on account of a proposal which has been made to your Directors for the
amalgamation of our business with those of several other engine building firms on
this coast. I may at once say that I was in no way responsible for the proposal, and am
neither directly nor indirectly interested in the scheme except as your chairman and
as a shareholder in your Company, but the commercial possibilities of such an
amalgamation are in the opinion of your Directors so important, that we feel it our
duty, even at the sacrifice of very considerable time, to investigate the position
thoroughly and to take part in what are proving to be very prolonged negotiations.
You will, I know, agree with me that the past year has been one of the most
disastrous in the annals of the North-East Coast, involving as it did the practical
stoppage of the engineering industry for no less than seven months by the engineers’
strike, this in our own case being preceded by partial stoppage and complete
disorganisation owing to sectional strikes in the shipyards. We have lost, in fact, an
entire year, and the immense efforts we have made in laboriously building up
additional branches to our business by the creation of new departments for the
manufacture of steam turbines, pumping machinery, steel works’ equipment and
electric installations, have been ruthlessly upset by one of the most ill-advised and
calamitous strikes on record. The general public have grown so accustomed to the
continuous succession of strikes that nothing short of the stoppage of the nation’s
railway system or coal supply creates more than ordinary interest, but the alarming
fact remains that British industries are being jeopardised and British capital destroyed
to an extent unparalleled in British industrial history. Take our own case as an
example. We have three works, in Hartlepool, Middlesbrough, and Sunderland, with
staffs of highly trained technical experts for the conduct and development of our
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draughtsmen complete in itself. To supervise the actual manufacture there is a further
organisation of works managers, departmental foremen and assistants, and in addition
the usual commercial and clerical staffs, numbering in all some 250 men, whose
services cannot, of course, be dispensed with the moment the general body of
employé’s decide to go out on strike. At the commencement of the strike it also
happened that we had an unusual number of important contracts in process of
erection in various parts of the kingdom, and at a stroke everything was brought to
a complete stoppage, this being followed by the virtual paralysis of our entire
business for seven weary months, each successive month bringing possibilities of
settlement by various proposals, including the intervention of the Board of Trade,
whose good offices were so flouted by the men as to result in the resignation of Mr.
Barnes, the General Secretary of the Amalgamated Engineers’ Society. For ourselves,
we were compelled to see our profits turned into losses, grass actually growing in our
yards, our customers disappointed and disgusted, and our prospective business
brought to a dead standstill by reason of our inability to accept orders. In the town,
as you know, men were brought to beggary, women and children to the verge of
starvation, and tradesmen’s savings reduced almost to vanishing point. This, then, is
the sorry picture of a strike for which there was no justification whatever and which
was blindly persisted in notwithstanding many friendly efforts, including those of a
Cabinet Minister and the men’s leaders.
We are still among the wreckage, but let us hope that this epidemic of strikes is
over, for otherwise it will be quite impossible to maintain the prosperity which has
hitherto been associated with the engineering industry on this coast. Indeed, even
with a mutual desire to recover lost ground, it is problematical whether we can do so
unless we adopt methods by which the cost of production can be reduced by the
elimination of wastage. The position we have to face is one of intense competition,
and what that competition means is well illustrated by the fact that our once highly
remunerative forge department, together with many others in the district, is now
practically closed, as we can obtain forgings at considerably lower prices than we can
either produce them ourselves or buy them in this country. This competition will
surely spread to other departments unless we adopt wise measures, and the points we
must always keep prominently in view are — that there must be no strikes, that
greater individual interest must be taken in the day’s work, that contract dates must
be kept and the confidence of buyers restored, and that the cost of production mustHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 231
be reduced.
If commercial success is to be achieved by any scheme of amalgamation, however,
it is obvious that it can only result from increasing the excellence of our
manufactures and decreasing the cost of their production. Any attempt at artificially
creating a range of selling prices higher than the market standard prevailing at any
given time is foredoomed to failure, as we should deservedly lose our trade by
sacrificing the goodwill of our friends and customers. The one objective must,
therefore, be to beneficially influence the shipbuilding industry by supplying
machinery at prices which will compare favourably with those of other competing
centres, and at the same time secure, if possible, a fair manufacturing profit. It is
unquestionable that marine engine building presents an ideal proposition for the
application of such a scheme, and if it becomes an accomplished fact and is carried
out with an enthusiastic determination to make it a great success, then, in my opinion,
it cannot fail to have a favourable and permanent influence on the shipbuilding
industry on this coast.
Experience has shown that the highest success in any manufacture can only be
obtained by specialised production in large quantities under expert management. The
production of marine machinery, and the mass of detail in particular connection
therewith, involves so many trades each requiring a separate department, that
specialised production in bulk under highly concentrated management becomes
practically impossible for the average engine builder; but under an adequate scheme
of amalgamation the entire proposition is simplified and is feasibly desirable. For
example, the firms considering this scheme have, during the past seven years,
supplied complete engine equipment to 1206 steam-ships, having an aggregate
horse-power of 2,150,000. The detail alone in connection with the yearly output of
172 sets of machinery is enormous, and were it standardised and manufactured under
modern conditions, profits would be obtained which, under the present conditions,
are quite impossible.
In view of the highly progressive nature, not only of the manufacture of marine and
other machinery but also of its design, every single builder is now constantly face to
face with heavy expenditures for plant in order to keep pace with the times. Take
another example: since this Company was formed, seven years ago, we have spent
.£133,000 in new machinery and buildings, besides another ,£140,000 or thereabouts
in maintaining our three works in a high state of efficiency, this expenditure beingHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 232
entirely apart from the cost of our turbine works, which are practically independent
and constitute what is to us an entirely new business, and which have involved an
outlay of fully .£50,000. We are, of course, not alone in this expenditure, as all firms
recognise that it is necessary for their very existence, and, heavy as it is now, it will
undoubtedly become more so in the future by reason of the ever-increasing severity
of competition throughout the industrial world. By amalgamating several of these big
businesses, however, and localising, as far as practically possible, the manufacture
of standard details, this enormous aggregate expenditure could either be very greatly
reduced or, if spent as freely as at present, would inevitably result in far greater
profit-earning capacity. This is to my mind the most important requirement of the
present-day engineering manufacture. Experience has proved beyond question that
in order to exist at all every engine manufacturer must, no matter how well his works
may be equipped at present, continue to spend money very freely, and the essence of
the contemplated scheme of amalgamation is to spend that money in such a manner
as will enable a united body of manufacturers to meet competition with far greater
success than is possible as independent units, each repeating the others’ work in a
fashion which, in years to come, will be regarded as tantamount to commercial
suicide. The suggested amalgamation is therefore a commercial proposition of the
first order, its anticipated effect being to conserve and ultimately to considerably
enhance the value of the capital embarked in the industry, an effect which will apply
equally to all the capital invested in engineering works on this coast. This is possible
because an amalgamation offers facilities for the high development of an organisation
on commercial, technical, and practical lines quite beyond those afforded by
independent competitive units. Of course, any scheme of amalgamation decreases
internal competition and automatic benefit would accrue under that head, but it
would be a mere bye-product in comparison with the central aim and object, viz.:
decreased cost of production. It would, of course, require time and immense energy
on the part of everyone concerned to organise the new departure, but there would be
compensation in the fact that the energy would be centred in the useful channel of
progressive construction rather than in competitive destruction, and, therefore, it
would beget that enthusiasm which is invariably associated with success.
It is a pertinent fact that all the firms on the coast buy many details in this country
cheaper than they themselves can produce them, and yet the manufacturers of these
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and concentrated management. Again, we all make details which cost us just as much
as we could buy them for, and we content ourselves with the thought that they
contribute their quota to our working expenses. To obtain the profits we now lose,
however, is only possible if the scheme of amalgamation is sufficiently large, so that
unless all the firms at present interested in the matter are in agreement it cannot be
carried through.
Under the present system engines and boilers are built by each of the firms to the
requirements of the several classifications, and whilst the average result of each
firm’s productions closely approximates that obtained by the others, yet each builder
has some points of excellence, either in design, method of manufacture, arrangement
of parts, quality of material or of workmanship, which in combination would yield
greater excellence, and being reflected in the higher general efficiency of the entire
machinery, would tend to place British construction on a higher plane in the markets
of the world. Again, each firm has an expensive staff, producing designs practically
identical with those of its competitors, as well as pattern-shops producing equally
identical patterns. The useless expenditure under these two heads alone may be
estimated from the fact that the designs and patterns for a cargo boat’s engines cost
about £500 to produce, and for passenger steamers a correspondingly higher figure.
It is impossible for me to enumerate within the limits of a speech all the sources of
economy that are open to such an amalgamation, but its possibilities are sufficiently
indicated if you consider the matter on its broad lines. The adoption of a single
scheme of buying under the control of the commercial directors would alone tend to
a considerable diminution in first cost.
With regard to the works, one system of organisation would be established, all
antiquated tools would be replaced, and the latest methods of manufacture adopted.
Overtime, which is at all times highly expensive, would be abolished as far as
manufacturing conditions permitted, and night-shift at high rates of pay only resorted
to when it was warranted by the conditions of trade and obtainable prices — the
productive capacity of the whole of the works acting in union would in all ordinary
circumstances dispel the conditions which lead the individual to resort to overtime.
Broadly, the leading principle would be to limit the working hours to the standard
length of the working week and to divide the work amongst the various shops to that
end — an arrangement, one would suppose, that would be as satisfactory to the
workmen as it would undoubtedly be to the employers.Hermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 234
An important advantage to the shipbuilders would result from contract deliveries
being strictly maintained, as in the event of local pressure relief could always be
given by one or other of the amalgamated works. There would also be no reason why
ships should not always be engined in the port in which they are built, as the same
standard of workmanship would prevail in each of the amalgamated works. Last year
the expenses incurred in this connection alone amounted approximately to £18,000
for insurance, towage, etc., all of which represents unnecessary cost, apart altogether
from the loss involved by the delay in completion consequent on the ship’s absence
in a distant port for approximately a fortnight.
It is intended to retain the identity of the several firms as at present, and each firm
would therefore trade under the name upon which its business has been built up, and
by which its productions are known and celebrated the world over. Moreover, the
local boards of management would continue and the executive staffs would be
retained, as only by their united efforts could the new scheme of organisation be
developed with despatch and success.
I would again emphasise the fact that I am simply putting before you the
proposition which has been put before your Directors, and before all the firms
interested in this matter, and it is only by force of circumstances and not by intention
that it falls to my lot to give public expression to the views which prompted any of
us to give the scheme our consideration. I am convinced, however, that if we are to
advance our industries and protect the capital invested in them we must recognise
facts and modernise our methods, and in dealing with this scheme we must also
endeavour to sink personal considerations of every kind. We cannot but realise that
the industrial world is advancing at a pace unparalleled in its history. To have been
told ten years ago, or even five years ago, that Japan would be building, and building
with the greatest success, her “Dreadnoughts,” her fast torpedo boat destroyers, and
her 23-knot passenger liners, would have been regarded as a dream, yet they are
accomplished facts. Continental competition is also, as you know, increasing by leaps
and bounds, but in spite of all I am convinced that we can hold our own, nay more
than hold our own, if we will but shake off the incubus of our stereotyped industrial
methods. In Germany, which is in the forefront of industrial progress, there are some
hundreds of amalgamations of one kind and another, so there it has been amply
demonstrated that the secret of commercial success lies in a policy of combined
effort. At this stage I cannot say whether the scheme will mature or not; if it does itHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 235
will involve an adjustment of our capital to a basis which, it has been decided, shall
be the standard basis for every firm, although on that point I am unable, and it is
altogether unnecessary that I should say more on the present occasion. Your Board
propose to you that this meeting shall stand adjourned until a convenient date, and
that in the meantime you will patiently await the maturing of the negotiations that are
now afoot, relying upon the ability and zeal of your Directors to safeguard and
protect your interests in every possible way, and as soon as the negotiations are





(Ridley’s ‘Wine and Spirit Trade Circular,’ 8th Nov. 1907, pp. 828–9.)
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Under the above title a “Trust” — as some people may be inclined to dub such an
association nowadays — has been formed, through the hands of which will pass all
the spirits sold for methylation or for use for industrial purposes, by the following
firms:
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
London: J. & W. Nicholson & Co., Limited; Hammersmith
Distillery Co., Limited (Haig & Co.).
Liverpool: Preston’s Liverpool Distillery Co., Limited; A. Walker & Co., Vauxhall
(now merged in the Distillers’ Company, Limited). Bristol: Bristol Distilling Co.,
Limited.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Bo’ness: Jas. Calder & Co., Limited. 
Edinburgh: The Distillers’ Company, Limited.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Belfast: United Distilleries, Limited.
The only firm manufacturing spirits for industrial purposes which is absent from
the above Combine as shareholders is that of Messrs. King, Howman & Co., Limited,
Derby; but an arrangement has been made under which all their output, which is not
very considerable, will pass through the hands of the new distributing centre. The
secretary is Mr. C. Honeywill, and his firm, Messrs. Honeywill Brothers, of Mark
Lane, London, E.G., will act as agents for the Company.Hermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 237
This Combine is perhaps in some ways the most important movement which has
ever taken place in the spirit trade, and viewed in conjunction with the drift in
Scotland and Ireland towards a “Trust” of all the manufacture for beverage purposes
of spirits by the patent still process, must be accepted, for good or evil, as another
step towards a gigantic spirit trust, embracing the manufacture of patent still spirits
in the three kingdoms.
The Combine may partly have originated in the competition, which from time to
time has existed, of the methylators among themselves, which competition was
accentuated and aggravated by the fact that every now and then, when a surplus of
grain spirit had to be got rid of in Belfast and in Scotland, not to speak of Liverpool
and Bristol, and the surplus was generally placed by a cut under the figure at which
the regular makers would quote. The whole difficulty, competition, or whatever it
may be called, has now been accommodated by those who caused the trouble having
been admitted into the Combine, and receiving shares in it, their fraction having, of
course, to come out of the share of the regular makers of the old informal association.
In its immediate effects upon trade profits in the methylated business the new move
is to be commended in the interest of all concerned. The methylator will have to
compete as usual, but he will not have to compete with a rival who has bought his
spirit at less money.
The Company is not a Company for profit; profit must be made or not made at the
distillery. It is purely a distributing concern at a price to be fixed, from which there
is to be no departure to any individual buyer, no matter how large the purchases of
that individual methylator or manufacturer may be.
The advantages of such a combination are obvious. In the first place, as just
mentioned, a uniform price is ensured; secondly, a great saving of carriage is made.
It will be at once seen, that to have the nearest outlet for the spirit appropriated to the
particular distillery which can with least carriage serve the customer must mean a
great saving on the whole to the Combine. It will be none of the members’ interest
to increase, at the expense of another member of the Company, their output; that is
defined by the proportion of orders to which the member is entitled to by his share
in the Company.
It will at once be asked by those who know anything of the methylating trade, what
provision has been made for dealing with those distillers who themselves methylate
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who had to pay a commission to the agents on sales to the methylators or
manufacturers. This has been met by providing in the Articles of Association for the
payment into the Company’s funds, by the distillers who methylate, of a sum per
gallon equal to the selling commission payable by the Combine to the agents.
The point just mentioned is the only resemblance to the well-known “pooling”
process, by which those who sold more, paid into, aid those who sold less than their
proportion received, out of the “pod,” so much per gallon.
That the Industrial Spirit Supply Company is in itself apparently not a formidable
engine of capitalism would seem to be shown by its registered capital being £1000
in twenty shares of £50 each, in fact, as at present constituted, it is merely an
invoicing office, through which all the output of spirits sold by the above-named
distillers for methylating or manufacturing purposes must pass. We share then the
declared opinion of the promoters that it is at present a most innocent association of
manufacturers formed to prevent undercutting of prices, and to afford buyers of
spirits for industrial purposes a guarantee that there is no lower price than the one at
which they are buying.
It will be able to regulate the inflow and outflow of spirits, with Messrs.
Honeywill’s hands, as it were, on the tap, so that the possible inroad of the German
Centrale may be controlled, by a fall in tie price on the one hand, if that Spirit Ring
wants to send in spirits here, or be provided with spirits from this side, if the surplus
here, and the price over there, warrant the shipment to the Continent of British spirits.
While we indicate above that apparently the general effect, it present, of the new
Supply Combine will be of benefit to the traders concerned, we cannot conceal the
view which must present itself lo the mind of those who have studied the question
of monopolies, that they always begin by disclaiming any intention of, at any time,
bearing hardly on those whom they supply, and thereby bearing hardly on the
dependent industries, and finally on the public. We know of a certain place the way
to which is paved with good intentions, and we cannot but foresee that this monopoly
within another nearly organised monopoly, may turn out ultimately of anything but
advantage to the industries which may be concerned in the production and
distribution of industrial and methylated spirits.
Fortunately, perhaps, for those branches of our national commerce which have to
look to supplies of cheap alcohol in competition with Germany in particular, where
the alcohol used for purposes other than drinking is subsidised and thus renderedHermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition, 239
artificially cheap for the industries using it, and for consumption for motive power,
lighting and heating purposes, we, in order to enable our manufacturers to compete,
have lately granted the same drawback to spirits industrially used as to those
exported.
As the new Combine heralds an approaching rise in the price of industrial spirits,
we see foreshadowed in this a movement which might become dangerous, if the
distillers should become too desirous of profit. Happily, however, there is a constant
check at present existing in the German article, which will be always on the watch
to come in if the price here of the British article is unduly pushed upwards. At
present, the Combine would be quite safe at some pence higher, but it is quite likely
that in another six months to a year the volume of German production may again
bring down the figure over there to a dangerously low point. However, a move up or
down becomes now a matter of twenty-four hours with the central bureau of the new
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